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Performing Indigenous Well-Being:  
Historical and Political Geographies of Canada’s Community Well-Being Index 
 
Noah Laser Cannon, M.Sc. 
 
Set against the view that development indices provide objective assessments of the human 
condition, in this research, I demonstrate that indices are deeply political and emerge from 
specific and embodied histories and geographies. This study traces the emergence and 
subsequent politics of the “Community Well Being Index,” hereafter the CWB, an index 
designed to measure the conditions of Indigenous communities in Canada that was developed in 
the early 2000s by researchers at the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in 
collaboration with social scientists at the University of Western Ontario. Drawing theoretical 
contributions from performativity scholars, as well as postcolonial, settler colonial and critical 
development literatures, my research explores how the index, as a historically, socially, 
technologically contingent tool, actually produces the world it sets out to measure. Through 
analysis of interviews with designers and users of the index, observation of its presentation, and 
a review of official documents in which the index is elaborated, I trace the multiple and at times 
contradictory ways in which the CWB has come to matter in shaping development common-
sense, constituting Indigenous subjectivities and allocating responsibility surrounding 
development interventions. I contend that, notwithstanding its use in advocating for the 
improvement of Indigenous peoples’ socio-economic conditions, the index is part of a settler 
policy and bureaucratic performance that predominantly serves to narrow the development 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 In November of 2017, Tom Flanagan, a well-known conservative pundit and former 
political science professor at the University of Calgary, appeared on the Ontario public broadcast 
network’s prominent current affairs program The Agenda to put forth a prescription for First 
Nations’ community development based on his latest social indicator research.1 Half-way into 
the half-hour show, organized as a debate between two teams of experts on Indigenous well-
being, the host, Steve Paikin, asked Flanagan whether he was willing to “...acknowledge the 
terrible history they [Indigenous peoples] have endured in this country.” Flanagan responds, 
“Yes, I will. But I also want to look towards the future.” He then made his pitch:  
I’ve been looking at those that are doing better demonstrably according to [the Community 
Well-Being Index], looking for the common features [of successful communities]. And what I 
find is traits like taking advantage of the ‘off ramps’ [from the Indian Act], taking control of 
local affairs, taking advantage of economic opportunities; for some you could almost call it 
‘community capitalism’, engaging in business through their band government as the owner... I 
think we can all learn from the progress that is being made on the ground. 
Looking to establish common ground between the debaters, Paikin turns to Suzanne Stewart, 
Director of the Waakebiness-Bryce Institute for Indigenous Health at University of Toronto, to 
 
1 Throughout this thesis I use the term “Indigenous” to refer to the peoples whose ancestry is that of pre-colonial 
occupants of the territory that is now known as Canada. Less often, I use the term “Aboriginal”, which, like 
“Indigenous”, is an umbrella term. However, Aboriginal is used by the Canadian government to refer collectively to 
three Indigenous taxonomies established through processes of early colonization and tied to conceptions of race: 
First Nation (formerly “Indian”, a colonial misnomer that is further divided into status/non-status according to 
whether individuals are registered under the Indian Act), Inuit and Metis. I reserve its use for those circumstances 
related to the Canadian government including state-led organizations, the research-state nexus, or in reference to 
research-policy projects, such as “Aboriginal well-being”. At times I also use the term “Native”, or “Indian” where 
it has been used in the literature, (e.g. when using a quote from the literature) with an understanding that these terms 
are also linked to colonial tropes and misnomers and are not self-determined. 
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ask whether she agrees that “significant demonstrable progress is being made today”. Stewart 
replies,  
Well I guess that depends on how you define progress and who is defining it... The social 
determinants of health, or these indexes for measuring wellness don’t really fit for Indigenous 
people. Because Indigenous peoples have a different history, have a different culture, have a 
different identity and have different definitions [of well-being and success]. If we want to 
really talk about how to measure wellness or success in Indigenous communities, we need to 
define wellness and success from Indigenous paradigms.  
I begin with this vignette because it illustrates the disparities in systems of knowledge production 
and highlights the role of development indices in shaping and disseminating Indigenous-specific 
development discourses in what is commonly considered Canada. On the one hand, Flanagan’s 
expertise draws on a well-being index constructed from Census data and provides generalizable 
and comparable knowledge to generate lessons about progress through numerically evaluated 
“success” stories, stories which can ostensibly be replicated across the particular historical and 
geographical context of the targeted communities (i.e. dissemination of governance “best 
practices”). In contrast, Stewart rejects a universalizing view of success and instead speaks to the 
significance of specific histories, cultures and identities in producing relevant definitions of well-
being, and most importantly to the necessity that Indigenous perspectives guide these definitions. 
This exchange reveals part of a much broader struggle in which the stakes are very high indeed: 
control over what it means to live a fulfilling life, and how this meaning is operationalized 
through efforts to (re)order the relations and structures of settler and Indigenous societies. This 
struggle over meaning and material relations can be traced back to early colonial legislation, 
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such as the 1857 Gradual Civilization Act,2 long before development indicators existed, or even 
before statistical tools were used to measure and document the gap in socio-economic conditions 
of Indigenous and settler “populations”.3 With the emergence of Indigenous-specific 
development indices in the late 1990s—culminating in the Community Well-Being Index 
(CWB) that Flanagan deploys in the introductory example—and their proliferation in policy and 
decision making processes, it is critical to examine the role these indices play in this ongoing 
struggle and to ask how, why and to whom these types of indices have come to matter. 
 This thesis uses the CWB as a case study to explore the politics and power relations in 
the knowledge production cultures and practices of quantitative expertise and to consider how 
such politics play out through development discourse and questions of governance in 
Indigenous–settler relations. While indicator research emerged as a field of social science to 
produce knowledge in support of the interests and demands of a Keynesian welfare state, since 
the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s, these quantitative technologies have become key to the 
dissemination of audit culture and to the management of civic society and the state (Merry, 2016; 
Shore & Wright, 2015; Sirgy et al., 2006; Strathern, 2000).4 Anthropologist Sally Engle-Merry 
 
2 The Act's formal title is: An Act to encourage the gradual civilization of the Indian tribes in this province, and to 
amend the laws respecting Indians (1857). It was later consolidated into the Indian Act in 1876 along with various 
other laws targeting Indigenous peoples. Among other things the Gradual Civilization Act created a process termed 
“enfranchisement”, through which Indigenous men over the age of 21 were ‘rewarded’ with the benefits of 
citizenship, such as individual parcels of land fractured from the ‘lands held in trust for Indians’ as outlined in the 
1763 Royal Proclamation. Enfranchisement required that potential candidates prove to the colonial administration 
that they were “civilized” enough to earn the rewards of citizenship. For instance, men capable of writing in either 
English or French were eligible. However, those unable to write, but who could speak English or French could go 
through a three-year probation period to earn eligibility by demonstrating that they were “of sober and industrious 
habits, free from debt and sufficiently intelligent to be capable of managing his own affairs” (p. 2 Clause IV). 
3 Efforts to document the gap in socio-economic conditions between Indigenous and settler “populations” began in 
the Post-WWII era of “Indian policy” and the Canadian state’s “community development” initiative, which was seen 
as a means to achieve the official objective of Indigenous peoples’ integration into settler society and economy 
(Shewell, 2004). The most well-known of these efforts included the 1966 Hawthorn Report (Hawthorn, 1966) and 
decades later the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP, 1996). 
4 Shore and Wright (2015) define audit culture as “the process by which the principles and techniques of 
accountancy and financial management are applied to the governance of people and organizations – and, more 
importantly, the social and cultural consequences of that translation” (p. 24). 
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(2016) contends that, as categorized numbers arranged to represent complex social phenomena, 
the seductive power of indicators lies in their ability to “convey an aura of objective truth and 
authority despite the extensive interpretive work that goes into their construction” (p. 1). They 
are routinely used to promote self-governance and influence behaviors among the governed 
(including individuals, organizations and nations) by dictating the standards for improvement 
and measuring compliance (Merry, 2011). Further, indicators play a critical and often overlooked 
role in the contest to stabilize particular “common sense” (i.e. hegemonic) visions of 
development; they serve as a proxy for development and justify expert interventions and the 
application of technocratic knowledge in the quest for improvement (Uribe, 2015).5 In this 
regard, indicators do more than simply reflect the existing or external realities that they seek to 
represent, instead working to produce them, in part by producing subjectivities, ordering 
relations, and shaping people’s beliefs and actions.  
 While there is a burgeoning interdisciplinary body of literature critically investigating the 
work of indicators, little attention has been paid to the roles and effects of indicators used in the 
context of Indigenous development within a settler society, for example Salée (2006) and Walter 
and Andersen (2013). My research examines the making and subsequent politics of the CWB 
produced in the name of improving Indigenous peoples’ well-being in Canada. Cast loosely in 
 
5 Davis, Kingsbury, & Merry (2012) define an indicator as: “... a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports 
to represent the past or projected performance of different units. The data are generated through a process that 
simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed form, are 
capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as countries, institutions, or corporations), 
synchronically or over time, and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards” (p. 73–74). I 
am drawn to this definition for its attention not only to an indicator’s structure, but also to the processes of its 
creation and the work that an indicator sets out to accomplish—rather than merely presenting indicators as tools to 
produce a statistical reflection of existing phenomena. While I have come across other compelling definitions in the 
social indicator literature, I feel a particular affinity with the Davis et al. (2012) definition as it shares a focus on 
investigating the role of indicators as an emerging technology of governance. As a final note on terminology, the 
focus of my study is a “composite index” (the CWB), meaning the index merges and weights multiple pre-
established indicators to form a new statistical assemblage. That said, I generally use the term indicator, rather than 
index, as a descriptor of the CWB’s broader network—for example, I refer to “indicator research” rather than “index 
research” with the understanding that indices fall within the purview of indicator research. 
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the image of the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI), the CWB is a composite 
index that was developed through a collaboration between a group of social scientists at the 
University of Western Ontario (UWO) and experts in a research unit at the Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) who came together under the banner of First 
Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP) to produce, among other projects, a series of development 
indices. The stated aim of the research was “to advance the state of knowledge” about the 
conditions of Indigenous communities so that “...policymakers are better equipped to make 
meaningful improvements to the matrix of policies and programs that affect Aboriginal well-
being” (Beavon & Jetté, 2009, p. 3). The CWB uses census data from 1981 forward, combining 
4 indicators—education, labour force activity, income per capita, and housing—to produce 
“scores” ranging between 0 to 100 that are assigned to nearly all communities across the country, 
Indigenous and settler alike. These scores provide a basis for comparison between First Nations 
and Inuit communities as well as between settler communities,6 and are used to track changes 
over time. CWB data can be combined with an array of other community level data and is made 
publicly available for any interested parties to access and deploy (e.g. to conduct statistical 
studies) to make new meanings about Indigenous well-being. In short, the CWB has become an 
important tool through which policy-makers, social scientists, politicians, pundits and the general 
public frame and understand Indigenous development. Despite an apparently simple structure 
and output, the construction of the index required the amassing of extensive resources, the 
formations of academic–government institutional collaborations, years of preliminary research, 
massive data sets, computers and software capable of processing the data, and so on. In contrast 
to the view put forward by its authors that the CWB provides an objective assessment of 
 
6 The community scores can also be aggregated and used to represent averages of provincial or national 
“populations”.  
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development, my research demonstrates that the CWB is deeply political and is grounded in the 
particular and embodied histories and geographies of Canadian settler colonialism and that it 
constitutes the world it sets out to measure. Specifically, I examine the discursive and material 
work of experts involved in the production and proliferation of the index. I trace the multiple and 
at times contradictory ways in which the CWB has come to matter in shaping development 
common-sense, constituting Indigenous subjectivities and allocating responsibility surrounding 
development interventions. I argue that notwithstanding the metric’s use in advocating for 
Indigenous peoples’ rights, it narrows development pathways in ways that predominantly 
prioritize the interests of the state and settler society.  
 This project is, in no small part, motivated by my skepticism about some of the premises 
advanced by the Indigenous-specific development indicator network, for example, claims that 
highlighting the relative disadvantage of Indigenous peoples, including “intra-Aboriginal 
difference”, will help to improve Indigenous peoples’ lives and maintain Canadians’ high 
standard of living and social cohesion more generally; or that meaningful improvements in the 
socio-economic conditions of Indigenous communities have been hindered by a lack of empirical 
information in policy debates; or the assumption that the knowledge produced through 
development indices is good in-itself and is for everyone’s benefit; or that objective and accurate 
tools are necessary to ascertain and predict if a community is sustainable and has the capacity to 
develop, or if “history has passed some communities by” (Beavon & White, 2007, p. 19). Given 
the scope of injustices produced through processes of settler colonialism, including the 
established history dating back to post-WWI, of using social scientific research to influence 
policy to help solve the so-called “Indian Problem” (Shewell, 2001), these hypotheses seem 
misguided not only in their faith in policy and research to address issues of Indigenous poverty 
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but also in the way that they frame these issues and solutions as technical rather than political. 
This is especially the case given that the body of research generated by the CWB and its related 
indices tends to leave unquestioned the underlying structures that perpetuate Indigenous 
dispossession, and omit the role of settler society in the impoverishment and dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples across Canada have long insisted that poverty is 
inseparable from land dispossession, historical and ongoing. As the late Secwépemc freedom 
fighter, activist and leader Arthur Manuel, and Grand Chief Ronald Derrickson assert, “… It is 
the loss of our land that has been the precise cause of our impoverishment” (2015, p. 7). 
 As a white settler who has lived most of my life on occupied Indigenous territory, I felt 
that a master’s project in geography could be an opportunity to work in solidarity with 
Indigenous self-determination struggles by disrupting some of the taken for granted power 
relations surrounding knowledge production and development that Indigenous peoples in settler 
society are often required to contend with. In this regard, my political orientations have guided 
me to critically interrogate the work of experts, rather than examining the perspectives of 
Indigenous communities who are subject to an array of development interventions. While there is 
a long history of geographic research that positions Indigenous peoples as its objects and 
subjects, by taking the work of experts as my object of study, I hope to destabilize this deeply 
entrenched dynamic. 
 From the outset I write with an understanding that settler colonialism is an ongoing 
process. As Adam Barker (2012) describes it, settler colonialism is “a distinct method of 
colonizing involving the creation and consumption of a whole array of spaces by settler 
collectives that claim and transform places through the exercise of their sovereign capacity” 
(para. 1). This is distinguished from forms of colonialism primarily oriented towards resource 
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extraction and labour exploitation (Veracini, 2010), as settlers seek to eliminate Indigenous 
populations and replace them with their own (Wolfe, 2006). As Patrick Wolfe’s (2006) much-
quoted passage elaborates, “Settler colonizers come to stay; invasion is a structure not an event” 
(p. 388). The history of the Canadian state making practices demonstrates that the shift from 
resource extraction at imperial outposts to the establishment of permanent settlements entailed, 
as Cameron (2015) puts it, “the development of more complex structures of settler legitimation” 
(p. 176). With resource extraction remaining a paramount state interest, layered justifications, 
including those built on the foundations of “evidence-based” policy knowledge, are required to 
naturalize and deny the violence, implicit and explicit in the perpetual dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples as a result of the occupation of their lands and denial of their rights and self-
determination.  
 The remaining sections of this introductory chapter are meant to offer context for my 
research. The initial three sections examine the postcolonial, settler colonial and critical 
development literatures starting with an examination of the history of colonial claims to 
jurisdiction and questions of Indigenous peoples’ well-being in Canada. I then highlight some of 
the specific techniques and technologies that generate, propel and at times subvert colonial 
processes, and explore the politics of ‘expert’ knowledge in Indigenous–state relations. In the 
forth and final section I explore scholarship relating to the history of social indicator research 
and examine the relationship between this field of knowledge production and governance.  
Literature Review 
Settler colonialism and Indigenous–state relations in Canada 
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 Domination and assumed European superiority tie together a history of Canadian 
“Indian” policy with otherwise varying underpinning rationales and objectives.7 Tobias’ (1991) 
analysis of the history of Indian policy details the emergence and entanglement of paradoxical 
principles that continue to undergird Indigenous–state relations today—protection, civilization 
and assimilation. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 on the one hand recognized Indigenous 
groups as sovereign treaty partners with entitlements to the land—acknowledging a nation-to-
nation relationship in accordance with the existing treaties. On the other hand, it laid claim to 
Indigenous lands and lives, establishing a fiduciary obligation of the imperial government to 
Indigenous peoples, later transferred to the Canadian government; for example, ‘protecting’ 
Indigenous landholdings by making their transfer illegal unless first being surrendered to the 
‘Crown’ by way of treaty, for example. As geographer Shiri Pasternak (2013) points out, this is a 
“double move of jurisdictional recognition and subordination [... which] relocated Indigenous 
society into the common law of the colonizing nation” (p. 22). It marks the beginning of a long-
standing European claim to jurisdiction over Indigenous peoples and lands—much different from 
treaties, the Royal Proclamation did not seek, or give the pretence of seeking consent. Starting in 
the early eighteenth century, as the settler population mushroomed, Indian policy set new 
objectives to ‘civilize’ and assimilate Indigenous peoples with the underlying rationale of 
‘developing’ their capacities (Milloy, 1991). The reserve system was introduced as a keystone of 
Indian policy that paradoxically set out lands in isolated locales where Indigenous peoples were 
to be both protected from settler society and conditioned to join it. During this time, colonial 
administrators also introduced the initially voluntary “enfranchisement” process as laid out in the 
 
7 While acknowledging that relations of domination are a pillar of settler colonialism, it is also crucial to understand 
that the stories that the colonial project tell about itself—of a successful invasion and dispossession of Indigenous 
peoples—disregard the fact of Indigenous peoples’ survival of genocidal processes and refusal to be subsumed into 
settler society (Alfred 2009; Brown 2014; Simpson 2014). 
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1857 Gradual Civilization Act (discussed in more detail in footnote #2 of this introduction). 
Citizenship was the “reward” for First Nations men who met certain standards that proved to 
settler commissioners that they were “civilized”, such as reading and writing English or French. 
One of the “rewards” was an individual parcels of land split from the ‘lands held in trust for 
Indians’, as outlined in the Royal Proclamation. When met with resistance from Indigenous 
leadership, enfranchisement became compulsory and coercive strategies were deployed to 
accelerate the process. As Milloy (1991) argues, among other things, this policy was significant 
because:  
It represented a direct colonial intervention in Indian affairs. Furthermore, the act gave 
development a higher priority than traditional constitutional relations anchored to the 
Proclamation of 1763, for it removed exclusive tribal control over reserves for the sake of 
enfranchisement (p. 148).  
Social engineering—to shape ‘civilized’ citizen subjects—became the paramount work of Indian 
policy, a task enacted in the name of Indigenous peoples’ well-being. As Tobias (1991) explains, 
through this work “... Indian identity and culture would be eradicated, and the Indian would be 
assimilable and no longer in need of special status” (p. 127). Moreover, the central purpose of 
Indian policy, along with ‘civilizing’, was to eventually eradicate such jurisdiction by 
eliminating “... those persons and lands that fell within the category of Indians and Indian lands” 
(p. 133).  
 In the decades following WWI, the then-Department of Indian Affairs, frustrated by 
persistent failure of policy to engender assimilation, increasingly embraced the apparently 
rational approach of the social sciences to guide the department in achieving its objectives 
(Shewell, 2004). In his carefully researched history of Indian welfare policy in Canada, Hugh 
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Shewell argues that under the social sciences lens (i.e. economics, political science, psychology, 
public health, sociology, social work and so on), the so-called “Indian problem” gradually shifted 
from a moral and political quandary about assimilation to a more secular, scientific question 
directed at informing policy. Inflected by the biases of modern liberalism, this also marked the 
department’s departure from an overtly repressive administration of Indigenous lives in favour of 
an outwardly more humanist approach, while steadfastly aiming for assimilation. Social 
scientists now led the charge to lift Indigenous peoples to full and equal citizens. This manifested 
in the federal government adopting Community Development as an official objective for 
spurring Indigenous peoples’ integration into modern society. Personal choice was seen as a 
primary vehicle to inspire such transformation, persuading—through education campaigns, 
restructuring family, using social workers—Indigenous individuals to depart from traditional, 
collective society and adopt the “natural forces” of modern society, through engagement in the 
liberal state and market society. By the late 1950s, a number of large-scale studies set out to 
assess Indigenous peoples’ capacity to adapt to modernity. These focused on ways to motivate 
change within individuals to reduce their dependency on government funds and encourage their 
engagement in markets.  
 Until the early 1970s, the colonial rationales of civilization and assimilation operated in 
plain view, with the end goal of terminating Indigenous peoples’ “special status” by absorbing 
them into the settler body politic and opening ‘lands reserved for Indians’ to settler development 
(see Tobias, 1991). Pierre Trudeau’s infamous 1969 White Paper Act is widely regarded as 
marking the closing of this overtly assimilationist policy agenda (Coulthard, 2014; RCAP, 1996). 
The White Paper proposed to, once-and-for-all, do away with all legal mechanisms that held 
Indian status distinct from that of the settler population. However, instead of expediting 
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assimilation, Dene scholar Glen Coulthard points out, “... the White Paper inaugurated an 
unprecedented degree of pan-Indian assertiveness and political mobilization” (p. 5). Indigenous 
peoples’ fierce opposition forced the government to shelve the White Paper. It also catalyzed 
what Coulthard (2013) theorizes as successive waves of contemporary Indigenous resistance that 
further forced the state to adopt strategies rooted in “transitional justice” to usher in what he 
terms the “politics of recognition”. This is meant to “‘reconcile’ Indigenous assertions of 
nationhood with settler state sovereignty via the accommodation of Indigenous identity claims in 
some form of renewed legal and political relationship with the Canadian state” (p. 3). However, 
drawing insights from anti-colonial philosopher and psychiatrist Franz Fanon, Coulthard urges 
that while present-day Indigenous–state relations are characterize by recognition and 
accommodation, these amendments are a strategic reproduction of colonial power and serve to 
bolster foundational asymmetric power relations. Therefore, colonial power, operating for 
centuries towards exclusion and assimilation through openly violent and coercive means, now 
depends on its ability to “... entice Indigenous peoples to come to identify, either implicitly or 
explicitly, with the profoundly asymmetrical and non-reciprocal forms of recognition either 
imposed on or granted to them by the colonial-state and society” (Coulthard, 2007, p. 439). 
Coulthard’s work interrogates sites where colonial power operates through such forms of 
recognition, such as Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s formal apology to survivors of the 
residential school system, and the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 Today, the state’s claims to jurisdiction over Indigenous peoples and lands persist, 
marking both the incompletion of settler colonialism’s agenda to eliminate (Brown, 2014; 
Veracini, 2010) and the ongoing existence of colonial relations. That is, despite moves over the 
past five decades signalling greater self-determining powers for Indigenous peoples, such as co-
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management agreements or the state’s official use of nation-to-nation discourse, Indigenous-state 
relations continue to be negotiated largely on the state’s terms through state-held political and 
legal mechanisms that frame Indigenous peoples and their lands within Canada’s jurisdiction. 
 This section has sketched some of the contradictory colonial rationales and strategies that 
Indigenous peoples have been subject to and resisted since the onset of colonisation. With an 
intent focus on opening Indigenous lands to settler development, colonial rationales and practices 
have been woven into development initiatives deployed in the name of Indigenous peoples’ well-
being. Over time, the settler state and industry have juggled objectives to protect, civilize, 
assimilate, exclude and include Indigenous peoples while maintaining an unwavering faith in 
settler jurisdiction. I now turn to an examination of the role of specific knowledges, techniques 
and technologies in generating, maintaining and occasionally subverting colonial power.  
Knowledge technologies—accruing, maintaining and resisting colonial power  
 
 There is a substantial body of work detailing the importance of geographic knowledge 
and representational technologies to the processes and patterns of colonial expansion. An 
overarching argument in this research field is that maps—whether they work to dispossess 
(Harley, 1988, 2001; Harris, 2002; Pickles, 2004; Razack, 2002) or to resist imperial expansion 
(Brody, 1981; Bryan & Wood, 2015; Sparke, 1998)—are inherently political, rather than 
objective, representations, and they produce, rather than reflect, colonial landscapes. Moreover, 
maps are inscribed with the particular values and assumptions of their authors, and can advance 
particular aims (e.g. the state’s) through purposeful omissions, or ‘cartographic silences’ as 
Harley (2001) describes them, which are widely taken for granted and accepted by the general 
public as necessary simplifications in the map making process. However, as Harris (2004) 
argues, the power of maps to dispossess Indigenous peoples in British Columbia did not stem 
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from purposeful omissions as is often argued in the literature on cartography and colonialism—
where Europeans assume that spaces on maps represent tabula rasa on the ground. Rather, while 
early maps often only included outlines of the coast and rivers, colonial officials were occupied 
with resources not represented on the maps and were well aware that Indigenous peoples 
inhabited most of the map’s ‘blank spaces’. Instead, Harris asserts, a map’s power to dispossess 
rested in its ability to “introduce a geographical imaginary that ignored Indigenous ways of 
knowing and recording space, ways that settlers could not imagine and did not need as soon as 
their maps reoriented them after their own fashion” (p. 175). Cadastral surveys in Australia 
served a similar purpose, introducing a grid-like division of the landscape that mimicked a 
European ordering of a kingdom into counties, shires, parishes and ‘hundreds’—a system 
stemming back to Saxon times (Byrne, 2010). While this was a well-established spatial 
convention in Europe long before its inscription into surveys, its appearance in Australia was 
instantaneous with the white invasion. It came to mark the patterns of Indigenous peoples’ 
dispossession, ignoring completely the pre-existing Indigenous boundaries, spatial practices and 
epistemologies. Settler colonial studies scholar Denis Byrne (2010) points out, “With England’s 
cartographic language inscribed upon it, the landscape of colonial Australia would be in 
immediate dialogue with the landscapes of England” (p. 105). All this was necessary to the 
creation of Australia’s racially segregated society and landscape because it served to naturalize 
and organize colonial governing practice. Even still, as Byrne details, Indigenous peoples found 
ways to subvert the white supremacist colonial system by eking out lives in the ‘gaps’ of the 
cadastral systems. As Bryan and Wood (2015) explain, from the 1970s forward maps became 
integral to the subversion of Canada’s colonial claims to Indigenous peoples’ lands. Shortly after 
Trudeau’s White Paper misstep, and in conjunction with the Calder decisions, which outlined the 
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basis for Indigenous peoples’ legal title, the Inuit, Dene and Cree took on extensive mapping 
projects that not only detailed land use and occupancy, but attempted to harness the power of 
maps in order to assert future visions that would maintain a collective way of life. That said, 
while these maps were integral to ‘modern treaty’ processes and defining Indigenous title 
through supreme court rulings, the state found ways to insert itself into such projects (often 
through funding) and ultimately “... set the limits on what could be mapped and which maps 
counted when it came to consultation with tribes” (Bryan & Wood, 2015, p. 73). 
 Statistics are another technology that has often worked in the service of settler 
colonialism. In large part, census taking in settler colonies, in conjunction with maps and a legal 
system, has facilitated the processes of land settlement as well as formalized and legitimated 
European constructions of racial categories—fixing race to place (see also Razack, 2002). The 
census has also been central to state taxonomies that define Indigeneity according to blood 
quantum, for example, in a move that Veracini (2010) calls ‘counting Indigenous peoples out of 
existence’ (p. 39). In British Columbia statistics were used as a way to track the ‘progress’ of 
assimilation by enumerating such things as band membership, landholdings, the number of 
cultivated acres compared with the number that could be cultivated, rates of land clearing and 
livestock, economic activities off reserve and attendance at residential schools (Harris, 2002). 
Through these tallies and with the aid of the ‘Indian Agent’, the courts would assess ‘land 
requirements’ for each band—if more was needed the band would be obligated to go through a 
lengthy and complex formal application process. 
 Other studies have shown instances where the census has been used to subvert settler 
colonial processes. For example, a study in Australia details a period from 1961 to 1971 where 
Indigenous groups used the census to effectively ‘enlarge’, rather than eliminate, the Indigenous 
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population (Rowse & Smith, 2010). In the mid to late 1800s Indigenous groups in New Zealand 
quickly recognized enumeration as a practice to ‘control, bound, intervene in, displace and erase’ 
Indigenous lives (Wanhalla, 2010). So, while widely resisted, the census was also strategically 
embraced or accommodated by some Indigenous groups who sought to reverse the process of 
land acquisition by taking control of what was being counted. In Canada, however, the practice 
of ‘counting Indigenous peoples out of existence’ persists through federal Indian Act policy. 
With the fictional race of “Indians” at its base, the number of “status Indians” are reduced by 
transferring them to the category of “non-status” through an array of legal avenues including 
“marrying out” (discussed in more detail below), erroneous exclusion from band lists, adoption 
into non-Indigenous families, as in the case of the infamous “sixties scoop”, or ‘paternity policy’ 
that relegates Indigenous children into the non-status category if the status of the father is 
undisclosed (Byrne, 2010). These practices serve to alleviate the Canadian government from its 
legal obligations to Indigenous peoples as non-status Indians do not receive the same access to 
essential services and programs in exchange for the state’s use of Indigenous land and resources 
(Palmater, 2014). Such legislation has deleterious effects on Indigenous communities and 
individuals as status is closely tied to “one’s health and well-being—recognition, acceptance, 
self-worth, familial and communal supports, access to language speakers and traditional 
knowledge-holders, and the ability to enjoy one’s culture in community with their specific 
Indigenous Nation” (Palmater, 2014, p. 47). 
 Statistics have been theorized by Tuck and Yang (2012) as facilitating a “settler move to 
innocence” (p. 9). Tuck and Yang draw from Mary Louise Fellows and Sherene Razack’s (1997) 
concept of a “race to innocence” whereby hierarchies among feminist women go unchallenged as 
a result of each woman’s convictions that their own marginality is the worst, thus concealing 
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their complicity in the subordination of other women. Building on this analysis, the “settler’s 
move to innocence” is described as “those strategies or positionings that attempt to relieve the 
settler of feelings of guilt or responsibility without giving up land, power or privilege, without 
having to change much at all” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 10). Notably, the parallel between the 
involvement of white settler academics (such as myself) in Settler Colonial Studies and the 
discipline’s rapid ascent and embrace as a legitimate academic field of inquiry has some scholars 
wary of the potential ‘move to innocence’ within the field (Snelgrove, Dhamoon, & Corntassel, 
2014). Another way in which the settler move to innocence is enacted is through the codification, 
representation and in/exclusion of Indigenous peoples in social science research. Tuck and Yang 
(2012) suggest that statistical representations of Indigenous peoples in social science and 
educational research are either as “at risk” peoples or as “asterisk” peoples. Whereas the at-risk 
representation places Indigenous peoples on the “verge of extinction”, asterisk peoples are those 
who “...are represented by an asterisk in large and crucial data sets...”, meaning their numbers are 
negligible within a much larger population (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p.22). Adding to this analysis, 
Snelgrove et al. (2014) note that when Indigenous groups are framed as minority populations 
contained within the bounds of nation-states, the emergent logic is one of an “Indigenous 
problem” wherein the state is taken for granted as the logical manager of Indigenous populations. 
Such dynamics point to the need for careful scrutiny of statistical methodologies and findings, 
particularly in situations where Indigenous-specific statistics are deployed by non-Indigenous or 
settler state actors.   
 Colonial power in Canada was accrued, in part, through a history of institutionalized 
racist and gendered violence that legislated Indigenous lives and reordered familial structures 
according to European value systems. In her research on the effects of colonialism on First 
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Nations women in Canada, Winona Stevenson (1999) details the history of some of the most 
destructive colonial policy targeting First Nations communities, particularly regarding women 
and children. The introduction of an ‘Indian’ administrative legislation in 1850 marked a 
succession of sexist, racist technologies that aimed to usurp the power to define Indigenous 
membership. An assemblage of similar laws collectively known as the ‘Indian Act’ followed in 
1869, which imposed a patrilineal definition of “Indian” by granting the state the power to 
dispossess First Nations women, and their children, of their Indigenous citizenship if they 
married anyone other than a First Nations man. Under these circumstances, women and their 
children lost access to any rights and protections afforded by the Indian Act, including access to 
their ancestral territories and participation in their Band’s governance system—the same rules 
did not apply to men. The strong condemnation of these legislations by Indigenous leaders was 
ignored by the Canadian state until 1985, when the Indian Act was finally modified to address 
this opposition. In the interim, the regulations became more stringent when the Act was amended 
in 1951, resulting in First Nations women who married ‘outside’ of their Band losing their rights 
to “live on-reserve free from taxation or liens; be buried on-reserve; receive their fair share of 
First Nations annuities, revenues, and any on-reserve services like health and education” 
(Stevenson, 1999, p. 68). Analysing a 1970s court case in which an Indigenous woman had lost 
her status as a result of “marrying out”, Mohawk legal scholar Patricia Monture-Angus (1995) 
framed the issue this way: “Many Indians by birth are non-Indians at law” (emphasis in original, 
pg. 135). Drawing on this court case, Monture-Angus demonstrates the extent to which gendered 
racism undergirds and is taken for granted in the Canadian legal system: the presiding judge 
found that, by no longer being “Status” the plaintiff had equal rights with all other Canadian 
women. Monture-Angus keenly observes that “such a conclusion is based on a faulty assumption 
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that Indian status is status less than the status of other Canadian women. [The judge] saw an 
elevation in personal status as a result of the disenfranchisement” (pg. 135). This observation 
lays bare the negative implications for Indigenous peoples, especially women, seeking justice 
within the settler legal system. As for the ‘immediate and long-term effects of this Indian Act 
provision towards women and children’, Winona Stevenson explains, “[it served to] reduce the 
number of status Indians the government was responsible for, impose the European patrilineage 
system, and elevate the power and authority of men at the expense of women” (p. 68). By 1985, 
at least 16,000 Indigenous women had lost their legal status as Indigenous persons, and tens of 
thousands of children were also affected (Palmater, 2014). The result was the disruption and 
destruction of traditional kinship systems including the matrilineal descent, and matrilocal, post-
marriage patterns and ultimately the detachment for many people from Indigenous cultures and 
ontologies (Krebs & Olwan, 2012; Stevenson, 1999). 
 This section has explored the power of a selection of technologies of knowledge—maps, 
statistics, laws—and their role in shaping materialities, particularly the conditions of Indigenous 
peoples’ lives in settler societies. This destabilizes the common conception of such technologies 
as value neutral and inert. Further, this body of literature details how assumptions and processes 
of simplification, omissions and inclusions become inscribed in the representational technologies 
and work to prioritise certain interests over others. There are, of course, contradictory outcomes 
as maps, statistics and laws (often operating in tandem) are deployed to both propel and subvert 
colonial power. I now look to closely related questions of expertise and power in Indigenous–
state relations. 
Expertise and power asymmetries in Indigenous–state relations 
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“[...] the claim to expertise in optimizing the lives of others is a claim to power, one that merits 
careful scrutiny” (Li, 2007, p. 5). 
 
 Implicit in the literature review’s preceding sections are questions of expertise and the 
role of expert knowledge in the politics of settler colonialism. That is, expert knowledge is 
embedded in networks of statistics, maps and legislation, as experts grapple with available 
technologies, interpret data, organize exclusions and make judgement calls relating to 
Indigenous–state relations. Expertise helps to make the settler colonial governance practices 
thinkable, yet the politics of expert knowledge are easily naturalized and overlooked by the 
experts themselves. For this reason, I turn to those who have critically analyzed expertise. 
 Recent scholarship explores the work required in producing expertise and knowledge 
hierarchies through the proprietary claims over technologies and techniques and through the 
exploitation of research subjects (Inda, 2005). For instance, anthropologist David Horn (2005) 
details the ways in which “criminal anthropology” was invented as a discipline. Central to 
Horn’s analysis is the struggle of criminologists to gain authority as experts within the 
nineteenth-century Italian criminal justice system. To achieve this elevated status, criminal 
anthropologists demonstrated their technical prowess with an array of technologies used to 
measure and diagnose pathological or ‘normal’ behaviour. Given that such technologies and 
techniques were unavailable to others, and appeared to produce scientifically ‘objective’ 
knowledge, in part by “deny[ing] the constructed nature of what was measured” (p. 149), 
criminal anthropologists were able to secure a position within the legal institution as ‘expert 
witnesses’. From this privileged position they became advisors to other experts, particularly 
judges and juries, regarding appropriate treatment of criminals, thereby legitimizing so-called 
 21 
expert interventions in the name of securing societal well-being. Whereas Horn focuses on the 
importance of technologies and techniques to generating expertise, Ian Mosby (2013) details the 
exploitation of Indigenous bodies to advance expert careers. Mosby’s study of nutritional and 
biomedical experimentation in residential schools and Indigenous communities from 1942 to 
1952, sheds light on this disturbing opportunism. At a time when Indian Affairs was cutting 
relief payments to communities experiencing hardship and while the science of nutrition was 
nascent, scientists, eager to make a name for themselves experimented on malnourished 
Indigenous peoples using whole communities as laboratories under the guise of solving the so-
called “Indian problem”. Malnutrition and hunger were treated as a result of cultural 
backwardness and were knowingly sustained so that scientists could conduct experiments with 
vitamin supplements. Mosby writes, “... these studies did little to alter the structural conditions 
that led to the malnutrition and hunger in the first place and, as a result, did more to bolster the 
career ambitions of the researchers than to improve the health of those identified as being 
malnourished” (p. 148).  
 For Tania Li, who researches development interventions in the ‘global south’ (2007; 
2014) experts and expert knowledge are integral to the processes and practices of governing 
human conduct. They serve to define problems within populations and develop technical 
solutions through calculation and monitoring techniques and technologies. As Li points out, 
expertise is permeated with specific—rather than universal—visions of human nature and 
society. It matters, then, how experts conceive of populations and the subgroups within 
populations that they target for improvement interventions. For example, Li (2014) argues that 
current efforts to govern Indigenous peoples in the global south through their “free, prior and 
informed consent” would never have been thinkable during early 19th century colonial 
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interventions where administrators envisioned Indigenous peoples as wholly dependent. Li’s 
work raises important questions about the role of expertise in producing and maintaining 
relations of domination in expansive governmental assemblages, as disparate interests coalesce 
around the notion of improvement (discussed in more detail in the Methodologies section of 
chapter two). Others have detailed the use of scientific expertise in struggles over land and 
resources to deny the legitimacy of Indigenous claims in court, thereby allowing development to 
proceed on Indigenous lands and further entrenching uneven power relations between Indigenous 
groups, industry and the state (F. Li, 2009; Wainwright & Robertson, 2003). Fabiana Li’s (2011) 
study of a contentious mining operation in Chile explores the ways in which expert knowledge 
serves to commensurate the environmental impacts of mining with the company’s mitigation and 
compensation plans to frame the company as socially and environmentally responsible and 
downplay opposition. While these studies demonstrate the various ways that expert knowledge is 
deployed to reify asymmetrical power relations, both Tania Li (2014) and Fabiana Li (2011) 
bring attention to the instability of and resistance to these attempts to govern or legitimate 
development projects. That is, while experts may devise and monitor a plan’s implementation, 
the results are never fully known and unanticipated consequences inevitably emerge. For this 
reason, Tania Li advises that ethnographic studies of expertise must be attentive not only to the 
ways in which it is deployed and circulates but also to the ways in which it is contested or set 
aside (Li, 2014). 
 In this section I have attempted to highlight the various ways in which experts and expert 
knowledge matter to the processes and politics of land struggle. Expertise is used to legitimate 
infrastructure projects and manage opposition to them; its interventions are based on specific 
understandings of its subjects and its own authority. As Mosby (2013) and Horn (2005) have 
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demonstrated, it has taken extensive work to naturalize expert authority. In the case of Mosby’s 
study, it is at the great expense of the targets of expertise. Once naturalized, expertise is drawn 
upon by public authorities to govern society at a distance, particularly in a neoliberal context 
(Rose, 1996a). In the final section of the literature review that follows, I turn to the literature on 
the history of social indicator research to explore this final point more closely by asking: Where 
does indicator research come from and what is its relationship with governance? 
Social indicators and governance 
 
 The history and geography of social indicator research shows its deep entanglement with 
forms of modern governance in the West. Initially, the two central drivers behind the merging of 
numerical information and governance were nation-state formation and the management of 
resource extraction from colonies during the rise of industrial capitalism (Merry, 2016). While 
nations have made use of numerical information since at least the 5th century, formal statistical 
practice and a nation-state’s interest in collecting and analyzing numerical data to organize, 
control, and manipulate populations spread through Europe during the 19th century. At this time, 
states were coming to understand populations and a workforce as the primary source of wealth, 
rather than securing territory. In this regard, a population census provided information essential 
to the management and growth of the nation-state’s economic engine. Ian Hacking (1990) cites 
1820 as the starting point for the “avalanche of printed numbers” that signaled the intensified—
“fetishistic”—state practice of numeric classification (p. 17-18). Prior to this, he argues, the 
census was of greater importance to the management of colonies than to European homelands. 
Mitchell’s (2002) research on Egypt similarly shows the centrality of quantifying projects to 
securing and maintaining colonial control, including through land surveys, the tallying of a 
population and the measurement of its capacities according to race and caste-based categories.  
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 The project of modernity underway in the early nineteenth-century by and large worked 
to produce and depended upon a widespread understanding of quantitative knowledge as value-
neutral descriptions of the world separate from the biases of hypothesis and theory (Poovey, 
1998). The embodied assumptions and interpretive work inherent to the construction and 
manipulation of numerical information continues to go predominantly unacknowledged. As 
quantitative knowledge came to be understood as a distinct form of knowledge from other 
analytic modes, those who developed this knowledge came to assume the privileged role of 
expert knowledge producers. Such experts became critical to informing the processes and 
practices of governance, providing apparently neutral information.  
 Through the twentieth-century, policy and decision making practices increasingly came 
to depend on quantitative knowledge. In the mid-1930s the first intimations of what would come 
to be called ‘social indicator research’ emerged in the USA through the social sciences, including 
sociology, economics, and political science. Its intellectual, political pursuits were guided by the 
concerns of the then-prevailing welfare state—measuring and monitoring redistribution, and 
assessing needs-based aid entitlements for sections of society, and ultimately attempting to track 
and abate the potential threat of societal fissure resulting from the inequalities of capitalism 
(Noll, 2004; Sirgy et al., 2006). Two notable predecessors to the field of social indicator research 
include W. F. Ogburn’s 1933 report on Recent Social Trends in the United States, which was 
published through president Herbert Hoover’s “Committee on Social Trends” and funded by the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and Odum’s (1969) Southern Regions of the United States, originally 
published in 1936. While examining social trends, both focused primarily on economics. In a 
review of quality of life research, Noll (2004) also cites the earlier work of Italian statistician 
Alfredo Niceforo as an under-recognized but influential predecessor to the field. Niceforo’s 1921 
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book Les indices numérique de la civilisation et du progrès sought to uncover quantitative data 
on living conditions so as to ‘measure and track the levels of civilization and social progress 
across time and space’ (see Noll, 2004, p. 152). In this sense, the cornerstones of the field of 
social indicator research are a continuation of the nineteenth-century project of modernity, and 
its linear teleological vision of progress. 
 In 1966, the U.S. space agency NASA launched the first major social indicator initiative, 
which set out to assess and predict the impacts and social fallout in American society resulting 
from their space program (Sirgy et al., 2006). The years that followed saw the christening of the 
‘social indicator research movement’, a boom in the field that enrolled international 
organizations such as the United Nations and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) and extended the practices beyond America and Europe while still showing 
the heaviest concentrations in the West. Throughout the 1970s and early 80s, social indicator 
research flourished, with confidence that its broad agenda of monitoring and making necessary 
interventions through statistical measurement would engender “planned progress” and 
improvement in societal well-being. However, in the waning years of the 1980s the movement 
rapidly dissolved, leaving some American social scientists in the field to announce its official 
death, citing three major causes: lack of funding due to an economic downturn and therefore a 
change in government priorities; lack of political will on the part of the Reagan administration to 
support indicator projects that could lead to increased social spending; and a lack of ‘product 
utility’, meaning, policy makers did not appear to be using indices in their work (Andrews, 
1989). 
 Following its 1990 launch, the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) 
appeared as a key player in resurrecting the field of indicator research, if indeed it had ever really 
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died. It followed in the tradition of indicator research of the welfare state era insomuch as it 
concerned itself with measuring the welfare of populations. Its underlying “human capabilities” 
theory, which combines and measures three factors—health, education and income—and focuses 
on ends, came to supplant the economic utility-based measure of GNP (Gross National Product), 
which focused on means and had previously stood as the principal definition of development.8 
While the UNHDI readily gained political acceptability among government representatives, it 
was the product of sustained and incremental effort, building on nearly thirty years of work in 
the field of development economics (Davis, Kingsbury, & Merry, 2012; Stanton, 2007). Since its 
release, it has been subject to a variety of critiques from academics and politicians alike, but has 
proven its durability, maintaining its widespread credibility by responding and at times adapting 
to certain critiques. As Davis et al (2012) note, an important element behind its durability also 
relates to the position of its authors, a group of prominent academics who profited from the 
support of powerful international institutions. Many of the points relating to the UNHDI’s 
emergence and success are relevant to that of the CWB and the Registered Indian Human 
Development Index (RIHDI). As I will discuss in the empirical chapters that follow, the 
researchers who developed the CWB and its predecessor, the RIHDI, were among a wave of 
indicator researchers directly influenced by the UNHDI and who set out to adopt and adapt its 
methodologies, applying its underlying human capabilities theory to their measurements of 
Indigenous populations and communities. However, broad shifts in governance were also at play 
in the shaping of such measuring endeavors. 
 
8 While a measure of economic growth, GNP, like the UNHDI, was tied to the intellectual/philosophical history of 
welfare economics. It built on the early efforts to use national income as a principal measure of economic well-being 
pioneered by influential actors such as A.C. Pigou, a founding father of welfare economics, Arthur Lyon Bowley, an 
economist and statistician, and later Simon Kuznets, a Nobel Prize-winning American economist and statistician 
(see Sirgy et al., 2006). Also, like the HDI after it, the GNP took decades of work to gain widespread acceptability 
as a proxy for development (see Davis, Kingsbury and Merry, 2012).   
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 Another major factor driving the contemporary boom in indicator use in policy and 
decision-making practices relates to the rise of neoliberalism, the transition from “government to 
governance”. During the 1990s, a strong bond was formed between what Merry (2016) terms 
“indicator culture” and evidence-based governance. Indicator culture, as Merry understands it, is 
an element of “audit culture” (see also, Shore and Wright, 2015). Both are deemed cultures not 
because they describe society, but rather because they are a set of techniques, practices and 
assumptions applied within specific—namely bureaucratic and institutional—situations. Audit 
culture in particular is seen as “the process by which the principles and techniques of accounting 
and financial management are applied to the governance of peoples and organizations—and, 
more importantly, the social and cultural consequences of that translation” (Shore and Wright, 
2015, p. 24). It privileges a set of technocratic and expert practices, techniques and assumptions 
that place high value on numerical data for knowledge production and decision making, 
especially within institutional and bureaucratic environments. Following Foucauldian 
scholarship, Merry (2016) explains, rather than deploying coercion or the imposition of “hard 
law” measures, such as sanctions, the governmental form at work in indicator culture operates 
through the shaping of behaviours by establishing standards that require actors—all levels of 
government, individuals, groups, communities, corporations—to report on how they have met 
them. Whereas welfare economic era indicators were concerned with societal improvement 
through activating redistribution mechanisms and allocating aid, those that arose through 
evidence-based governance were infused with concerns of business management, efficiency, 
transparency, performance and so on. In this sense, the proliferation of indicators stands as 
evidence of corporate and neoliberal cultures and modes of governance permeating the broader 
social sphere (Merry, 2011). Compliance and change are enacted through assessment, reporting 
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and ranking. A central tactic to elicit compliance and change is to “name and shame” those 
actors who fail to meet, or improve towards the targets set by indicators. As I aim to show in the 
subsequent empirical chapters, the CWB emerged through a convergence of welfare-state based 
governance imperatives, with influences stemming from the social indicator movement and the 
UNHDI, as well as imperatives and influences tied to the emergence of indicator culture and 
neoliberal governance. 
 My review of the postcolonial, settler colonial and critical development literatures 
highlighted the historical and geographic entanglements of settler state governing rationales and 
practices, knowledge production, expertise, dispossession and concern for and about Indigenous 
peoples. It has also brought attention to some of the politics of ‘expert’ knowledge in 
Indigenous–state relations and related techniques and technologies that propel and occasionally 
challenge colonial processes. Reviewing the literature on the history of social indicator research 
outlined its relationship with different forms of governance dating back to the formation of the 
nation-state, through to the rise of neoliberalism and the flourishing of indicator culture. Still, 
across these literatures, little attention has been paid to the production and uses of development 
measures in settler governance and development/improvement interventions.9 My research 
contends that Indigenous-specific development indices are one aspect of a settler policy and 
bureaucratic performance that narrows the pathways of socio-economic development available to 
Indigenous communities. They serve to distribute power, between index users and targets, 
surrounding development initiatives as well as to naturalize and universalize various facets of 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada’s (INAC) development agenda, including determining 
what appropriate forms of development look like, who is in need of development, who is made 
 
9 Exceptions to this include: Salée (2006) and Walter and Andersen (2013) 
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responsible for it, and in what ways this responsibility can or ought to be addressed. Yet, the 
politics of such ordering practices—the inscription of the producers’ and users’ assumptions, 
interests, and concerns in the processes of data selection, manipulation and presentation—are 
largely invisible. By examining the everyday and discursive practices of index creation and 
proliferation, I hope to disrupt the ostensibly apolitical nature of these quantitative knowledge 
technologies, showing them to be tools that predominantly uphold the settler state and non-state 
authorities as the “natural” and “benevolent” managers of Indigenous populations. Further, I 
hope to destabilize the ways in which CWB studies frame Indigenous peoples as somehow both 
developmentally stunted and also responsible for the conditions of their poverty.10 Such a 
framing sets the stage for Canadian state actors, industry and free-market proponents to 
champion and pursue the intensified engagement in markets and intensified resource extraction 
by individual communities as the only viable development option, in the process opening up 
communities to further state and industry-driven development interventions. 
  
 
10 I draw here from Walter and Andersen (2013) in their exploration of statistical constructions of Indigeneity 
through official data, such as the census. They see the “deficit Indigene” as part of a practice within dominant 
quantitative methodologies of shortchanging Indigenous peoples and ultimately reinforcing the already well-
entrenched neo-colonial relationship between narrowly conceived statistical constructions of Indigenous sociality 
and development-based policy grounded in a racialized terrain of knowledge production. These forms of knowledge 
production, they argue, are tethered to long-standing government policies to “close the gap” between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous populations and continue to marginalize alternative, and often more positive, statistical stories and 
understandings of Indigenous sociality. 
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Organization of Thesis 
 
 This thesis is divided into five chapters including this introduction. In the second chapter, 
I detail my research design. I start with a discussion of key insights from theorists of 
“performativity”, which I use as a frame for conceptualizing the CWB. I then explain the 
guidance that I take from Mountz’s (2003) “institutional ethnography” and Cameron’s (2015) 
“stories as material relational practices” in shaping my methodology. After this, I locate myself 
in the research and describe how I arrived at a combination of methods—interviews, textual 
analysis of official documents and observation of CWB presentations—to generate the data I 
analyze in the substantive empirical chapters to follow. I also discuss some of the limits of my 
work.  
 My empirical research material is divided between the third and fourth chapters. Chapter 
3, Tracing the Emergence of the CWB, explores the history and conditions of possibility that 
underwrite the CWB’s emergence. I have organized it into three vignettes that detail the 
connections between the intellectual projects of Indigenous-specific development index 
‘pioneers’, those of the CWB network, and then trace the ways in which the concerns, interests 
and governing rationales of the state became inscribed in the CWB. Additionally, the chapter 
demonstrates the immense effort and resources necessary for this particular vision of Indigenous-
specific development to take hold. Chapter 4, The CWB in the Wild, examines the efforts of 
social scientists, academics and technicians to extend the CWB network out of universities and 
DIAND and into the policy sphere, in part, through developing discursive and material strategies 
to frame the index as existing outside of politics. I examine the index’s material and discursive 
effects, as a variety of actors—politicians, bureaucrats and free market think tanks—come to 
produce new meanings about Indigenous peoples’ well-being by combining community level 
 31 
data with CWB scores and prescribing particular development pathways. The chapter’s final 
section explores examples of Indigenous leadership engaging with and contesting the CWB and 
its predecessor the Registered Indian Human Development Index (RIHDI). In the final 
concluding chapter, I highlight the key findings and interventions of my thesis, attempt to bring 
together the major themes that have surfaced and discuss some of the research’s limitations. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework, Methodologies, Positioning and Methods 
Index Performativity 
 
 This thesis aims to describe the role of the Community Well-Being Index and its adjacent 
indices in (re)producing and concretizing settler state and industry-driven development 
“common-sense”.11 My approach is principally informed by the theory of performativity as 
elaborated in explorations of gender and sexuality (Butler, 1988, 1990), markets and the 
economy (Blomley, 2007; Butler, 2010; Callon, 2010; Christophers, 2014; Collard, 2013; 
Mitchell, 2007, 2008), and the discipline of economic geography (Barnes, 2002, 2008). I also 
look to Indigenous and anti-colonial scholars and to those who engage with critical and feminists 
strands of Science and Technology Studies and its sub-discipline Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
to help me develop methodologies that articulate with performativity and that are attentive to the 
discursive and material relations particular to persistent structures and practices in settler state 
(quantitative) knowledge production (Andersen, 2013; Cameron, 2015; Haraway, 1999; Latour, 
2005; Law, 2009; Merry, 2016; Smith, 2012; TallBear, 2013; Walter & Andersen, 2013). These 
intellectual networks have been instrumental in unraveling the entanglements of culture and 
politics with technological and scientific knowledge production, while also revealing power 
relations whose nature is often camouflaged. Relatedly, this diverse body of work has 
contributed to disrupting the myths of universality and objectivity stubbornly cherished by 
Western science,12 and destabilizing dualisms which are foundational to Western epistemologies 
(i.e., modern/primitive, culture/nature, micro/macro, formal/informal economies and so on) that 
 
11 Loosely following Uribe (2015), I use “common-sense” to describe knowledge that assumes hegemonic status 
(Gramsci, 1995). 
12 Science studies scholar Donna Haraway (1988) most famously led the charge against the prevailing form of 
objectivity in white masculinist positivist scientific and philosophical practices and cultures that she referred to as 
“the conquering gaze from nowhere... [which] makes the unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, 
to represent while escaping representation” (p. 581). She then termed her radical reworking of this dominant 
approach “situated knowledges”, which calls on researchers to remain rigorous in their research while also 
accounting for their specific positions within their work. 
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are deeply entwined with historical and ongoing operations of colonial power.13 My research 
carries forward a set of theoretical insights and assumptions drawn from this work that I 
elaborate in the following section. I start by reviewing key interventions in theorizing 
performativity that guide my analysis of the CWB. I then go on to explain the processes and 
limitations of my own knowledge production and account for my position within this research. 
The final section of this chapter details the specific research methods I employed.  
 At base, performativity rejects a separation between representation—or discursive practices 
more generally—and reality. Under a performative framework, rather than inertly reflect existing 
external phenomena, representations and statements—quantitative technologies included—
contribute to producing and enacting the material world. For example, statistical measures do 
more than just mirror existing realities; they shape people’s understandings, experiences and 
behaviours and therefore participate in the production of reality (Bowker & Star, 2000). 
Likewise, to describe a fee simple property ownership model as performative is to acknowledge 
that the model itself reorganizes relations and actions according to its own assumptions, thus 
giving form to the world that it represents (Blomley, 2007). Performativity scholars are not, 
however, suggesting that the world is somehow fake as a result of being performed. Instead, the 
theory calls for a reimagining of the relationship between representation and reality, discourse 
and materiality. 
 Arguably, one of the most influential reimaginings and contributions to the theory of 
performativity emerged in feminist philosopher Judith Butler’s (1990) book Gender Trouble. 
One of Butler’s central achievements in the book is to destabilize the hegemonic conceptions of 
gender and sex as elemental, innate or stable. Gender Trouble analyzes gender and sex as 
 
13 For more on the role of networks of dualisms and interlinking forms of oppression in western culture see 
Plumwood (1993).  
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performed phenomena, contending that societal expectations produce the anticipated norms that 
demarcate and regulate both. Butler draws on Foucault’s understanding of power as diffuse and 
generated through material and discursive relations to demonstrate how the performance of 
gender and sex, and performances more generally, gains power through the mundane 
(re)production of norms, subjectivities and identities. Moreover, while gendered performances 
create an apparently “seamless” identity—a “gendered self”, generally within a hierarchical 
binary of male and female “compelled by social sanctions and taboos”—Butler (1988) argues 
that this identity is in fact a stylized discursive form created by the “bodily acts” of subjects 
repeated through time (p. 520). 
 While Butler focuses on gendered bodies, my theorization of the CWB follows scholars 
who extend performativity, and its related intuitions, to make sense of the production and 
regulation of norms of political bodies, such as states and settler collectives (Cameron, 2015; D. 
MacKenzie, Muniesa, & Siu, 2007; Mitchell, 2002, 2007; Mountz, 2003). For example, 
geographer Emilie Cameron (2015) examines the performance of “iconic” stories of white settler 
encounters with Inuit in the North of Canada (particularly the travel narratives of Samuel Hearn), 
in ordering relations of the Canadian state, settler society, and industry with Inuit. As with the 
mundane and repetitive production and regulation of sex and gender norms, Cameron 
demonstrates how the everyday storying practices of settlers “… not only order and naturalize 
forms of violence, domination, extraction and dispossession in representational terms; they also 
intervene in material orderings of lives and livelihoods and they make such orderings make 
sense” (p. 26). Rather than interpreting stories as merely texts, Cameron sees them as “embodied 
material practices shaped by the social, cultural, environmental, and political contexts within 
which they are told” (p. 21). Thus, she opens up such storying practices to a place-based 
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empirical investigation of where, when, how and why they are performed and what relations they 
make possible. Another example of a study that extends performativity from the corporeal to the 
body politic comes from Timothy Mitchell’s (2002) book Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-
Politics, Modernity, in which he investigates the rise to dominance of expertise (e.g., civil 
engineering, administration, economics, accountancy and so on) in shaping Egyptian society 
from the height of British colonialism through to the era of development spurred by structural 
adjustments of the International Monetary Fund and visions of modernity. He argues that the 
categories widely taken for granted as universal and as possessing a pre-existing ontological 
status, such as private property, the economy, or the state, are in fact produced through the social 
practices that define them. The naturalization of such categories is largely accomplished through 
a combination of drawing and policing discursive boundaries between interlinking dualisms 
well-entrenched in Western epistemologies, a view that the state, society and economy are 
separate, and a commitment on the part of social scientists to uphold a distinction between 
apparently universalist abstract knowledge and the materiality of local contexts. Following 
Cameron and Mitchell, my theorization of development metrics rejects the apparent universality 
of the CWB and in turn interrogates the spatiality and everyday practices of experts in the 
processes of knowledge production. This entails examining the concerns, assumptions, 
abstractions, exclusions and boundary-making practices that constitute the index and the 
subjectivities and relations that it gives rise to. Accordingly, I set out to explore not only what 
the index authors and its users say but also what they do.  
 Another vision of performance that influences my theorization of the CWB comes through 
Actor Network Theory, whose foundations are affiliated with the work of Bruno Latour, John 
Law and Michel Callon, all of whom got their start studying how scientific practices produce the 
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world they profess to reveal. Informed largely by post-structuralist philosophy, ANT has 
developed what Law (2009) describes as “a disparate family of material semiotic tools, 
sensibilities, and methods of analysis that treat everything in the social and natural worlds as a 
continuously generated effect of the webs of relations within which they are located” (p. 141). 
This has been used to effectively unsettle dominant assumptions and explanations in the social 
sciences, resisting generalizable theories of power, agency and representation, as well as 
rejecting rationalist and linear narratives of development (see Mitchell, 2002).  
  According to ANT, a performance is a network. Whereas we colloquially understand 
network to denote a stable structure with nodes and ties, like that of a municipal sewer system, 
ANT networks comprise disparate actors—human and non-human, material and social—that are 
in flux (Latour, 2005). It follows that one of ANT’s central preoccupations is how new relations 
and networks—made of heterogeneous actors—form and dissolve, as well as concerning itself 
with how and why certain networks, or performances, are stronger than others. (Law, 2009). A 
strong performance depends on the alignment of actions, entities and representations and for 
such assemblages to remain aligned—a process ANT terms “translation”—long enough to 
become stable, but never static, as a new piece of reality (see, Blomley, 2007; MacKenzie et al., 
2007). Translation entails the alignment of disparate actor’s interests into a network with the 
promise that their separate goals can be achieved through collaboration. Along the way, actors 
necessarily compromise and alter their initial interests as a result of their new relations. If we 
hold true ANT’s assumption that “nothing has reality or form outside of the enactment of […] 
relations” (Law, 2009, p. 141), the methodological implication for my study of the CWB is, to 
borrow Latour’s phrase, the need to “trace the relations” in its formation (Latour, 1987, 2005). In 
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my understanding, tracing relations also entails an examination of social, material and political 
processes through which the index proliferates. 
 Finally, to capture the dynamics behind the variations in the force and effects of a 
performance, Judith Butler (2010)—weighing in on questions of the performativity of 
economics—turns to JL Austin (Austin, 1975), the philosopher of “ordinary language” credited 
with developing the foundations of performance theory. Austin distinguishes between three 
speech acts: statements of truth or falsehood, illocutionary utterances, such as a minister stating 
“I baptize you”, which enact that which the speaker announces, and perlocutionary speech acts, 
which depend on an alignment of specific intervening conditions in order to produce effects over 
time. Butler (2010) highlights that in both illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts, the 
agency to perform is dispersed rather than being held by a ‘sovereign’ speaker. Even in the case 
of illocutionary utterances, Butler points out that “… the speech act is a reiterated form of 
discourse, so we would be mistaken to overvalue the subject who speaks” (p. 148). Considering 
again the example of the minister, Butler’s point is that the minister’s pronouncement of baptism 
is itself a learned and codified speech act. The powers we imbue in the speaker are themselves 
contingent on internalized codes and rituals. For instance, the phrase “I baptize you” will quickly 
change meaning and importance, depending on the beliefs of the listener, and the authority 
vested in the speaker. After all, the performances of experts, using expert instruments in spaces 
of expertise, are likely to be more persuasive than those of non-experts lacking apparatus; e.g. a 
baptism performed by an unordained or non-minister outside of a church without the usual ritual 
objects will not ring as “true”. When it comes to defining Indigenous-specific development, 
consider how those experts who are equipped with indices that can be read at a glance, indices 
which themselves correspond with definitions put forth by an array of well-resourced and 
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influential international governance and development institutions, are likely to have greater sway 
using those indices than a layperson or, ironically, the peoples describes by those same indices. 
Butler is also highlighting how even those speech acts that are seen to enact reality are dependent 
on histories and sets of relations. 
 My theorization of the CWB mobilizes the key insights of performativity that I have 
outlined above to make sense of the state and the practices and cultures of quantitative 
development-based knowledge production born of state and academic institutional 
collaborations. To explore the performative work of the CWB, I have organized my thesis 
according to two broad aims. The first aim is to analyze the historical geographic context 
surrounding the emergence and stabilization of the CWB network. To pursue this aim I ask: 
What are the conditions of possibility for the CWB’s emergence; what are the practices and 
processes of the experts that engage with the index; and what is the role of power relations in 
producing quantitative knowledge about Indigenous peoples’ well-being? The second aim is to 
examine the new forms of politics made possible through the index’s proliferation. In this vein, I 
ask: What role does the CWB play in the performance of development discourses in Canada; 
what types of subjectivities does it help to constitute and by which means; how does it serve to 
order socio-material relations, and to what effect? Below, I discuss the more specific focus of my 
research methodologies, within an explanation of my understanding of the state and discourse.  
Methodologies  
 
 As with all institutions, the state performs a coherent public facade even when diverse 
interests and agendas are at work under the surface (Mountz, 2003, 2007). Institutional 
ethnography offers methodological openings for examining the spaces and socio-material 
relations beyond the facade of coherence. Take for example feminist geographer Alison Mountz, 
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who observes immigration officers, administrators, and policy makers working in the department 
of Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and who in doing so captures the embodied practices of 
these actors as they determine belonging to, and mobility within the bounds of, the nation-state. 
Mountz (2003) explains,  
Rather than an abstract, hegemonic, repressive, autonomous body that affects social relations, 
I conceptualize the state as an everyday social construction. This approach entails looking at 
the bureaucracy as a site where the nation-state is produced unevenly across time and space 
and where the everyday relations among those theoretically conceived of as ‘outside’ of the 
state bleed into the dimensions of bureaucratic life in fascinating ways (p. 626).  
 
Mountz’ approach to assessing the everydayness of state-building exercises is instructive for my 
understanding of the work of social scientists at Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (DIAND),14 who, through a network of collaborators (human and non-human) and 
colleagues (some of whom are conventionally considered to work “outside” the state)—
academics, technicians, politicians, policy analysts, and bureaucrats—produce “common sense” 
about and circumscribe economic development pathways for Indigenous communities. In the 
early stages of my project, I imagined conducting an ethnography in the spirit of Mountz’ work, 
spending time at a desk in the research unit examining the spaces and embodied practices of the 
state actors in situ as they collected, manipulated, interpreted, and presented data and deployed 
the indices to make decisions informing Indigenous policy. I was, and still am, particularly 
interested in the role of quantitative indictors in shaping policy orientations, as these 
 
14 The Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) was the name of the department from 
1966 to 2011. At the time of my visits to the department in 2016 it was named Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC). Before this it was named Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) and 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). Some of the reports that I analyze are published during the Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada era, but in an effort to limit confusion I generally stick to DIAND, which was the 
department’s name at the time that the indices I am studying were first being developed.   
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technologies at the outset of my research appeared to be both on the rise and under studied. 
However, for reasons elaborated in my methods section, I was unable to achieve the “insider” 
status necessary to conduct sustained ethnographic fieldwork in the department and instead drew 
on Mountz’ work to guide my research in contexts mostly peripheral of the DIAND research 
unit. 
 As my project progressed and shifted, I also drew indicator-specific ethnographic 
techniques from Merry (2011, 2016), whose work looks at the impacts and roles of human rights 
indicators on global governance using a wider variety of research techniques, but still within the 
purview of ethnography. Recognizing that indicators are increasingly implicated in the exercise 
of power in international governance (e.g., influencing political decision making processes, the 
allocation of resources, and the tracking of human rights records), Merry advocates an 
ethnographic approach that is attentive to the creation and histories of indicators. Such an 
approach entails, “examining the history of the creation of an indicator and its underlying theory, 
observing expert group meetings and international discussions where the terms of the indicator 
are debated and defined, interviewing expert statisticians and other experts about the meaning 
and process of producing indicators, observing data-collection processes, and examining the 
ways indicators affect decision making and public perceptions” (Merry, 2011, p. 85). My work 
attempts to respond to Merry’s appeal by tracing the systems of meaning through which the 
CWB is produced, maintained and proliferated. This includes examining the alliances and 
tensions of actors involved as well as instances of contestation, failure, and occasional 
dissolution of index networks in struggles over how and to whom these indices count.  
 To analyze the networks and meaning making practices and processes of DIAND 
Indigenous-specific development measures, I return to Cameron’s (2015) conception of “stories 
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as relational and material ordering practices”, which I understand as a sustained engagement 
with, and methodological intervention into, the predominant discourse analysis techniques, 
findings, and assumptions in postcolonial studies. Discourse can be thought of as series of ideas, 
statements, representations, and practices that produce a distinct body of knowledge; give 
meaning to concepts, rhetoric, stories, texts; constitute identities, and social relations; and 
condition political and moral outcomes (Barnes, 2003; Berg, 2009; Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, 
Watts, & Whatmore, 2009). Discourse Analysis in postcolonial studies is used to excavate the 
hidden or taken for granted systems of meaning that structure knowledge and social practices, 
including the ways that relations of domination and oppression are ordered and maintained 
(Berg, 2009).  
 Palestinian-American literary critic Edward Said (1978) used discourse analysis to launch a 
powerful critique of the power relations buttressing Orientalism—the West’s study of the East. 
He argued that Western imperialism was conditioned by representations and imaginings of 
Oriental spaces and those who inhabit them. Imperial domination, in all of its materiality, was 
justified and carried out based on the social and individual imaginings of the West’s difference 
from, and supposed innate superiority to the Oriental “Other”. Said’s work has been highly 
influential and generative for scholars assessing colonial and neocolonial power and disrupting 
the view that representations, stories or narratives are somehow innocent.  
 Cameron (2015), in her thoughtful and potent analysis of Samuel Hearn’s story of Bloody 
Falls massacre, both draws from and pushes against the now well-trodden path of postcolonial 
discourse analysis sparked by Said. While acknowledging her debt to this work, Cameron 
contends that examining colonial texts and discourse alone “… relies too little on geographical 
contexts, too readily conjures homogenized, stylized constituencies, and too easily accepts a 
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timeless, static rendering of colonial relations” (p. 24). Among the consequences she calls 
attention to is the tendency of such analyses to reinscribe the colonial relations that they seek to 
dismantle by foregrounding the actions and imaginaries of colonizers and assuming that white 
settlers are always and everywhere the most powerful actors in Indigenous politics and 
territories,15 all the while omitting Indigenous peoples’ accounts. This is to say, such frameworks 
prefigure the scope and terms of colonial power relations and resistance to them—that 
Indigenous responses to white settlers must be made “in modes, formats and terms that are 
dictated by, and legible to, [white settlers]” (p. 15). Therefore, rather than only examining the 
power of representation, Cameron traces messy, material, and contextual relations. In doing so 
she evades assuming and reinforcing well-known roles and lines of difference between settler 
and Indigenous, colonized and colonizer. Cameron’s treatment is instructive to my examination 
of the CWB. To follow her methodology means visiting the places and contexts where CWB 
stories are practiced, as well as being attentive to the broader political, social and economic 
structures and contexts in which these relations and practices are embedded. While I take up a 
relatively standard discourse analysis by examining texts, power relations and subject positions 
constituted through quantitative representations, their authors, and targets, (in ways that I will 
detail in the following methods section) I have also done my best to heed Cameron’s call to 
avoid “assuming to know in advance who and what matters in a given context” and instead turn 
to those messy contextual and material specificities and practices that come to account for how, 
why and to whom development indices matter. Before detailing my methods, I first locate myself 
within my research. 
 
15 Cameron’s work addresses specifically Inuit politics and territories in the North and in this context she uses the 
Inuit term “Qublanaaq” to describe white settlers. 
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Locating Myself in the Research 
 
“... whether positioning ourselves as compassionate witnesses, reliable observers, benevolent 
technocrats, accurate scientists, bearers of history, or champions of Inuit tradition, [white 
settlers] have a practiced capacity to write our own interests out of the story” (Cameron, 2015, p. 
174). 
 I became interested in researching the CWB in 2012. This was a time of reinvigorated 
struggle over ideas about, and definitions of, Indigenous peoples’ well-being, during which 
Indigenous self-determination struggles, including movements such as Idle No More, and 
Indigenous networks such as Defenders of the Land, were taking the socio-political foreground. 
There was also, however, a parallel ramping up of the Canadian federal government’s neoliberal 
governing tactics designed to undermine Indigenous self-determination, including legislative and 
policy mechanisms—the push for the First Nations Property Ownership Initiative/Act, Bill C-27 
(First Nations Financial Transparency Act), and Bills C-38 and C-45 (omni-bus legislation) to 
name a few. Yet, despite the public backdrop against which these Indigenous-led movements and 
these Federal mechanisms were interacting, it remains challenging for me to locate an exact 
entrance point for my own entanglement in the network of Indigenous-specific socio-economic 
indicators. 
 For many years prior to studying geography, I had participated in varying capacities in a 
range of social and environmental justice campaigns working with community organizations, 
such as Books to Prisoners and Food Not Bombs, in a number of American and Canadian cities 
where I lived and visited. My interest in geography started with a view towards a career in 
environmental science, pursuing broad questions and concerns surrounding issues of climate 
change, wildlife habitat destruction and water management. Towards the end of my 
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undergraduate degree at Concordia, I was swept up, along with over 250,000 other students 
across the province, in a months-long battle over the Liberal government’s proposed increase in 
tuition fees during the 2012 Quebec student strike. This reinvigorated my activist commitments 
that had in recent years taken a lesser role in my daily life. The experience also reoriented my 
academic interests. Through conversations and debates at picket lines and in classrooms, during 
rallies (“manifs”) in the streets, and over lengthy general assemblies, I became fascinated and 
dismayed with the extent to which neoliberal discourses, practices and logics permeate the day-
to-day. Additionally, seeing certain voices marginalized within what appeared from the outset to 
be a shared struggle, I was faced with questions of solidarity, with finding ways to participate 
that would hopefully support and involve, rather than alienate, potential allies. Critical and 
feminist geography as well as political ecology introduced me to a set of analytic tools and had 
begun to help me make sense of the power relations at hand not only between the student groups, 
the university administration and Quebec politicians, but also among those organizing to resist 
neoliberal affronts.16  
 By the time the student strike had reduced to a simmer, the Indigenous mass movement 
Idle No More (INM) was ablaze across Turtle Island. Led largely by Indigenous women, INM 
arose as an iteration of hundreds of years of Indigenous sovereignty struggles, and set out to 
oppose Conservative government’s Bill C-38 and C-45 omni-bus legislation that included far-
reaching amendments to the Indian Act, the Fisheries Act, the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, and the Navigable Waters Act, among others. In part, INM was a refusal of the 
state’s attempt to circumscribe Aboriginal and environmental rights to market logics, a 
condemnation of the Conservative’s amendments, changes that were designed to transfer a wide 
 
16 For a fascinating and in-depth geographic analysis of power relations within the student strike at Concordia see 
Matak (2012).  
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array of legislations into the government's economic folder in order to then manage and 
deregulate them through fiscal mechanisms (see Kino-nda-niimi Collective, 2014).  
 INM created space for dialogue and action surrounding the possibility of shared 
environmental and social justice struggles that would centre Indigenous voices and proceed on 
Indigenous peoples’ terms—an arrangement that settler environmentalists and scientists have 
historically proven to misapprehend and undermine (see, Willems-Braun, 1997). Attending INM 
rallies and teach-ins and marches for Missing and Murder Indigenous Women and Girls in 
Montreal, in tandem with classes in post/anti-colonial geographies, inspired me to revisit and 
deepen my understanding of solidarity. It also spurred me to take seriously the politics of 
knowledge production, including acknowledging the ways in which my privilege as a white 
settler conditions my intellectual pursuits and actions. To act with the aim of being in solidarity, 
including through a geography Master’s research project, however naive this may be, I believe, 
demands that I be transparent about my privilege. My position affects how I gain access to 
research spaces, subjects and material and how I move within such networks. It also shapes my 
choice of analytical frameworks and my ability to communicate my understandings down to the 
content and structure of my thesis. My hope was that my Master’s could be an opportunity not 
only to learn much more about Canadian history, but also to potentially use my privileged 
position to support Indigenous self-determination struggles, or more modestly to push back 
against the weighty power imbalances that permeate Indigenous-settler relations supported, in 
part, by quantitative technologies of knowledge production. The broader point is that the 
contextual entanglements in which I am embedded, including my personal trajectory, political 
orientations, scholarly influences etc., have oriented my research interests, the types of questions 
I ask, and my methodological approach. This is also to acknowledge that, while I seek to be 
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rigorous in my analysis, I make no attempt to produce a “complete” comprehensive history of the 
CWB—it is necessarily partial and contingent.  
 It was in the summer following the initial flurry of media attention surrounding INM, that a 
friend sent me a National Post article that first introduced me to the CWB. This friend and I had 
been discussing the politics of the recent intensified push for the privatization of reserve lands—
a push that came from a coalition of federal bureaucrats, neo-classical economists in right-wing 
think-tanks, and the First Nations Tax Commission under the leadership of Manny Jules (see 
Schmidt 2018). The article was essentially a press release for a study conducted through the free 
market think-tank the Fraser Institute, as well as a promotion for the First Nations Property 
Ownership Act (FNPOA), a piece of legislation designed as an opt-out mechanism from the 
Indian Act that would allow First Nations bands and individuals on reserves to transfer their 
lands into fee simple title (Flanagan & Beauregard, 2013; Gerson, 2013).17 The study itself, The 
Wealth of First Nations, an ode to classical liberal economist Adam Smith, deployed the CWB to 
generate multiple regression models and ultimately suggest that, according to the National Post, 
“First Nations that opt for proposed federal legislation allowing private ownership on reserve 
land could see the well-being of their communities improve” (Gerson, 2013). I read the report 
closely from the comfort of my parents’ house, a building located squarely on the unceded 
territory of the Sinixt Nation, in the Slocan Valley in what is commonly known today as British 
Columbia. The Sinixt, at this time, were in the midst of a protracted legal battle to have their 
very existence recognized by the Canadian state (referred to as the “Crown” in legal contexts) 
who had wrongfully declared them “extinct” in 1956 after their having been gradually pushed 
across to the American side of the border by the incursion of settlers and extractive industries. 
 
17 For critical perspectives on the formation of the FNPOA see Pasternak, 2014; Schmidt, 2018 
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This served the Crown as a justification for the complete denial of Sinixt’ inherent rights and title 
to the land, a denial that was recently successfully challenged in the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia by the plaintiff DeSautel who, on the long road towards reversing the “extinction” 
status, has won the initial case as well as two appeals by the Crown to date (Kassam, 2017; R. v. 
DeSautel, 2017). As I considered The Wealth of First Nations, the gravity of the Sinixt situation 
sunk in, as did my own position of privilege. I was faced with the question of my unencumbered 
presence on Sinixt land while they were in court fighting for recognition of their existence, to say 
nothing of access and rights to their lands. I was also struck by the power optics and qualitative 
differences in the Sinixt legal struggle for recognition of inherent rights and title, versus the 
quantitative expertise of white settlers in the Fraser Institute’s proposal that First Nations 
transform their reserve lands into fee simple holdings in the name of their well-being. (But 
consider, being deemed “extinct,” the Sinixt are not recognized under the Indian Act and are not 
allotted reserve lands by the state and thus couldn’t even follow the Fraser Institute’s advice if 
they chose to). All this led me to examine and reexamine the underlying question of well-being 
and the power of its quantitative definition. Drawing on this simple, apparently unambiguous and 
objective measure of development, Beauregard and Flanagan (2013) were able to tell a seductive 
story about property markets and Indigenous peoples’ poverty, and then provide seemingly tidy 
solutions for First Nations to pursue in order to attain higher levels of development—i.e. 
“develop stable governing institutions and property rights that encourage participation in 
economic markets” (p. 25). The CWB brings to its performance the conventional wisdom that 
development exists along a hierarchical gradient, which in turn motivates, justifies and 
naturalizes expert interventions in a quest for higher and more evenly distributed scores, where 
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all parties are elevated to the level of socio-economic status enjoyed by settler society.18 As I 
searched further into the history and uses of the CWB I found it deployed in a variety of contexts 
by a number of different actors, most of them institutional. I found that while there were 
commonalities in its application, it did not always reflect the same politics as those I initially 
encountered in the Fraser Institute report. At times the CWB was used as a tool for advocacy, but 
it predominantly provided a starting point from which various actors and interests would 
investigate and suggest development pathways. It was the emergence of new politics and power 
effects that have come to comprise this thesis. 
Methods 
 
   My research pursues two interrelated threads: tracing the conditions of the CWB’s creation 
(e.g. examining cultures and practices of knowledge production) and the material and meaning-
making effects of its proliferations (i.e. its function in shaping how “Indigenous development” is 
understood and enacted in Canada). I have structured the two empirical chapters that follow 
according to these threads. They also inform how and why I have produced my knowledge, 
requiring methods that attend to the metric’s historical development and explore its work in the 
present. During twelve months of fieldwork between December 2015 and December 2016, I 
visited and examined sites where the index is produced, maintained and circulated. This included 
four visits to DIAND headquarters in Gatineau Quebec, three of which were spent in the 
departmental library and the other of which included a visit to the Strategic Research and 
Analysis Directorate (SRAD—currently the Strategic Research Directorate SRD) where the 
indices were elaborated. I conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with the index authors 
and technicians who developed and worked with the indices (detailed below). I also observed 
 
18 In keeping with the free market capitalist aphorism that “a rising tide lifts all boats”.   
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presentations, in situ and through archival video footage, in which the CWB and its closest 
predecessor the Registered Indian Human Development Index (RIHDI) are deployed so that I 
could better understand the processes, politics and spaces of their circulation.19 The videos I 
analyze are from ParlVU, the online Canadian parliament streaming service, and YouTube. 
Finally, as geographer Lawrence Berg (2009) suggests for those practicing discourse analysis, I 
“absorbed [my]self in the texts”, reading and re-reading well-being index studies (both published 
and drafts), research briefs, newspaper articles, meeting minutes and official reports.20 This was 
helpful not only for identifying themes, but also, to use Barnes’ (2012) metaphor, to triangulate 
with other sources, such as accounts from interviewees or presentations. This was particularly 
useful for corroborating and occasionally correcting information from interviews, such as when 
interviewees misremembered details such as names or dates. It was also instructive when I 
revisited interviews I hadn’t wanted to interrupt, but which I hadn’t fully comprehended at the 
time. When, for example, interviewees off-handedly referenced organizations or concepts that I 
was unfamiliar with, rather than derail their train of thought, I would later return to the section of 
 
19 As I will elaborate later in more detail, the RIHDI was developed in 1998 (a few years ahead of the CWB) within 
the same research unit as the CWB. The RIHDI was modeled after the United Nations Human Development Index 
and is a population measure that produces scores for Indigenous population living in Canada (rather than a measure 
of communities) at either the provincial or national level. These scores correspond with those of the UNHDI to 
provide a basis of comparison between Indigenous peoples’ development with that of Canada and all other countries 
measured by the UNHDI. The RIHDI and the CWB often appear together in the introductory explanations of experts 
who use them.  
20 Drafts included: Treat Land Entitlement and Urban Reserves in Saskatchewan: 
A Statistical Evaluation (Flanagan & Harding, 2017). The Seven Habits of Highly Effective First Nations (Flanagan 
& Harding, 2016). The Community Well-Being Index: Methodological Details (received from the Strategic Research 
and Analysis Directorate in DIAND, no listed author, 2016). Published studies: I have reviewed a plethora of 
published CWB and RIHDI studies and research briefs. Rather than list them all here I believe it is more meaningful 
and productive to let those that I have engaged most closely appear in the pages of my analysis in the subsequent 
empirical chapters. Official reports: Similar to the I published studies, I will let those that I most closely engaged 
appear in my references. In general, I tracked and compared the use of the CWB (and the RIHDI) between the Plans 
and Priorities Reports to the Departmental Performance Reports of DIAND (then-INAC, Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada) from 2004-2005 to 2015-2016. I also examined departmental audits and research evaluations as 
well as a range of final reports from government organizations relating to the emergence and circulation of the 
indices. I also reviewed digital archives of defunct government and University of Western Ontario conference and 
networking blogs (during the early days of blogging).   
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the recorded interview in order to research and clarify the points that I had missed. In the 
following section I detail my methods and the processes of knowledge production I used as I 
traced the relations of the indices network and examined the performances of quantitative 
knowledge and expertise used therein. 
 My research involves a variety of actors within the following institutions: DIAND, the 
University of Western Ontario (UWO), the Fraser Institute, the Frontier Center for Public Policy, 
the Institute for Liberal Studies, the House of Commons and the Senate among others. That said, 
it is predominantly populated by the SRAD researchers and the social scientists at the UWO who 
came together in a collaboration called the First Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP), which was 
responsible for creating the CWB and RIHDI and ultimately spearheading Indigenous-specific 
indicator development in Canada as we know it.21 From SRAD and the FNCP, my interview 
subjects included a variety of roles including former student interns, professors, researchers, 
technicians, analysts and past directors. Remaining within DIAND, I also interviewed a member 
of an adjacent directorate to SRAD the Results and Performance Measurement Directorate about 
the CWB’s use as a departmental performance measure. Both SRAD and the Results and 
Performance Measurement Directorate are housed within the Planning Research and Statistics 
Branch (see Figure 1). Interviewees from outside of DIAND mostly included academics 
associated with the University of Western Ontario and its FNCP, with the exception of Tim 
Albert, a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technician who was integral to the development 
 
21 Since its start in the early 1990s the research unit has undergone a number of name changes depending on 
departmental objectives and ensuing mergers and/or separations of research groups. I use SRAD because this was 
the name at the time of my interviews and is therefore most commonly used by interviewees. I did not find any 
documented record of the name changes. This quote from an interview with a long time member of the research unit, 
gives some insight into the nature and potential for confusion of the name changes: “So the name changed a few 
times. We came together; we separated a few times. Maybe it was like three times since I've been here. So, it really 
depends, you know. There's a re-work and people decide to stick with other groups. That's right, when we were with 
STRAT [?] Policy we had SMD with us at the same time, in fact they were probably still SEDS in those days. The 
whole goal at that time was to try and get people in strategic policy to be wedded to the hip of the research group 
and the stats group. So it [the policy unit] would use the research and the statistics more naturally” (interview, 2016) 
 51 
of the widely circulated CWB map, and had also worked on an interactive web-based map that 
vanished—some speculated that it may have ended up in the sub-basement of DIAND (see 
Chapter 4: The CWB in the Wild). Finally, Robin P. Armstrong is a prominent figure in my 
research, a geographer by training who worked for DIAND and Statistics Canada through the 
1990s and who is considered a founder of indicator research at SRAD. Given that he had passed 
away in the early 2000s, my knowledge of Armstrong comes through reading his published 
materials, his indicator research and dissertations, and through discussions with his colleagues, 
although only one of them directly collaborated with him. 
 A good explanation of SRAD’s basic structure and role within DIAND (then-INAC) comes 
from its former Director Dan Beavon in an interview about career opportunities in the 
department (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2010): 
My group has two different components. One group is that of researchers, the other group is 
the stats side… The statistics side is the interface with Stat[istic]s Canada. We get most of our 
data from Stats Canada, from the census, or from other surveys. A lot of this information 
feeds other research groups in the department. I'm actually one of only about 55 research 
groups in the department, but I'm probably the only group who has a visible face because we 
do a lot of external publications. On the research side, basically we're like university 
professors, except we don't have to teach, and we actually have a budget for doing our 
research, so we don't have to beg for money. 
During Beavon’s tenure, the SRAD unit had approximately thirty employees, but more recently 
there are around twenty. The institutional structure fluctuates and individuals move within and 
beyond the unit assuming different roles and titles. By the time my research began, SRAD was 
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organized into four “teams”: Survey Development, Statistics, Research, and Knowledge Transfer 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Diagram of the Canadian federal government’s organizational structure  
 
 I laid the groundwork for developing my methods during a yearlong undergraduate 
research project conducted in 2014, which entailed a historical geographic exploration of the 
index. At that time, I requested interviews with the authors of a number of research papers 
discussing the production and use of the CWB. Of eight requests—some contacted through cold 
calls and emails, others through referrals from participants—I found a group of four interviewees 
who were instrumental to the development of the CWB and I subsequently digitally recorded 
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approximately five hours of semi-structured interviews conducted over the phone.22 Through the 
project I got to know some of the key actors in the network and I became familiar with the 
contextual backdrop, the underlying development theories, key debates, and the types of 
limitations shaping these development measures, as well as some critical lacunas in the field. In 
this Master’s thesis I continue to draw material from these initial four interviews to elaborate the 
early formation of the index networks—the coming together of the FNCP and collaborations 
with Robin P. Armstrong.23 
 Contacting potential interviewees for my Master’s research was a relatively straightforward 
process. However, securing those interviews often proved to be a greater challenge, as did 
gaining access to the sites where the CWB was elaborated. In the fall of 2015 I reconnected with 
two previous interviewees at DIAND to see about further research possibilities and to ask for 
recommendations for other potential interviewees. At the same time, over the course of several 
emails and phone calls, I arranged to interview Tim Albert about his collaborations with SRAD 
as an outside contractor working for Focus (acquired by WSP inc.), a geomatics and engineering 
company that got its start in the mining industry. 
 There were a mix of responses from those who I approached at DIAND. Aside from two 
people who directly declined my invitation and one who did not respond, people mostly 
expressed interest in my research and a willingness either to be interviewed, or to discuss the 
indices and answer questions more informally. There were those who were enthusiastic to meet 
with me and helped to connect me with their colleagues, and others who had initially expressed 
interest that later refused to commit or cancelled. Twice I traveled to Ottawa from Montreal for 
interviews that ended up being cancelled at the last minute. In one of these instances, someone 
 
22 To clarify, I did not count these as part of the twelve interviews discussed above. 
23 I received ethical approval to conduct my undergraduate research through the Departmental Ethics Committee at 
the Department of Geography Planning and Environment, Concordia University. 
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else from the research unit was willing to fill-in for their colleague. In the other instance I 
changed gears and instead conducted research in the INAC library. On another occasion, I found 
my request to be the source of bureaucratic jurisdictional tensions as colleagues messaged back 
and forth about which departmental unit was responsible to address my request. After a string of 
group emails spanning seven months, from early May to late November 2016, and after my 
having forwarded a set of questions to be reviewed (Appendix A), one of the people from the 
group finally agreed to meet me. Unfortunately, they sent the confirmation the day I visited the 
department, which I did not see until after I had already left; thus, I missed my opportunity for 
the in situ interview, although we did reconnect by phone at a later date. 
 Of my twelve interviews, most were conducted over the phone. Only one ended up taking 
place in the research unit, allowing me a highly limited but fascinating opportunity to observe the 
space. Another was conducted in the basement studio/office of Dan Beavon in a suburb of 
Ottawa. A subsequent interview with Beavon took place via Skype. Most interviews lasted about 
an hour, although a few took ninety minutes. Most were also recorded with a hand-held digital 
recorder, with the exceptions of three interviews where the interviewees requested not to be 
recorded, in which case I simply took notes during the discussion. The interviews included both 
general questions about the background of the interviewee, their role in the index network and 
then more specific questions about the day-to-day practices and processes of their work. In 
relevant situations, I prepared for interviews by reading index studies conducted by the specific 
interviewee in question, as well as sometimes reading sections of their dissertations as a way to 
have a more directed and conversational exchange. Whenever possible, I tried to encourage an 
open discussion or engagement that allowed for the researchers to tell stories about their 
backgrounds and work in detail. At times this also lead into discussions about broader themes 
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surrounding the politics of Indigenous–state relations and economic development, while still 
revolving around the subject of the CWB and its related indices. In two instances, interviewees 
had requested to preview questions, leading to discussions that were understandably more 
circumscribed.  
 I believe that my position as an academic-in-training likely greatly influenced my ability to 
access these interviewees and these spaces. This both opened up certain opportunities and 
blocked access to certain actors, depending on the specific circumstances. For instance, during 
my undergraduate thesis project, one interviewee would not offer me contact information for the 
retirees who had worked on the CWB. This same person, however, was comfortable in 
connecting me with some of their colleagues in academia. I imagined several explanations for 
this at the time, a policy perhaps, this person’s not feeling sufficiently comfortable in their 
position within the network to offer such information, or simply their protective desire to keep 
these retirees free from unsolicited interruptions to their daily life. However, once a Master’s 
student, a different colleague of this first interviewee formally and without hesitation introduced 
me, via email, to these same retirees. In other instances, interviewees openly expressed both 
sympathies and camaraderie, reminiscing with me about their own experiences as junior 
academics. On occasion, people expressed suspicion about my work, suggesting that I might use 
information from the interviews in ways that might be damaging. At the end of one interview 
(2014), an interviewee asked offhandedly, “So, you're not going to write down anything that's 
going to get me in trouble or anything?” followed by an apprehensive laugh. In this instance, my 
position as an academic examining the work of civil servants seemed to shift power relations in 
ways I was not expecting.  
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 One final consideration relating to access and power relations in my research is that, as a 
white academic, access to INAC spaces appeared simply as a matter of following protocol—
calling ahead of time to schedule a visit, signing in at the security desk, and having someone 
from within the department willing to accompany me through the metal detectors and up the 
elevators to my destination. It would be easy for me to take for granted this access as a more or 
less democratized and egalitarian process (practically anyone can get in if they follow the 
appropriate steps). However, I am not blind to the multifarious and sometimes subtler 
manifestations of white settler privilege that afford me a position in a Canadian university in the 
first place, nor to the histories of colonial pillage that benefitted first my ancestors and now me, 
so that my access to these contemporary bureaucratic spaces is made readily and without 
question.   
 In addition to interviews, I was interested in observing the spaces and sets of relations 
surrounding the (re)production, maintenance and proliferation of the indices themselves. In my 
initial email requests to potential interviewees and in phone calls with the research unit I inquired 
about visiting SRAD and the Statistics Canada Research Data Centres to observe any 
engagements or elaborations of the index “in action”. I suggested attending presentations or 
meetings that would involve the CWB as possibilities for my observations. It appeared that my 
timing was poor. The responses I received indicated that I was welcome to arrange a visit to the 
department, but that I wasn’t likely to see the CWB in action. This was due in part to the fact that 
I had just missed the most recent re-production of the CWB; it is produced once every five years 
following the cycles of the census. Further, even if my timing had been better, it was explained 
to me, the Research Data Centres where the CWB is assembled are secure locations and would 
require special permissions for me to gain access. As an observer of the space and research 
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practices of others, rather than a researcher accessing quantitative data for my own project, I was 
told it would be a greater challenge, not to mention that it would require coordination with the 
INAC researchers whom I would hope to accompany—a big ask to say the least. Instead, I was 
sent a statistical analysis package (Statistical Analysis Software code) used to calculate the latest 
CWB and a draft of a soon-to-be-published document explaining the methodologies in producing 
the CWB. I did not hear back about any departmental meetings involving the CWB. I also 
reached out to the INAC library in search of archival material about the history and structure of 
the SRAD unit. Somewhat comically, this request was redirected through emails to the same 
people I was in the process of appealing to for interviews. When dealing with a relatively small 
and prolific research unit, it became increasingly clear that many roads led to the same place.  
 While I was limited in observing the researcher’s cultures and practices within 
departmental spaces to my one visit to conduct an interview, which did include a brief 
walkthrough tour of the cubicles and meeting rooms, a sequence of other opportunities arose that 
allowed me to gain knowledge of the embodied nature of Indigenous-specific index 
proliferations. Early on in my research, I had set up Google alerts to notify me of content relating 
to the CWB and RIHDI circulating on the internet, including news articles, press releases, 
government or think tank reports and so on. Through this I was made aware of a Frontier Centre 
for Public Policy report that deployed the CWB. After contacting the think tank I was able to 
secure an invitation by one of the study’s authors, Tom Flanagan, to observe him present his 
work at a one-day symposium on property and law at the Institute for Liberal Studies in Ottawa. 
This initially came as a surprise given Flanagan’s influential position as former advisor to 
Stephen Harper,24 as a conservative media darling and as a Senior Fellow at the high profile and 
 
24 Flanagan has been credited with organizing the campaign that led to Harper’s election in 2006. 
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prolific free market think tank the Fraser Institute. The symposium was elucidating, allowing me 
to witness the CWB “in the wild”, where I could get a sense of the politics, cultures and spaces 
generated through the CWB, including the types of questions and discussions that it engenders, 
and the concerns that are shared among an audience of predominantly white male law and policy 
experts (see chapter 4: The CWB in the Wild). While there, I took notes, recorded the 
presentation, sketched maps, and tried to absorb the details of an array of interactions and social 
relations. Afterwards, in an effort to capture the many details and my initial impressions, I wrote 
my reflections in the pages of my research journal, a practice that I also applied following 
interviews. Flanagan also put me in contact with one his co-authors/interns, who, through a 
phone conversation and a few emails, explained to me the details of constructing a new index 
from the CWB and raw data collected from the First Nations Financial Transparency Act.    
 In keeping with the observation of spaces, cultures and expert practices, I also searched the 
online archives of House of Commons and Senate Standing Committee meeting minutes for 
content relating to the CWB and RIHDI. There I found and pored through a selection of 
meetings in which the indices were deployed in presentations by politicians and invited guests to 
various Committees.25 The archive includes transcripts and in some instances audio and video 
recordings. I used these videos in an “ethnographic” manner, taking advantage as well of the 
pause feature to examine finer details I wasn’t able to scrutinize in presentations I personally 
witnessed. This was also my approach to observing CWB presentations at a policy conference 
posted on YouTube. The Standing Committee transcripts are also dynamic, although they do not 
provide the details of spaces or subtleties of exchanges between actors (e.g. the tone of a 
speaker’s voice). Finally, in my interviews, I asked for interviewees to recount in detail the steps 
 
25 The CWB first appears is in a 2004 House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development.  
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taken in the quotidian processes of index production, maintenance and circulation, something I 
was unable to learn through these other sources.  
 While I have combined various methods—interviews, textual analysis of reports and 
studies and observation of presentations to offer a detailed account—there remains a number of 
noteworthy silences in my history of the CWB. This includes the many people I did not 
interview who were involved in the broader index network through either SRAD or in the FNCP. 
Finally, given the challenges of providing confidentiality for interviewees within a relatively 
small group of easy to track public figures, I have included only the names of those who both 
agreed to having their names included and where it was most helpful to my explanations. In 
other words, for the sake of providing greater confidentiality to some, not all those participants 
who agreed to non-confidentiality are named in this study. 
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Chapter 3: Tracing the CWB’s Emergence 
 
Introduction: Complicating Index Origin Stories 
 
 To explain the emergence of the CWB, its authors commonly tell a story that involves the 
social scientists at the Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate (SRAD) at DIAND seeking 
empirical evidence to resolve a debate between politicians about Canada’s high ranking on the 
United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) in the 1990s.26 As the story goes, then-
Prime Minister Jean Chretien was boasting widely that “Canada was the best country in the 
world in which to live”— and the HDI confirmed it.27 Ovide Mercredi, the then-chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations (AFN), countered Chretien’s boast by pointing out the irony of a #1 
UNHDI ranking when so many First Nations communities lived in poverty. Spurred by the 
debate and a passion for unearthing empirical evidence, the SRAD unit took the opportunity to 
create the Registered Indian Human Development Index (RIHDI) and intervene with its findings 
in the form of a development “score” that would locate the First Nations’ population along the 
UNHDI scale. Once accomplished, the social scientists realized that having only an average 
score for the aggregate population obfuscates the diversity of conditions that First Nations 
experienced, and so then set out to build a community level index—thus the CWB was born. 
 This is undoubtedly a compelling and succinct origin story. It is easy to recount and offers 
a glimpse of the context surrounding the index’s emergence, something that can fit within the 
limited timeframe of a conference presentation, where the story is often told, before its narrator 
moves on to the pièce de résistance—statistical findings, geographic distributions of well-being 
and so on. Further examination of the published materials about the history and methodologies of 
 
26 A good example of this contextual anecdote being delivered can be found in video footage of a CWB presentation 
at a Canadian Research Data Centre Network (CRDCN, 2013) conference. 
27 See Chrétien (1997) 
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the CWB do not lead much further; its authors are busy “doing” index research and do not relay 
the messy contextual and material specificities of the index’s emergence. In contrast to the brief 
historical anecdotes and published accounts in which the index generally appears fully formed, 
this chapter argues that the discourses, subjects and material relations of heterogeneous actors 
comprising the index network are grounded in particular histories and geographies of Canadian 
settler colonialism. This chapter traces the contextual fragments, including the practices, 
assumptions, concepts of social scientists and the institutions in which they produce their 
knowledge in early Indigenous-specific index construction and examines how all this has 
contributed to the CWB assuming the status of a hegemonic proxy for Indigenous development.  
 Rather than detailing its complete and comprehensive history, this chapter presents three 
interweaving vignettes significant to the emergence of the CWB. The first vignette locates the 
index within the broader history of efforts of social scientists to make visible and track “the gap” 
in socio-economic conditions, and then examines the texts of two “pioneers” in the Indigenous-
specific development index network, detailing their efforts to create quantitative development 
typologies—a process of narrowing the development vision in accordance with limited data and 
to address the priorities and constraints of the state. The second vignette explores the centrality 
of the concept of Social Cohesion to the formation of the CWB and its closely related indices. I 
demonstrate that this concept was a manifestation of broader national anxieties about difference 
and societal change surrounding Canada’s neoliberalization and intensified engagement with 
economic globalization. Within this context, the First Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP) carved 
out an intellectual niche, built up their network, and began to produce their family of indices 
aimed at measuring, tracking and locating the source of challenges to Indigenous peoples’ 
development. Steeped in positivist and policy cultures, the FNCP did more than simply represent 
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existing conditions; they rendered questions of Indigenous self-determination and Indigenous 
peoples’ political concerns surrounding development external to the process of formulating 
expert solutions. The final vignette details the formation of the FNCP and a shift in the cultures 
and practices of the SRAD research unit towards an intensified quantitative knowledge 
production. Together the three stories demonstrate how, amidst benevolent intentions, expertise 
and state imperatives have predominantly driven index research agendas and design. 
 
3.1 The Trials and Tribulations of Index Pioneers   
Naturalizing development hierarchies 
 
“The key to a successful index is that everybody can understand the logic, that the data is easily 
found and easily reproduced census year after census year. If it's too complex, or the data 
disappears... [or] if you can't reproduce it over a longitudinal period then the value of that index 
is going to be reduced.” (Jerry White, interview, 2014)    
 
 This section focuses on the early efforts undertaken first by sociologist Lynda Gerber 
(1979), and later by geographer Robin P. Armstrong (1994, 2001; Armstrong & Rogers, 1996), 
to construct development typologies that laid the foundations for INAC socio-economic indices. 
I examine how their research naturalized development hierarchies and constituted subjectivities 
of expertise and its Indigenous targets. Notably, neither Gerber nor Armstrong and Roger’s 
typologies appear to have gained much traction at the time. However, they provided important 
methodological and conceptual guidance towards their indicator research successors in the FNCP 
and Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). My analysis sketches 
the contours of early typology production to reveal their material, intellectual entanglements with 
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the CWB and the RIHDI both. 
 The most recent of the two typological predecessors to the CWB and RIHDI comes 
through the work of Armstrong, who worked to produce early prototypes of development indices 
during the 1990s for DIAND, and later for Statistics Canada, in the same research unit in which 
the CWB and RIHDI would be produced,28 years before the FNCP got its start. Armstrong’s 
index work was inspired in part by the United Nations Human Development Index (UNHDI) as 
well as by the work of Gerber, who had created a development typology as part of her doctoral 
thesis at the University of Toronto in the late 1970s. Although all of the people I interviewed 
from the research unit knew of Armstrong and his indicator work, only Dan Beavon, who 
became the director of the research unit in the late 1990s, had directly collaborated with him 
before Armstrong transferred to Statistics Canada and then passed away in the early 2000s. One 
of the founders of the FNCP, sociologist Jerry White, describes Armstrong’s work as 
“pioneering”:  
Robin had looked at the UNHDI material and said, ‘you know there is something more that 
we can do here with this’. And he started to compile data sets of information. He wasn’t sure 
what was going to pan out and what wasn’t. But he just had some ideas that we should start to 
pull together some of these things. (Interview, 2014) 
 
Over the course of a decade Armstrong documented some of what he pulled together in a handful 
of reports for the department and in an article for an academic journal,29 detailing the limitations 
he encountered and providing suggestions for future index research. Beavon, recounts the 
 
28 In the study that I closely examine below, Armstrong has a co-author, Tim Rogers. At the time of my interviews I 
was unaware of Rogers and therefore know considerably less about him.  
29 Of the seven reports authored, co-authored, or supervised by Armstrong that are available through the INAC 
library two of them pertain directly to indicator and typology creation (Armstrong, 2001; Armstrong & Rogers, 
1996). For the peer reviewed journal article about DIAND’s efforts to develop indicators see (Armstrong, 1994). 
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influence of Armstrong’s typology work in the department: 
I can't remember, he [Armstrong] split it down to maybe four or five factors that differentiated 
the First Nations communities, but there was no comparison to non-First Nations 
communities. But it was the first time people saw the ‘Well-Off’, ‘Average’ and ‘Below 
Average’ and where they [First Nations communities] were situated [within these categories]. 
And what you could see... was basically Saskatchewan and Manitoba and the Northwest 
Territories were sort of the ‘worst off’ in terms of this typology he had developed. And the 
ADM [Assistant Deputy Minister] I had at the time... loved this. (Interview, 2016) 
The important point is that what today appears as a relatively mundane development 
classification scheme was novel enough to grab the attention of the ADM. This, in turn, helped 
to spur further typological work at SRAD, some of which would come to circulate more widely, 
producing material effects in its wake, and altering people’s understandings and actions 
surrounding questions of Indigenous development.  
 Despite Armstrong’s influence, his early typological work was seen by his successors as 
overly complex, combining hard to quantify indictors, a quality that would limit its 
reproducibility and wider application. Further, as Beavon points out above, Armstrong stopped 
short of a creating a system of measurement that would serve as a basis of comparison between 
Indigenous and settler communities,30 an innovation which later became one of the FNCP’s 
major contributions and an axis of their research portfolio. Another of his colleagues describes 
Armstrong’s contribution and the later developments as part of an early stage within the 
scientific method: 
It’s like what we see generally in science: somebody has an idea but doesn’t quite know how 
 
30 Beavon may not have remembered Armstrong’s (2001) last published work through Statistics Canada, in which 
the final of four research questions included: “Where do First Nations communities find themselves placed in the 
socio-economic landscape of non-Aboriginal Canada” (p. 2)  
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to do it but tries and you kind of go, ‘hmm... okay, yeah’. And then somebody else reads it 
and then says, ‘ooo, oh, wow—I would do it like this’ and then they publish and so on. 
(Interview, 2014)  
This is a compelling portrayal of the index network’s broader knowledge production process, 
however it should be noted that the citational trail leads back beyond Armstrong to sociologist 
Linda Gerber and still further to the 1966-67 Hawthorn Report.  
 The Hawthorn Report is the common name given to the study by lead researcher and 
anthropologist Harry B. Hawthorn, who conducted an extensive pan-Indigenous study and 
produced a two volume report formally entitled A Survey of the Contemporary Indians of 
Canada: Economic, Political, Educational Needs and Policies. It was the first comprehensive 
study to detail “the gap” in development between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations, 
setting out with the explicit imperative to produce information about current conditions of First 
Nations meant to be practical for DIAND officials to develop and reformulate programs (see 
Weaver, 1993).31 At this time, First Nations integration had become an official objective of the 
federal government; community development was seen as the means to achieve this (Shewell, 
2004). The Report had ninety-one recommendations, many of them running against the grain of 
DIAND’s operations, including granting band governments greater autonomy from DIAND and 
allowing Indigenous peoples be taught in their native languages. Its most well-known 
intervention advocated that Indigenous peoples be considered “Citizens Plus” in accordance with 
the substance of some of the treaties—rights and title—and based on the fact that prior to the 
arrival of European settlers, Indigenous peoples had a much higher quality of life. As Weaver 
 
31 At this time Indian Affairs was operating as a sub-department housed within the Department of Citizenship and 
Immigration, which had implications for how the department aimed to solve the “Indian problem”: by offering full 
citizenship into the settler state (Shewell, 2001). The Indian Affairs branch lacked the research capacity to undertake 
the study internally, so in 1963 the Government of Canada commissioned Hawthorn and a team of fifty-two 
researchers (most of them also anthropologists). 
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(1993) points out in her analysis of the report, its guiding philosophy was still grounded in liberal 
conceptions of individual choice and saw integration as something that would need to be chosen 
by Indigenous people themselves when presented with meaningful options, rather than achieved 
through coercion or assimilation. The report also took the position that “...further economic 
participation of Indians in White society seems the only feasible path by which to achieve 
substantial improvement in economic status” (Hawthorn, 1966). More specifically, the authors 
assumed that given a broad shift in the Canadian economy from more rural-based industries (e.g. 
farming) to greater urban employment opportunities, integration would necessarily be urban. 
Also notable was the Report’s recommendation that reserves be treated as municipalities.32 I 
raise these points because they resurface in the work of Gerber, and later Armstrong, 
contributing to a (re)iterative performance that works to naturalize particular settler norms within 
the development sphere. 
Pioneering quantitative community development typologies part 1: Linda Gerber 
 
 Gerber (1979) was among a wave of social scientists giving shape to the federal 
government’s official goal of community development in the decade following the Hawthorn 
Report.33 In 1979, Gerber published a study, The Development of Canadian Indian 
Communities: A Two-Dimensional Typology Reflecting Strategies of Adaption to the Modern 
World, marking the earliest attempt to produce a ‘community development typology’. Drawing 
data from a 1966 comprehensive INAC survey of over 500 bands, and using statistical 
techniques and technologies such as multivariate analysis, z-scores, charts, and graphs, Gerber 
 
32 The recommendation reads: “Reserves should be treated as municipalities for the purpose of all provincial and 
federal acts which provide grants, conditional and unconditional, to non-Indian municipalities, except where the 
application of a specific act conflicts with the provisions of Section 87 of the Indian Act or is unacceptable to the 
Indians concerned” (Hawthorn, 1966, p. 18) 
33 Notably, Gerber was not working for the Canadian government when she published. 
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sought to measure the extent and variation of community development initiatives. By revealing 
that a diversity of socio-economic conditions exists among reserves and showing that such 
variation is distributed in seemingly discernible geographic patterns, Gerber proposed to discard 
the stereotype of Native communities as “unavoidably poor and devoid of opportunity” and to 
show that “the evolution of communities with particular [development] profiles cannot be 
attributed to chance” (p. 405). Gerber’s fascination with the geographic patterns of development 
set the stage for Armstrong’s work and later became a keystone of the INAC and FNCP indicator 
research agendas, as did the narrative that by revealing a diversity of conditions, the stereotypes 
of reserves could be discarded. 
 Gerber’s (1979) work contributed to the larger body of social science expertise that 
sought to guide communities in surviving the processes of adaptation to modernity. For Gerber, 
this involved performing a balancing act between the fostering of characteristics understood as 
true to the traditional nature of Indigenous communities while also encouraging the kinds of 
interventions intended to provoke improvement in the conditions of these communities, so as to 
match those of the dominant “developed” society and to do so without disrupting the qualities of 
a community that upholds its fundamental difference from the dominant group.34 This tension 
emerges in Gerber’s effort to define community development and in her moves to draw a 
discursive line between adaptation and integration (or assimilation). By Gerber’s definition, 
effective community development amounts to equal parts “institutional completeness” and 
“personal resources”—concepts drawn from the community development and integration 
literature and modified to fit the available data. Institutional completeness sought to “define… 
 
34 My understanding here of Gerber’s balancing act is influenced by anthropologist Tania Li’s (2007) conception of 
“the will to improve”, a form of neocolonial governmentality in which the desire of the colonizer to improve the 
colonized group stands in tension with the perceived difference of the colonized group from the colonizer. This is 
also informed by Rose’s (1999) theorization of “governing through community”. 
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internal opportunity structures and determine… the degree to which potentially mobile members 
[of an Indian band] can be retained” (p. 405). On the other hand, “personal resources”, defined as 
“an individual's experience with mainstream institutions”, measured namely employment and 
education factors and was believed to either enhance or compromise a community’s viability 
depending on its relationship to institutional completeness. If an individual’s personal resource 
score outweighed the community’s institutional completeness score, it was assumed the 
individual would migrate and gradually (completely) integrate into the dominant society, thus 
threatening a community’s viability. The central idea behind Gerber’s project then, was to 
discover ways to maximize opportunities for individuals while simultaneously enhancing a 
community’s “viability”. More broadly, Gerber and her peers in the field of community 
development assumed that an alternative to community development was the encouragement of 
urban migration. 
 Embedded in the concept of institutional completeness is an underlying assumption that 
there are degrees of purity to a community’s traditional nature, and that this purity—maintaining 
the community’s distinctness from settler communities—is vulnerable to disintegration if the 
pressures of change are not properly managed.35 The role of expertise in guiding such change is 
implied in the very existence of the indicator project. Gerber (1979) notes the overtones of settler 
dominance in the concept of institutional completeness, and that Indigenous leadership has 
firmly resisted “the adoption of ‘modern’ behavioural patterns (e.g., elected band councils, 
formal committees, and hierarchical relations)” (emphasis in original, p. 406). She then goes on 
to describe how the concept applies to the development of First Nations bands:  
Whereas the institutionally complete band may be viable as a distinct community, it is not a 
 
35 This again draws on Tania Li’s (2007) reading of Rose’s (1999) “Governing through Community” 
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purely traditional one: native languages, elements of aboriginal value systems, and various 
other cultural traits may be retained, but for the most part the developing band is actively 
responding to modern conditions. The distinguishing characteristic of this particular mode of 
adaptation is its potential for allowing improvement in socioeconomic conditions without 
requiring total assimilation and structural integration… (Gerber 1979, p. 406)  
Here, Gerber envisions institutional completeness as occupying a sort of “sweet spot” for 
communities in which they might adapt to modernity (read “improvement”) without threatening 
their distinctness (i.e. their difference from settler communities) by falling into assimilation or 
“structural integration”. In keeping with the community development work at the time, Gerber, 
like Hawthorn, discursively delineates a boundary where adaptation ends and integration (or 
assimilation, seen as integration without choice) begins. It is then the role of the expert to foster 
the former without instigating the latter.  
 Based on the variously weighted variables comprising institutional completeness and 
personal resources, Gerber then generates four categories to rank communities according to their 
level of development and adaptations: listed here in descending order, “municipal”, 
“integrative”, “pluralistic”, and “inert”. While Gerber’s work effectively disrupts the foundations 
of the stereotype that paints Indigenous reserves as universally succumbed to poverty, she 
problematically constructs her typology on a foundational colonial trope that frames some 
Indigenous peoples as naturally existing outside of modernity, stuck—“inert”—in need of help to 
ascend from a state of pre-modernity. “Inert” communities are those seen as “not actively 
adapting”, or resisting development initiatives. Such resistance was commonly interpreted by 
social scientists at the time as evidence that something was culturally wrong with a community 
(see chapter 7 of Shewell, 2004). “Inert” communities rank below average in regards to ‘personal 
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and group resource scores’. At the opposite pole of inertia are those communities that resemble 
municipalities, at least in regards to their governance structure, and who are considered to be 
following the most—if not the only—viable development option. They are able to retain 
members through the provision of "opportunities both internally and within commuting distance" 
(p. 412). “Pluralistic” communities are seen as isolationist, having higher levels of institutional 
completeness than personal resources; while they retain their members, their economic scores are 
low. “Integrative” communities are the mirror opposite of pluralistic and are perceived as being 
at risk of losing their members to integration or assimilation.  
 Finally, in defining the highest form of governance as “municipal” Gerber follows 
Hawthorn’s assumption and further enrolls her typology in a performance normalizing settler 
colonial logic and interventions that Indigenous peoples have been resisting since the Indian Act, 
and even since its earlier iterations, such as the 1869 Enfranchisement Act. This is not to deny 
that Gerber’s work comes from a place of benevolence. Yet, consider how policy analyst and 
Indigenous rights activist Russ Diabo (2017), a Mohawk from Kahnewa:ke, locates the drive to 
transform Indigenous Nations into municipalities within a broader settler state effort to terminate 
Indigenous rights through the Indian Act. He explains that this attempt started with the fracturing 
of Indigenous Nations into “Indian bands” which were then meant to “become a collection of 
Canadian citizens living within municipalities without any legal distinctions from the general 
Canadian population” (p. 23). As Diabo (2012) argues elsewhere, the effort to terminate First 
Nations rights and title, and to municipalize Indigenous communities, lives on through the 
Canadian government’s contemporary land claims process—Comprehensive Land Claims and 
Self Government Final Agreements.36 
 
36 This process was first introduced in 1973 following the landmark Supreme Court Calder decision which 
confirmed the basis of Indigenous peoples’ legal rights as resting in their historic occupation of the land, thus 
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 Reading Gerber, it is clear that terminating Indigenous rights and subsuming Indigenous 
individuals and communities into the Canadian body politic is not what she has in mind (i.e. she 
is clearly not an unwitting puppet carrying out the settler state’s agenda of assimilation). 
However, as I have tried to highlight, her aim of finding ways for Indigenous communities to 
adapt to modernity while preserving their distinctness from settler society relies on and 
perpetuates a number of settler colonial assumptions, norms and logics deployed in the quest to 
manage Indigenous lives in the name of improvement. Some of these assumptions, norms and 
logics are hallmarks of the then-nascent community development context in which Gerber was 
embedded (e.g. assuming settler society to be the appropriate yardstick of development; 
positioning resistance to settler state interventions as a sign of  “inertness”, living outside of 
progress or modernity; assuming that Indigenous communities had somehow otherwise avoided 
adapting to influences beyond their lands). As Shewell (2004) notes, “...community development 
ideally is a method of self-determination and actualization yet [ironically] it is often used as a 
form of indoctrination to preferred paths” (p. 225). Gerber positions her typology as social 
science working to upend stereotypes of impoverished communities and to help preserve 
distinctness amidst adaptation. However, through revealing the heterogeneous values and 
aspirations of different communities, Gerber is also working to find policy makers cost effective 
paths forward in devising strategies for implementing development programs to encourage First 
 
forcing the federal government to seek a fast resolution to the many outstanding Indigenous claims that threatened 
the state’s claim to sovereign jurisdiction. The land claims process initially set out to “extinguish” First Nations 
“undefined’ inherent rights and title—borrowing the language of “ceded, release, surrender” from the numbered 
treaties, the last of which had been signed in 1921. After being rejected by Indigenous leadership, the state amended 
the language of land claims from extinguishment to “achieving certainty” on Aboriginal rights. Critics point out that 
the central principle remains intact, to significantly narrow Aboriginal rights and title in exchange for monetary 
compensation, fee simple title, and a top-down delegated authority for Indigenous communities under federal, 
provincial or territorial jurisdiction, all of which essentially render these communities into ethnic municipalities 
(Kulchyski, 2005; Manuel & Derrickson, 2015; Pasternak, 2010). 
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Nations bands choosing to adopt municipal-type governance models on their own accord.37 
Pioneering quantitative community development typologies part 2: Robin P. Armstrong 
 
 In the early 1990s, while working for the then-Department of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development (DIAND) Research and Analysis Directorate (later SRAD), Armstrong (1994; 
Armstrong and Rogers, 1996) began assembling the building blocks for social indicator work 
within the department, bringing his geographic training to bear on DIAND administrative data, 
and that of Statistics Canada’s national surveys. As alluded to earlier, Armstrong was a critical 
actor in the performance of the Indigenous-specific indicator research network, in part through 
his reinvigoration of elements of Gerber’s typology work, adapting these elements to the 
institutional and increasingly neoliberal context in which he worked. That is to say, compared to 
Gerber, Armstrong’s work was more concretely grounded in the priorities and constraints of 
DIAND, which had in recent years become interested in gauging improvements in Indigenous 
peoples’ socio-economic conditions and monitoring the gap between Indigenous peoples and the 
settler population. 
  Neoliberal governance was spurring the rise of what Merry (2016) refers to as “indicator 
culture”, broadening the scope of indicator development to apply in performance measurement. 
DIAND, along with all other federal departments, was obliged to define objectives for an 
“operational planning framework” designed to enhance its accountability to the Treasury Board. 
However, neoliberal governance was also serving to constrain indicator development. Armstrong 
(1994) points to a list of challenges to indicator work, among them pressures reflective of a 
department subject to austerity, noting “strict limits on the availability of financial and human 
 
37 In her conclusion Gerber (1979) writes: “Evaluation of developmental tendencies as well as the values and 
aspirations of the group involved, prior to program implementation, could prevent waste of capital and manpower 
resources” (p. 421) 
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resources” (p. 239). Armstrong also saw indicators as useful to processes of funding and resource 
allocation to communities, as well as a way for DIAND to demonstrate accountability to the 
general public, given DIAND’s central role in fulfilling the federal government’s responsibility 
to First Nations peoples. 
 The dominant discourse that emerges from Armstrong’s work is a systematic, statistically 
technical, geographically inflected, intently empirical focus on producing practical research for 
policy purposes. Armstrong (1994, 2001; Armstrong & Rogers, 1996) always includes suggested 
paths forward, whether pointing to ways for the department to source or produce more practical 
data for its quantitative research needs, or underlining the implications of his research for socio-
economic development solutions.38 Following Gerber, Armstrong and Rogers’ (1996) contend 
that by revealing the diversity of community conditions and by knowing the geographic 
distribution of “like-typed” communities’ better policy will follow, rather than a “one-size-fits-
all” approach.  
 In addition to Armstrong’s work more closely reflecting the priorities and constraints of the 
state, he also departs from Gerber’s typology in other ways. For one, while measuring many of 
the same socio-economic variables as Gerber, Armstrong and Rogers’ (1996) typology does not 
attempt to measure Institutional Completeness. Secondly, they avoid using Gerber’s descriptive 
categories, bookended by “municipal” and “inert”, entangled with linear and racialized 
conceptions of history and belonging within “modernity”.39 Instead, they start fresh with five 
community “types” situated along a “better-to-worse continuum” (p. v). In this typology, 
 
38 I should note that highlighting implications is not the same thing as making specific policy recommendations. 
Armstrong (as with those who succeed him) keeps an arm’s-length from the policy decision-making process. 
Instead, he makes inferences such as “innovative solutions will be required to rectify the disparities [between First 
Nations communities]” (Armstrong and Rogers, 1996, p. 29).  
39 Armstrong and Rogers do not engage with the variables that pertain to Gerber’s conception of Institutional 
Completeness.  
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communities with the best socio-economic conditions fall under the category of “primary 
industries”. It derives its name from the “primary sector” of Canada’s national economy: 
extractive industries responsible for Canada’s historic and continued wealth—logging, oil, and 
mining. This gives some indication of the underlying assumptions about the types of economic 
activities Armstrong and Roger’s development scheme has in mind for Indigenous well-being. 
The rest of the categories in Armstrong and Rogers’ typology are named in a manner that aligns 
with dominant vocabulary from the field of international development, in which communities, 
like nation-states internationally, are ordered according to their comparative socio-economic 
conditions: emerging economies; typical levels of on-reserve disparity; relatively high disparity; 
extreme disparity. Finally, Armstrong and Rogers do not explicitly explore questions of 
Indigenous peoples’ adaptation that are so central to Gerber’s investigation, and they reserve 
discussions of integration to a single sentence in the conclusion of their typology report. 
However, Armstrong’s narrow treatment of the question of accessibility stands in for integration 
as a more readily measurable metric (measuring distance from a reserve to urban centre, for 
example) and serves a similar purpose—privileging conclusions about certain development 
pathways over others. For example, in an early investigation into indicator development for 
DIAND he includes a map of Canada depicting “accessibility zones”, delineated by isometric 
lines meant to show “how near Indian communities are to large enough numbers of people 
[100,000] to support regional-scale manufacturing and services activities” (Armstrong, 1994, p. 
236). In a later report, Armstrong (2001) looks into the accessibility of resources and urban 
labour markets for the socio-economic development of First Nations communities. To clarify, I 
am in no way seeking to diminish the importance of Indigenous peoples’ access to services (e.g. 
health services, access to clean drinking water), but rather am pointing to the more narrow 
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framing of accessibility at work in the typology production, which I see as myopically focused 
on finding inroads for Indigenous people to integrate into the settler economy. 
 Armstrong also brings strength to the indicator network by openly acknowledging and 
attempting to address the blind-spots and limits of the work. For instance, rather than exclude 
any discussion of Indigenous peoples’ dispossession as negatively impacting community well-
being, Armstrong attempts to model it (see Armstrong, 1994, 2001). Armstrong’s model, entitled 
Dispossession Model: Causes and Dynamics of Social Decay on Reserve, visually conveys a 
relationship between dispossession and conditions on reserves, including the impact of factors 
such as Residential Schools, the Indian Act, Child Welfare Grab and the Settler Economy on 
individuals, families and communities. While the model brings visibility to the violent 
interrelated systemic and structural underpinnings of poverty, rather than sweeping them under 
the rug, for better or for worse these factors are never transformed into measurable variables, and 
thus do not enter into the indicator’s constitution. Instead, they appear as a piece of the puzzle of 
well-being to be addressed in the future, ostensibly when resources are more readily available to 
support such a measuring endeavor.40 Relatedly, Armstrong is careful to avoid overstating the 
scope of the development view put forth by his typologies. On the one hand, this more reflexive 
approach shows a shift away from purely positivist traditions and a willingness to acknowledge 
the epistemic limits of indicators. On the other hand, it performs a naturalizing effect for the 
broader indicator network, bookmarking phenomena to later be transformed into quantitative 
language, flattening difference so that all things deemed to matter can be discussed in 
measurable and comparative terms. 
 Whereas the Indicator Development Project favored a process in which each community 
 
40 Armstrong’s model called Dispossession Model Causes and Dynamics of Social Decay on Reserve first appears 
in his 1994 peer-reviewed article (p. 244) and then again in a 2001 working paper for Statistics Canada.     
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adopts its own unique sets of goals and indicators, Armstrong and Rogers (1996) note that their 
own goal of producing a more generalizable set of indicators with the potential of mapping well-
being across communities will require that they draw insights from the international development 
literature. As a guide they use a model including fourteen goals of development housed under 
three overlapping areas of community well-being—range of choice, life sustenance, and 
esteem—that they note “is subject to the biases inherent in western international development 
science” (p. 4). Again, due to data constraints, only three of the fourteen goals were deemed 
measurable: housing adequacy, labour opportunities, and material wealth.41 
 Finally, Armstrong and Rogers (1996) include several variables that are “indirectly, but 
theoretically linked to well-being, such as geographic accessibility, language and elements of 
demography (for example, age distribution and migration)” (p. 6). Notably, these variables are 
not drawn from either the visions of development put forth by the Development Indicator Project 
or from the international development literature that had thus far provided the parameters for 
constructing the development typology. Instead, they are points of enduring interest to DIAND, 
relating to questions of the department’s jurisdiction and responsibilities including, for example, 
the federal government’s responsibility for providing Indigenous peoples with access to health 
care.  
 Before arriving at their five “type” classification scheme another round of narrowing was 
undertaken to generate statistical models, a combination of “factor analysis” and “cluster 
analysis”. The technical details of, and rationales for, factor and cluster analysis, are explained 
 
41 Some of the variables excluded during the early stages included: a healthful, balanced diet in all seasons; 
adequate medical care throughout life (with special attention to the early years of life); environmental sanitation and 
quality as it pertains to human health and control of disease; safety of a person and possessions; freedom of anxiety 
about the future well-being of one’s children and descendants; absence of a reason to harm oneself; freedom of 
conscience and belief; access to technology; opportunity to acquire and develop skills and knowledge; a social and 
political and milieu wherein people enjoy equality. Other variables that that proved challenging to fully represent 
with data were later dropped following statistical tests. (Armstrong & Rogers, 1996, p. 5)  
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and then followed by matrix charts, tables,42 and three different maps which display the 
geographic distribution of the new typology based on the different factor analysis models the 
authors had run. Although the geographic patterns of development are most apparent only after 
having read the accompanying notes, the maps’ performances are powerful. The complexities of 
the social conditions behind the representations all but disappear, and what the viewer of these 
maps gleans instead is the sense of a deceptively simple and clear-cut First Nations community 
“type” and its relationship to adjacent “types”. Similarly, the tedious and time-consuming work 
of constructing the typology is hardly visible. Without wading into the pages of the report, one 
would not guess, for instance, that a “primary industry” community, represented by a upwards 
pointing triangle, included twenty-nine variables (the final number for one of the three factor 
analysis models after all the tests and rejections), not to mention that these twenty-nine variables 
had themselves been coded and oriented according to whether they were understood to have 
either positive or inverse relationships with “well-being”. Through the combination of the maps 
and typology, the well-being vision becomes readily knowable and easy to share, and the labour 
and subtleties that went into of the typology’s creation melt away. Even putting aside the ways in 
which the typology masks certain community experiences and codifies others, the emphasis on 
easy-to-read geographic distributions can be seen as naturalizing the contemporary status quo, 
and thus naturalizing land left, and the violence implicit and explicit therein.  
 By assembling disparate factors such as Aboriginal language, birth rates, accessibility, 
employment and so on, Armstrong and Rogers, like Gerber before them, are doing more than just 
representing existing conditions; they are participating in creating particular development 
realities, those that are grounded in, and that prioritize the concerns and interests of settler 
 
42 This includes statistical calculations of Z-scores, variable means and standard deviations. 
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society and state. This is not to suggest that the work is undertaken with deliberate ill intentions. 
However, it brings the authority and apparent objectivity of quantitative social science to bear on 
the questions of Indigenous well-being by putting forth empirical numerical evidence that, for 
example, “low Aboriginal language usage” in a community is linked to higher well-being (see 
Armstrong and Rogers, 1996, p. 27). Such a finding not only reveals the glaring prioritization of 
settler interests—the importance of language to the sense of well-being is irrefutable—but also 
omits the violence that conditions state researchers to ground such findings in a purportedly 
universal common sense. In doing so, the indicator and typology project participate, albeit 
through sometimes subtle epistemic means, in perpetuating that violence. 
3.2 Making Space for Experts and Anatomizing Indigenous Communities  
Social cohesion, national anxieties and eking out an intellectual niche 
 
 In the mid-1990s Canada along with France, Britain, the European Union and a number 
of international organizations—OECD, Council of Europe, the Club of Rome, UNESCO and 
others—began dedicating resources to policy and development-oriented social science research 
to explore the concept of Social Cohesion in the hopes of exposing the elusive social dimensions 
of development and finding ways to operationalize it towards governance and private sector pro-
poor initiatives. This vignette details the centrality of this concept in the formation of the First 
Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP) and for the expansion of Indigenous-specific social indicators 
developed through the SRAD unit at DIAND for two reasons. First, the concept provided lines to 
resources through existing and powerful academic and government networks, propelling the 
exploration of social cohesion; and second, it furnished a theoretical framework for researchers 
to formulate and test hypotheses about Indigenous communities’ socio-economic “outcomes,” 
creating an intellectual niche for the group of researchers in the process. In the following section, 
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I show how technical demands, aspirations for wider—global—comparability, and DIAND’s 
development-based policy agenda came to dominate the methodological design of the CWB and 
its adjacent indices. 
 The First Nations Cohesion Project’s major lines of support came indirectly through the 
federal government’s Policy Research Initiative (PRI) and its collaborations with the Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) that aimed to engage academics in the 
production of policy research through a government initiative called The Project on Trends.43 In 
1996, while overseeing significant neoliberal restructuring of the public sector and intensified 
pursuit of global market access, the then-Clerk of the Privy Council, Jocelyne Bourgon,44 
launched the PRI with three purported aims: developing a future-oriented research agenda; 
strengthening the policy and research capacities of academics and government; and facilitating a 
change in the cultures of government and academics. These were later narrowed to strengthening 
research capacity and creating infrastructure to support greater “horizontal” policy research.45 
Social Cohesion was adopted by the PRI as a central research theme, which then precipitated the 
formation of the Social Cohesion Network, a group comprising representatives from 
approximately twenty federal government departments and agencies, including a handful of 
experts from DIAND. 
 In 1997 the Social Cohesion Network began working intensively to develop a definition 
of Social Cohesion with the idea that the concept could steer Canadian policy while also 
 
43 For background on the Project on Trends see (Chapman, 2000; Coleman, 2000). 
44 Before becoming the Clerk of the Privy Council, Bourgon was Deputy Minister of Transportation and oversaw 
the privatization of Railways and Airports. Then, as Clerk of Privy Council Bourgon, working with then-finance 
Minister Paul Martin, oversaw cuts to the public service by close to 50,000 positions in Ottawa as well as launching 
a process of devastating cutbacks to health, education and social assistance across the country (Kellogg, 2011). 
45 While Bourgon’s horizontal policy research was inflected by neoliberal imperatives to “shrink” government by 
‘tightening up’ the management of so-called “soft” infrastructure such as human resources, social and foreign 
policy, health care, and sustainable development (see Jeannotte, 2003), the efforts to change academic and 
government cultures so that they might better align with one another was hardly new. Shewell (2004) reviews the 
major debates surrounding academic–government collaborations in Canada during the 1960s. 
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corresponding with international institutions undertaking similar efforts. At the heart of the 
Network’s formation and work was an anxiety that Canadian social fabric was showing 
symptoms of growing “faultlines”. This is in keeping with Jenson’s observation that the language 
of Social Cohesion was generally invoked by “those who judge that things are not going well” 
(as quoted in Jeannotte, 2003, p. 4). In workshops and reports, researchers identified a variety of 
sites and potential drivers behind such vulnerabilities.46 Notable examples included the 1995 
Quebec independence referendum, which threatened the perceived unity of the national political 
community. Within these same workshops and reports, Indigenous peoples were generally 
treated broadly as aligning with Quebec sovereigntists as groups “ambivalent about the country” 
due to historical factors—erasing the specificities of First Nations nationhood aspirations. There 
was also the suspicion that Canada’s 1971 adoption of an official multiculturalism policy and its 
related immigration policies ought to be studied in case they, decades on, risked weakening the 
societal fabric.47 Nonetheless, the FNCP found funding by aligning its vision with the broader 
concerns surrounding the pressures of globalization on Canadian society. The FNCP’s four 
founding professors at the University of Western Ontario (UWO), Paul Whitehead, Roberta 
Ferrence, Paul Maxim, and Jerry White were awarded a $600,000 grant through a SSHRC 
program entitled Exploring Social Cohesion in a Globalizing Era for their project entitled Social 
Capital, Social Cohesion and Population Outcomes in Canada’s First Nations Communities. 
Thus, a broad climate of national anxiety over the idea of social cohesion, coupled with interest 
in the same from the upper echelons of the federal government, made it possible for the FNCP to 
 
46 I specifically examine: The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 1999 Final 
Report on Social Cohesion; Social Cohesion: The Canadian Urban Context (Toye, 2007) Report for Library of 
Parliament, Political and Social Affairs Division, Canada; Inclusion for All: A Canadian Roadmap to Social 
Cohesion Insights from Structured Conversations (Government of Canada, 2001); and Social Cohesion: Insights 
from Canadian Research, Sharon Jeannotte (2003) Strategic Research and Analysis (SRA) Strategic Planning and 
Policy Coordination Department of Canadian Heritage 
47 For in-depth critical analysis of multiculturalism in Canada see Chazan, Helps, Stanley, & Thakkar (2011) 
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secure the resources necessary to stabilize itself within a scientific knowledge production 
network. 
 As a burgeoning theoretical framework with no widely-agreed upon singular definition, 
Social Cohesion was a windfall for the FNCP as they set about constructing tools and amassing 
resources to steer policy. As Jerry White (interview, 2014) explained, “we [the FNCP] worked 
with the OECD on Social Cohesion. We started looking at trying to develop a more global or 
generalizable theory around cohesion that would allow us to predict population outcomes” 
(Figure 2). Aware of the pitfalls encountered by their colleagues in the Social Cohesion Network 
whose original definition struggled to gain traction and policy applicability because they had 
included difficult to quantify concepts such as “shared values”, the FNCP took a decidedly 
functionalist approach choosing to incorporate only measurable factors into their definition. In a 
theoretical model that the group held as the foundation of their broader research agenda, they 
depict three emerging social science concepts popular within the international development and 
policy networks at the time determined as interrelated yet independent variables—Social Capital, 
Human Capital and Physical Capital (see Figure. 2). Social Cohesion was seen to flow from the 
relationship of these variables and the group envisioned it as a dependent “analytic variable 
capable of explaining population outcomes” (p. 24). Crucially, population outcomes are 
measurable—including only phenomena that can be counted, compared, and ranked. So even in 
its most fanciful moments, where the social scientists pursued universal truths, seeking out “the 
features of our communities to explain the human condition… [and] to understand them and 
predict their effects”, outcome measurement tethered their project to the canon of evidence-based 
policy research and predictive modeling (White, Maxim, & Whitehead, 2000, p. 1). Still, a lot of 
theoretical heavy lifting remained to be done, particularly in regards to delineating the 
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boundaries between otherwise overlapping features of social cohesion and social capital—an 
opportunity for the social scientists to eke out an intellectual niche in the increasingly crowded 
community development field. They also set to work on the ever-present challenge of selecting 
appropriate indicators that fit the concepts and could be supported by available data. 
 
Figure 2. Population Outcomes Model. Source: Social capital, social cohesion and population 
outcomes in Canada’s First Nations communities (White et al., 2000, p. 3)  
 Importantly, this practice in optimizing Social Cohesion was the domain of policy experts 
closely guided by quantitative social scientists. The FNCP outcomes model echoed what Rose 
(1999) describes as the intensified investigation of collective life undertaken by sociologists in 
the 1960s in which they  “… anatomized the bonds of culture and the ties of locality that were 
thought to be the essential conditions for moral order of society and for individual and familial 
well-being” (p. 175). Each form of Capital provided new points of intervention for potential 
programs meant to enhance the functionality and capacities of the target communities. For 
example, in the FNCP’s effort to create an index of “community capacity”, the researcher’s 
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investigation of Human Capital precipitated an analysis of demographic information such as a 
community’s population size, “Age dependency ratio”, “Occupational Diversity” and 
Educational attainment (White & Maxim, 2003). Each of these components was considered to 
reveal truths about a community’s capacity to take over the management of Health and Social 
programs from the federal government. Social Capital, also considered to reflect a collective’s 
capacity, brought about an analysis of a community’s trust or the trustworthiness of its 
institutions and civic engagement (i.e. institutions and governance)—which, despite efforts to 
simplify through wedding the concept to “outcomes” proved to be a significant challenge to 
quantify. Evoking Gerber’s (1979) much earlier attempt to strike the right balance between a 
community’s “institution completeness” and “personal resources” so that its adaptation to 
modernity would not threaten its vitality, the outcomes model, with its aim of ultimately 
improving the functioning of a community, was believed to reveal how well a community’s 
“constituents adhere to the collective” (White et al., 2000, p. 4). This created an opening for a 
further analysis of a community’s inner workings and for purportedly transformative policy 
interventions to follow. Further, Social Cohesion was believed to expose the extent to which 
“communities can draw on civic involvement, positive norms, trust and trustworthiness while 
having education and training based skills and the requisite financial and physical resources… 
[including] how a community manages its diversity and resources through established 
institutions for the benefit of its constituents” (p. 4). 
 The discourse of First Nations uniqueness was at the heart of the FNCP indicator research. 
Whereas Gerber’s (1979) work held the distinctness of Indigenous communities to exist 
according to degrees of purity in their traditional nature, the FNCP set aside questions of culture, 
given its heterogeneity, and instead committed to an evidence-based and technical course of 
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inquiry—examining First Nations’ demographic uniqueness. Nonetheless, on closer inspection, 
the FNCP understood demographic uniqueness to rest somewhere in the nature of the 
communities. In their words: 
We are centrally concerned, as social scientists, with what makes the population outcomes of 
the First Nations peoples so unique. The First Nations communities in Canada share a 
demography that sets them apart from the non-Aboriginal communities. Despite being 
particularistic by culture and geography they share commonalities across the country. We 
believe the key to this enigma lies in the very nature of the communities and how different 
social and physical resources interact to effect the cohesion of those communities. (Emphasis 
mine, White et al., 2000, p. 2) 
In understanding communities to be distinct because of their lack of development, and to believe 
this as emanating from “the very nature” of First Nations communities, the FNCP participate in 
an iterative performance, one that (re)produces deficit Indigenous subjectivities through 
quantitative social science methodologies and technologies (see Walter & Andersen, 2013). The 
performance is characteristically depoliticizing—eschewing inquiries into the relationship 
between settler practices and Indigenous peoples’ impoverishment.48 Instead, as I have detailed 
above, the FNCP engages in technical assessments of a community’s internal relations and 
capacities. This performance is iterative in that it builds on and (re)makes the intellectual 
common sense constructed through the particular histories of quantitative social sciences in the 
service of the settler state’s official turn to community development and sharing orientations, 
assumptions and exclusions with its intellectual predecessors such as Gerber and Armstrong. In 
 
48 I borrow this insight from Cameron’s (2012) critique of the dominant framework in studies of human 
vulnerabilities and adaptation to climate change in the Arctic. Cameron in turn engages Li’s (2007) Will To Improve 
to interrogate the exclusions and orientations in this field of research that “lead scholars to systematically overlook 
the immense importance of resource extraction and shipping as human dimensions of climate change in the 
Canadian Arctic”. 
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turn, it conditions the possibilities of Indigenous development-based indicator research yet to 
come and signals the orientation of development interventions and where the responsibilities for 
improvement of conditions will lie (as I explore further in Chapter 4:The CWB in the Wild). 
The Academic–State Nexus and the Quest for Policy Relevance 
 
 The government-wide social cohesion initiative was part of a concerted effort to wed 
research and policy. From the outset, the social scientists at the University of Western Ontario 
(UWO) were ardent proponents of such a union, spearheading what they termed the “research-
policy nexus”. The scholars formed a “strategic partnership” with the researchers in the SRAD 
unit under the banner of the First Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP). Contending that “the need 
for policy relevant research has never been greater…” the group positioned itself as a team of 
social scientists “both in and out of government” willing to work through deeply entrenched 
cultural differences between academics and policy makers in the name of producing better policy 
to address poor Aboriginal conditions (White, 2003, p. xv). In the words of sociologist Jerry 
White, one of the FNCP founders: 
Any hope of pushing forward the resolution of these issues rests on developing a research-
policy maker interaction… Making public policy that addresses the socio-economic 
difficulties and the resultant health and social conditions that face Aboriginal peoples requires 
a refined scientific investigation of the true conditions facing the Aboriginal population in 
Canada. (White, 2003, p. xv) 
This excerpt offers a good example of one of the predominant narratives justifying the 
emergence of the FNCP; an impassioned plea contending that all other avenues for improving 
Indigenous communities’ conditions have been exhausted, and that the hope of finding a solution 
to “Aboriginal issues” rests in expert collaborations to steer improvement interventions.  
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 Some of the group’s SSHRC funding supported the initial five-year collaboration 
between the group at UWO and the research experts at DIAND. Support also came through 
DIAND contracts created by Beavon to supplement his research team with student researchers 
from UWO. At the same time, the FNCP included an internship program where students were 
funded while honing research skills and working with data sets. As White explains, the nexus 
sought to bring together particular sets of expertise: 
What we really needed to do was bring together demographers who were also attuned to 
Aboriginal culture, language, history and understanding, sociologists that had the same kind 
of attuning, and quantitative methods people who bridged those two disciplines, but also 
could understand the Indigenous context. The last group was the Indigenous researchers 
themselves both at the community level and in organizations. (Interview, 2014) 
Regarding the aspiration of the FNCP to involve Indigenous researchers in the development of 
the index, White lamented the group’s approach: 
I think one of the things looking back is that we should have had more Aboriginal partners 
actually engaged with us. We did work with, and help to try and establish the First Nations 
Statistical Institute and others. That was certainly in the back of our minds that we wanted to 
not own this thing and use it ourselves, but rather pass it over to more Indigenous control. I 
think that we [non-Indigenous academics] have learned a lot in the past ten years on that… 
We probably could have been more upfront and more partnership-building at the very 
beginning of the process, but that wasn't necessarily the government way at that point at all 
and we were still just beginning to understand what it meant to do research with the four R's: 
Respect, Responsibility, and Reciprocity etc.[...] So, looking back I'd say we dropped the ball 
a little bit on that. (Interview, 2014) 
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White’s reflection is revealing of the culture of research–state knowledge production and the 
ways in which that knowledge production shaped the CWB. For one, White expresses a sense of 
social-pressure in which non-Indigenous academic culture, in the presence of state research 
culture, followed then-state research protocols, and that through all this Indigenous engagement 
was initially minimal. The sordid history of scientific and state research collaborations that target 
Indigenous peoples is shot through with similar dynamics, but is only being exposed and 
explored in recent years through the work of Indigenous scholars and their allies (Mosby, 2013; 
Shewell, 2004; TallBear, 2013). Another interesting point that emerges in White’s reflection 
comes through the order of operations in the production and sharing of the Index. Once the index 
is developed, it is then supposed to be ‘passed over’—pre-formed—to more Indigenous control. 
As I detail in a section of Chapter Four: The CWB in the Wild, this does not entirely preclude the 
CWB’s deployment by Indigenous activists and scholars in ways that advance their advocacy 
efforts or arguments for self-determination. However, this order of operations has implications 
when considering the performative insight that indices produce the truths they seek to reveal. 
That is, it matters who is present in the creation of an index given the social and political nature 
of these processes, and the ways in which the interests and techniques of the authors become 
inscribed in the index as decisions are made and contestations played out (Barnes, 1998; Latour, 
1987). The production of an index has implications for the subsequent politics and interventions 
that an index legitimates and enacts, often extending beyond the spheres that its authors may 
have anticipated (Merry, 2016). Further, the lack of Indigenous involvement in the index creation 
process leaves the metric vulnerable to forceful critique, despite the authors’ numerous and 
highly visible—often made in bold print—caveats regarding the limitations of a narrow 
conception of well-being (Canada, 2018). Yet, notwithstanding White’s self-reflection, the CWB 
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continues to endure, and has even flourished, as a hegemonic vision of Indigenous development. 
 By all accounts the assembled FNCP team was highly motivated, highly productive, and 
driven by a sense that they were working towards positive, impactful goals, achieved through 
“evidence-based” research with policy applications. Each of the FNCP participants that I spoke 
with came to the project with their own particular interests and aspirations which gave shape to, 
and revealed the limits of, the development vision. Most also already had interests that aligned 
with the work of the FNCP, although some expressed ways in which they modified their interests 
and skillsets to better align with the mandate of the organization. One of the then-doctorate 
students interning with SRAD, Nicholas Spence, reflects: 
I was very interested in conducting research looking at social inequality, racial, and ethnic 
issues, and looking to see if I could develop research that was, I would say, policy focused or 
at least had policy implications associated with it… I felt that I could really learn a lot 
[working with researchers at the SRAD unit], but also be a part of something that could be 
really ground breaking in Canada in terms of helping to develop indicators and helping to be 
on the ground level in terms of providing some kind of insights into what sorts of indicators 
might be important if we’re wanting to track well-being and decrease inequalities between the 
Aboriginal population and the greater Canadian society. (Interview, 2014) 
When asked about the challenges of shifting into work with SRAD, Spence describes the 
mundane aspects relating to assuming the subject position of a state-researcher: 
…just getting used to writing for different audiences, in terms of, you know, you’re working 
for government now. And working on specific projects that were of interest to them that might 
not necessarily have been my primary focus, say, working as a student at Western. So, the 
transition wasn’t really that difficult. Maybe just learning the data sets and learning the way 
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that research was done within the context of government [took some getting used to]. 
(Interview, 2014) 
 Dan Beavon, a former director of the SRAD research unit, shared the ethical 
considerations behind his motivation for getting involved in index work at DIAND:   
As an Aboriginal person, I didn't want to work for the 'evil empire' [referring to DIAND in 
jest], or I didn’t want to work for the organization unless I thought it was doing good. But 
being the crass empiricist that I am, I says [sic], 'well how do you measure that'? How do you 
measure whether or not we are improving the lives of the people in these communities? And 
that's what I wanted to be sure of. I didn't want to work for an organization that was not 
accomplishing that. (Interview, 2016) 
Interestingly, Beavon’s professed skepticism about working for DIAND is trumped by his 
commitment to policy-relevant research. Beavon did not elaborate any specific benchmarks of 
improvement that might guide his sense of commitment to working at DIAND, for example, 
whether he would track if the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations was 
closing; if there were improvements in average scores over time; or if there was an increase in 
the percentage of communities whose scores had improved. Meanwhile, rather than assessing 
DIAND’s performance, CWB studies tend to focus on issues with implications relating to First 
Nations’ courses of action, such as the value in pursuing Specific Claims processes. Moreover, 
neither the CWB nor the RIHDI were designed to evaluate the department’s performance, or its 
specific programs, although the CWB was later adopted into this role for a few years. Starting in 
2009-2010, it appeared in the annual Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Reports 
as the department’s key performance measure at the “outcomes level” and was used to evaluate a 
shifting assortment of programs. During the CWB’s tenure in this role, peaking in its number of 
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uses in the 2010-2011 Plans and Priorities and Departmental Performance Reports, targets for the 
programs it was set to evaluate were left undetermined or “under review”.49 Eventually, for a 
host of reasons beyond the scope of the present thesis, the CWB was dropped as a departmental 
performance measure.50 All this to say, while Beavon had a clear vision for and personal 
commitment to producing development measures, using these indices to evaluate whether or not 
the “department is improving the lives of people in the communities” proves to be a highly 
nebulous and complex project.  
 The important point is that the FNCP aim for policy relevance was among the ways in 
which the types of knowledge produced, or considered valuable, were narrowed. As one SRAD 
researcher described to me, the CWB was meant for use by the general public, but it was the 
needs of the departmental managers and policy makers that served as the bottom line. 
It was designed mostly to be, you know, useful to the department. Well… it was designed to 
be useful by whoever found it useful I guess, but you know, I guess if our managers find it 
useful then that’s good… Because if our managers, if policy makers here [in the department] 
use it then that's our gauge to say ‘okay, we'll produce it again because you guys are using it’. 
(Interview, 2014) 
 Finally, although the group of scholars and experts were recruited in part because they 
“could understand the Indigenous context”, the body of work they produced consistently avoids 
discussion of colonialism or dispossession, which is remarkable, if not ironic, given the 
 
49 For example, in the 2009-2010 Departmental Plans and Priorities Report the CWB target for “The People 
Strategic Outcome” was to “reduce the difference between the CWB scores of Aboriginal communities and those of 
the general Canadian population” (p. 6). However, in the in the corresponding Departmental Performance Report (p. 
10) the target is “under review”. 
50 None of the people that I interviewed were surprised about this outcome and saw the CWB as a poor fit as a 
performance measure. Among a variety of reasons was the fact that the CWB depends on Census data which is only 
produced every five years, but the Departmental Performance Reports were produced annually—i.e. annual 
performance targets could only be updated every five years.   
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preeminence of these processes in shaping the conditions and experiences of Indigenous peoples 
throughout Canada. It is not to say that these subjects are unacknowledged by the researchers I 
interviewed; with some, I had candid discussions about colonial power relations and their 
influence in the development context. However, as an outside observer, such omissions in the 
group’s research appear to be part of the culture of Indigenous-specific policy-focused social 
indicator research. As I have tried to demonstrate throughout this section, the quest for policy 
relevance and efforts to bridge divides between academic and policy cultures of practice has also 
involved a process of narrowing the frame of what counts, or what can be counted, in 
assessments of Indigenous well-being. Even while individuals within the network, some of them 
Indigenous, set out with intentions to develop methods to track improvement and contribute to 
positive change, colonial structures, including political-economic, systematic, structural relations 
generally appear as either irrelevant to, or beyond the scope of such a technical assessment of 
well-being. In the subsequent section, I examine an additional way in which the well-being frame 
is narrowed in accordance with the researchers’ predominant preference for simple models. 
Simple models reign 
 
I looked at dozens of different policy indices that either academics and others had 
developed… But I settled on the work of the Human Development Index [as a model for the 
Registered Indian Human Development Index], the work of the United Nations 
Developmental Program because it was simple (Beavon, interview, 2016) 
Despite numerous caveats from the group, the research-state nexus showed an overwhelming 
preference for simplicity in index design. Simplicity acts as an index’s armor securing its 
longevity, while complexity and nuance exposes an index to numerous vulnerabilities.  In one 
example, during a 2013 presentation showcasing the then-latest CWB findings at a Canadian 
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Research Data Centre Network conference in Waterloo Ontario, SRAD researcher Erin 
O’Sullivan remarks: 
I have to speak again to my love of, I don’t want to call them ‘simplistic analyses’—
complicated models are great—but more simple things, particularly things that policy makers 
can understand are so invaluable. Like, something like this [points to the map]. Anybody that 
does statistical analysis would know that it would be very hard to capture that pattern in a 
number, you know? But you see it on a map and instantly it’s understandable what’s going on. 
We have this clump of red in the centre, which is the lower well-being, and then the higher 
well-being tends to be around the periphery of the country. Breaking things down by region... 
any other break down you do, and try to do, just with numbers obfuscates that. And it’s 
always fun because [Indigenous] people at the end of the presentation, like, go up and, like, 
try to find their [community on the map]. (CRDCN, 2013) 
This excerpt reveals the discursive power generated through a combination of simple to 
understand representational technologies, capable of enrolling policy makers and others into the 
indicator development network with their ability to reveal otherwise invisible patterns. It also 
demonstrates the inequalities in which development knowledge is produced. The vision of well-
being projected by the index benefits from having been born of a collaboration between 
academia and state researchers; access to resources and far reaching networks are far less of an 
issue than they would be, for instance, in a vision of well-being carried in a song sung in a 
language with only a handful of remaining speakers. Further, through the simplicity of its 
representation, the index knowledge takes on the appearance of being universal, while the years 
of expert work leveraged to create development-based, policy relevant knowledge, is obscured. 
Individuals identify their communities on the well-being map and in the process the idea that 
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their community is part of a broader pattern of development is naturalized, including for 
example, the degree to which their community is deficient, compared to others. It is also 
important to note that non-Indigenous communities are left off of the CWB map, likely to serve 
the map’s primary function without unnecessary ‘noise’. The patterns that O’Sullivan describes 
emerge from the distribution of First Nations communities (based on Census Subdivisions) 
represented by one of five development symbols based on the range of well-being scores in 
which a community fits within—red triangles, for example, represent communities with low 
well-being scores between 1-49. The underlying logic is one in which Indigenous communities, 
bounded by Canadian nation-state’s borders, are distinct in their need for development. Further, 
it encourages people to visualize whether a community fits inside or outside of the bounds of 
‘development’, which in turn helps them to imagine that those who are outside of development 
will one day be included (Mitchell, 2007) (see Figure 3). 
 Through years of toil and experience, the FNCP came to realize that, everything else 
being equal (allotted resources, allies, access to data etc.), a lack of simplicity could spell an 
index’s demise. This was especially of concern as the group pursued aspirations to produce a 
more universal measure of Indigenous community well-being, one that could be deployed 
internationally. For example, the CWB eventually outcompeted its more complex cousin, the 
Community Capacity Index (CCI), which had been constructed a little before it under more or 
less the same conditions. Also, as the index network grew and enrolled a greater number of allies 
(particularly those with far-reaching influence such as actors associated with the United 
Nations), aspects of the greater index project thought to be too ambitious or non-replicable were 
set aside. Forging closer alliances with powerful international allies required the group to shift its 
course and abandon a number of its indicator projects, undergoing a process described by Actor 
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Network Theorists as translation (Latour, 2005). When asked about the CCI’s dissolution, Jerry 
White put it this way: 
I think that we bit off a bit more than we could chew. We sat back and we looked at it, and at 
the 2006 Aboriginal Policy Research Conference, in discussing with people who were on the 
standing committee of Indigenous Affairs of the UN, and Elsa Stamatopoulou [the Chief of 
the Secretariat UNPFII] and several others, one thing became clear: if we were going to have 
something that would apply outside of Canada we were going to need something that had a 
great deal of simplicity... I think that the CCI, when you take a look at that one paper, you'll 
say to yourself, I think, 'oh these are the similar elements that ended up in the Community 
Well-Being Index', but it's just a slight bit more of a complicated model and we thought [the 
CCI] would be less replicable and less understandable, unless we simplified it. (Interview, 
2014) 
In other words, the FNCP’s quest for indices with significant generalizability, with international 
reach, spelled the demise for all but the most rudimentary of metrics. Thus, the CWB, owing in 
large part to its simplicity, came to assume the role of the hegemonic Indigenous-specific 
development index. That said, White later relayed to me that efforts to disseminate the CWB 
methodologies to other countries with Indigenous populations targeted for development 
(including Russia) had stalled due to a lack of consistent data and due to political instability in 
the relevant governmental departments. 
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Figure 3. An early map of Indigenous community well-being hanging in the INAC headquarters 
in Gatineau, Quebec. Maps like this one have played an important role in normalizing particular 
understandings and geographies of indigeneity on which the CWB depends for its intelligibility. 
Photo credit: Noah Cannon  
 
3.3 The Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate’s Quantitative Turn 
Shifting modes of knowledge production 
 
 In this final vignette I examine interviews with members of the Strategic Research and 
Analysis Directorate (SRAD) at INAC and study official documents to reveal the contextual 
threads in a shift in the modes of knowledge production within INAC’s Strategic Research and 
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Analysis Directorate (SRAD) towards an invigorated quantitative analysis.51 In turn, I show how 
this contributed to the formation of the First Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP) and to the 
emergence of the Indigenous-specific development index network. Driven by a commitment to 
empirical-based policy-relevant research to the exclusion of other possible intellectual modes 
and interests, SRAD engaged in struggles over what, why and for whom the knowledge they 
produced mattered. Whereas the previous vignette privileged accounts of the formation of the 
FNCP from the academic perspective, this section focuses on the context surrounding the 
collaboration between UWO and SRAD from the perspective of SRAD.  
Born of a “failed” institutional joint initiative  
 
 In the years leading up to its collaboration with the University of Western Ontario 
(UWO), SRAD had been going through some qualitative transformations in its approach to 
knowledge production. The research unit had initially formed through a joint initiative with 
SSHRC, under the guidance of the then-director Victoria De La Ronde. According to one 
interviewee, “the joint initiative failed to achieve what it had set out to accomplish”, but the 
research unit remained active nonetheless (2016). Another SRAD researcher told me that unit’s 
collaboration with SSHRC was terminated because the two institutions no longer shared the 
same objectives. I found a more detailed account in the 1992 Final Report on the Interim 
Evaluation of the Joint SSHRC / DIAND Aboriginal Affairs Research Initiative Program which 
addresses the break up of SSHRC and DIAND (Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council, 1992). The executive summary explained:  
 
51 The official documents I examine include: The Final Report on the Interim Evaluation of the Joint SSHRC / 
DIAND Aboriginal Affairs Research Initiative Program (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, 1992); 
Horizons – Sunset Issue (1998) The Report on the National Policy Research Conference; Detailed Program of 1998 
Policy Research Initiative Conference;  
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Those objectives identified as being of priority to policy makers are shorter term in nature and 
appear to be incompatible with the full range of objectives for the program. Also, DIAND 
officials and First Nations representatives have divergent views on program objectives, 
primary users of the research results, and appropriate researchers... policy-making officials 
questioned the relevance of some of the projects selected for funding. [They deemed] the 
quality of proposals in the first competition [to be] lower than expected, particularly in the 
area of economic development... there is disagreement on whether the target audience for 
research funding should be aboriginal or non-aboriginal... [the program] has difficulty in 
reaching audiences outside the academic network. Within the academic community, there 
does not appear to be a satisfactory appreciation of policy relevance. Policy makers wish to 
play an active role in the selection of projects. 
While interviewees consistently described such tensions as “cultural differences” between the 
policy and research communities, the picture painted in this report instead reveals a power 
struggle over whose interests are prioritized, who determines what knowledge matters, where 
resources will be allocated, and who gets to make decisions about what.52 From my reading of 
the final report, while Indigenous peoples were the objects of the knowledge production at the 
heart of the SSHRC/DIAND collaboration, it appears that policy makers, DIAND and academics 
struggled to assume the right to dictate the terms, privileging expertise in decisions concerning 
research objectives, project funding and who stood to be the primary users of the resultant data. 
 What is particularly notable in the Final Report is the appearance and discussion of First 
Nations’ concerns and interests in the network. When the First Nations Cohesion Project would 
 
52 Such epistemic struggles echo what has long characterized the dynamic of academics and other researchers 
gathering of information on Indigenous peoples. See for example, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) Decolonizing 
Methodologies (particularly chapter four Research Adventure on Indigenous Land) in which she describes the 
institutionalization of such knowledge and its relatedness to colonial expansion and processes of empire building. 
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come together in the late 1990s, part of the mandate was to specifically address tensions between 
policy and research through the “research-policy nexus”. However, the omission of First 
Nations, or their inclusion at a later stage of the collaboration, was replicated in the very naming 
of its “research-policy nexus”—expertise is foregrounded, Indigenous peoples remain 
paradoxically outside the very nexus predicated on “First Nations Cohesion”. It is key to critique 
these issues in relation to the claims of social scientists that knowledge production is simply 
good in-itself, which flattens difference and erases underlying struggles. The Final Report of the 
Joint Initiative lists three options for the SSHRC / DIAND break up, ranging from a continuation 
of the agreement with “minor administrative changes” to discontinuing the program and phasing 
out its funding commitments after the 1992/1993 competition. I am unaware of the details about 
which path was taken, but do know that, following the department’s split with SSHRC, SRAD 
continued to produce research that primarily catered to the interests and needs of policy makers, 
even while later developing systems and strategies for disseminating its knowledge production to 
the general public.  
SRAD’s quantitative turn 
 
 It was within this context that Dan Beavon, a self-proclaimed “crass empiricist” with a 
background in criminology, transferred in 1996 from the Department of Correctional Service to 
join the research unit, a decision that he would second guess for the two years following and that 
would have lasting effects on the orientation of the unit’s knowledge production. Beavon’s 
career up to this point had been forged in the fires of audit culture, working for approximately 
seven years in program evaluation for the Department of Justice and then another five years for 
Correctional Service Canada in the field of accountability and performance measurement. 
Beavon had requested the transfer, pursuing an earlier invitation from Catherine Bragg, Beavon's 
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boss at Correctional Service Canada, but also a director at DIAND.53 However, he found that it 
meant leaving behind easy access to mountains of data and going where access to numerical 
information was comparatively scarce.54 Beavon's introduction to the unit also came as the entire 
department was (re)directing its efforts to respond to the recent release of the final report of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP). His first impressions were far less than 
favourable, as he recounted: 
The research group that I had, the director… a woman by the name of Victoria De La Ronde. 
She had a research plan that I looked at. It just made me sick—want to vomit. I mean it was 
just pure mush. I said to myself, and for a couple years I lamented why I left Corrections 
[Correctional Service Canada] because I am a quantitative kind of guy, and I'm in a data 
heaven where we control all the data. I had access to all the data there. I go to an organization 
that's just [pauses to search for words] got nothing basically. And it's just in disarray. 
(Interview, 2016). 
Asked to elaborate, Beavon continued: 
Well they got no data [sic]. Like, they have all sorts of different systems, but it's just for 
transactions. All the different information systems they have are for processing financial 
transactions. It was never designed for research purposes... beyond [the Indian Registry] you 
are basically dependent on data from Stat[istic]s Canada, primarily the census. Because you 
have some six-hundred-thirty-odd First Nations communities whose average size is only 500 
or so. All the large surveys that Stats Canada does don't go onto reserves because of the cost 
and because of the small size [of a community]… So basically the only source of data you 
have is the Census... which itself has all sorts of problems with respect to incomplete 
 
53 Catherine Bragg was an early champion of evaluation and performance measurement in government. 
54 Beavon also described facing a minor hurdle in gaining approval from the department to buy his preferred 
statistical software, SPSS, used in his everyday work. 
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coverage of reserves. But that being said, the research they were doing [scoffs], like the first 
project I was handed was looking at ‘Traditional Indigenous Knowledge’, written by a couple 
of academics from that program out of Saskatchewan. I looked at it and it was just mush. You 
know, there was no empirical data, it was just a bunch of ideas mashed around and, you know, 
they were thinking 'how could we turn this into policy'. And I'm thinking, 'yeah, garbage can'. 
And that was like most of the research there with the exception of one of the researchers 
there, Robin Armstrong, who at least was trying to work with some of the data from the 
Census. (Interview, 2016)  
Beavon's explanation not only emphasizes his tenacious commitment to empirical quantitative 
research above all else, but also points to the political nature of decisions about what gets 
measured, both before it reaches the SRAD unit and then again when assessed for its value in 
steering policy and programs. That is, research was not a consideration, or at least not a priority, 
when the Indian Register was established for the purpose of managing treaty entitlements and 
financial transactions between the state and First Nations bands. Now, decades after social 
sciences had assumed a prominent role in steering INAC decision-making, researchers like 
Beavon perpetually lament the dearth in data and continue to seek ways to modify existing data 
for wider, more generalizable applications, in the vein of a national survey (see Armstrong 
1994). Finally, Beavon’s dismissal of the research he deems “mush” is indicative of the narrow 
intersection between policy-relevance and an understanding of social conditions and the state’s 
willingness or ability to act on these understandings. Generalizable and comparable 
understandings of Indigenous “populations” according to development categories are key to 
constituting particular subjectivities, which in turn, through statistical surveys, support the state 
in its quest to realize particular development interventions. Further, such categories validate 
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other state interests and technologies, such as the Indian Act, to performative ends, building a 
sense of “naturalness” in their work (Andersen, 2013). In other words, these various state-
developed technologies, such as the Census, the Indian Act and development indices (much more 
recently) overlap and work to justify and reinforce each other’s performances/existence, creating 
an increasingly entrenched narrative that they are necessary, natural, and benign. 
 As Beavon acclimatized to working in the SRAD unit and being limited more-or-less to 
Census data, he began constructing the Registered Indian Human Development Index (RIHDI), 
the first in what would become a set of socio-economic indices produced through the SRAD unit, 
under the FNCP banner.55 Beavon set to work with the help of a student intern (first Mathew 
Cahoon and then Martin Cooke) producing a composite index that directly corresponded with the 
development ranking scheme established by the UNHDI, adopting and adapting its methodology 
to include three equally weighted indicators—life expectancy, education, and GDP (average 
individual income). This measure could be applied at either the national or provincial level to 
rank Registered Indian, under the Indian Act, populations relative to the UNHDI development 
scores of nation states. Beavon considered it to be a personal project insomuch as he did not 
initially discuss it with De La Ronde, given that, in his estimation, she “was a lawyer by 
background, [and] had no understanding at all about data” (interview, 2016). When he did finally 
raise it with De La Ronde, he explained that the idea had come to him through the PRI’s Social 
Cohesion Network and another of the PRI’s three themes, Human Development (see previous 
vignette). As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, Beavon also positioned the index as an 
empirical response to settle the ongoing high-profile debate between politicians surrounding 
Canada’s ranking on the United Nations Human Development Index.  
 
55 However, note that Beavon began working on the RIHDI before the FNCP was fully formed.  
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 Beavon would eventually present the RIHDI at the Policy Research Initiative’s (PRI) first 
ever conference Policy Research: Creating Linkages, a presentation that would help to spur a 
sort of quantitative revolution within the research unit, leading to a galvanized quantitative 
analysis effort and a concerted effort to shift the processes and politics of knowledge production 
undertaken by the SRAD unit. On October 12th 1998, Canadian Thanksgiving, and ten days after 
the PRI conference, the RIHDI earned a front-page headline in the Globe and Mail that read 
“Canada’s Squalid Secret: Life on Native Reserves: Income, education life expectancy worse 
than in 62 countries” (Appendix B). Beavon recounted that of approximately two hundred 
presentations at the conference, his was the only one from DIAND.56 In the days leading up, he 
was summoned to meet with Scott Serson, the then-Deputy Minister who was interested to know 
what Beavon was putting forward to represent the department. In the one-on-one meeting, 
Beavon presented the RIHDI to Serson. Serson’s response, as Beavon remembered it, was highly 
enthusiastic and he encouraged Beavon to “do whatever [he could] to get it out there” (Interview, 
2016). The following day at the conference, Beavon recounts: 
I go to the conference; we're at the luncheon banquet. I see Jefferey Simpson, who is the most 
prominent journalist in Canada at the time. I had worked with his wife […] so I knew Jefferey 
personally, because we would go to garden parties, when we would have office parties and 
you know, Jeffery would be there with the babies in his arms and maybe I'd chat with him. So 
I went up to Jeffery, sat down right beside him and said 'Hi Jeffery how are you doing?' And 
we started chatting and he asked me what I am doing. I said 'Oh, I'm presenting a paper'. He 
said 'Oh what are you doing it on'. And I said 'Oh, I'm doing it on this Human Development 
Index', explained it to him. He says 'Oh that sounds really interesting. Could I get a copy?' I 
 
56 Beavon was one of three presenters on a panel entitled How Do We Know Things are Getting Better or Worse? 
For Whom? (Government of Canada, 1998) 
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said 'sure'. He didn't publish the article himself, he gave it to the young journalist [Erin 
Anderssen] whom he was mentoring. It's the same way like I mentor students. He gave it to a 
young journalist. And so that was her first headline that she had ever got in her career. I didn't 
know what was going to happen with it. (Interview, 2016) 
The headline of which Beavon is speaking is of course the aforementioned Globe and Mail story. 
Beavon’s recounting of how this story began to circulate highlights the role that everyday state 
spaces and mundane interpersonal relations had in impacting how the Indigenous-specific 
development indices gained ground early on. It also points to the index network’s dependence on 
a degree of contextual serendipity; on the favorable alignment of actors and circumstances. 
According to Beavon, the headline sensationalized his research and then, “Every paper in 
Canada and every T.V. show covered it. It just exploded.”  
 This coalescing of relations had profound implications for the index network. Beavon 
expected fallout: “I went into work on Tuesday morning wondering if I was still going to have a 
job” (Interview, 2016). Instead he was surprised to find that the response from “all the ADMs in 
the department” was in fact enthusiastic and grateful. In the wake of the Globe and Mail article, 
Beavon explained how “the taps came on from the Treasury Board”, meaning that funding for 
the research unit increased. “We’re talking close to a billion dollars all of a sudden was just freed 
up like that, as a result of that study”.57 Soon after, Beavon was promoted to be the Director of 
the unit. De La Ronde transferred to become the Director of Treaty Policy. As Director, Beavon 
“...embarked on a whole building process. Building up the [research unit] and mak[ing] it more 
quantitative and doing that kind of research” (interview, 2016). This entailed deploying an array 
of strategies to shore up ties between the research unit and Statistics Canada, including efforts to 
 
57 I was unable to verify the amount of money that was directed to SRAD following the Globe and Mail story, but 
note that one billion dollars seems exceptionally high.  
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establish a Statistics Canada Research Data Centre directly in DIAND so that data was readily 
accessible to SRAD researchers without having to travel outside of the building, and to staff the 
research unit primarily with researchers Beavon hired from Statistics Canada. He also continued 
the push to re-work the ever-vexing administrative data. This is not to say that Beavon’s efforts 
were myopically quantitative; he supported other projects, such as contributing his time, 
quantitative prowess and privileged access to data towards the formation of the Aboriginal 
Healing Foundation.58 He also made efforts to highlight upcoming Indigenous artists in policy 
magazines that he had a hand in publishing. However, what is relevant to the development of 
index network is that under Beavon’s direction the research unit was ushered into a new era of 
intensified quantitative analysis, an epistemic shift which continues to characterize SRAD today. 
Around this time, the First Nations Cohesion Project began as a “strategic partnership” with the 
University of Western Ontario and SRAD. I see the emergence of the First Nations Cohesion 
Project as marking a turn toward concerted indicator research, given its preoccupation with 
indicator and index production.  
 Many of these indices took years to develop but did not manage to survive past the initial 
construction phases before dissolving, exceptions being the RIHDI and the CWB. Nevertheless, 
the creation of the FNCP remains a critical moment when considering the history of Indigenous-
specific indicator development, and in examining the types of knowledge substantiated and 
supported by the proliferation of quantitative indices. Moreover, the indices that failed to 
stabilize still helped to create conditions for the success of the CWB and RIHDI. For instance, 
they contributed to the expansion of the index-making network, populating shared published 
 
58 Its archived website describes the Aboriginal Healing Foundation (n.d.) as “...an Aboriginal-managed, national, 
Ottawa-based, not-for-profit private corporation... with a mandate to encourage and support, through research and 
funding contributions, community-based Aboriginal directed healing initiatives which address the legacy of physical 
and sexual abuse suffered in Canada’s Indian Residential School System, including inter-generational impacts.” 
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volumes, circulating in journals and conferences organized around common research approaches 




 Organized into three vignettes, this chapter has explored historical geographic contexts 
underpinning the CWB’s emergence. The chapter’s overarching aim was to disrupt the view of 
development indicators as having emerged organically to name and measure pre-existing, value-
neutral and universal categories. The first vignette attempts to show how the concerns, concepts, 
assumptions and research orientations of previous efforts to quantitatively define Indigenous 
development have contributed to shaping the CWB and its related indices. The early quantitative 
development typology work of Gerber grappled with conceptions of modernity and improvement 
and drew discursive boundaries between integration and assimilation while seeking out cost-
effective paths for programs and policies in support of the Canadian government’s development 
agenda. Decades later, under increasing neoliberalism, the typology work of Armstrong and 
Rogers struggled to incorporate indicators of development that might be relevant to Indigenous 
conceptions of well-being, but ultimately arrived at a narrow model that predominantly 
forwarded the interests of the state and settler society. These pioneering efforts and an overall 
dearth in data helped shape the politics of the indicator work that followed. The second vignette 
detailed how the index network, through its engagement with the concept of social cohesion 
(popular within development and governance networks), aligned itself with the interests of 
powerful institutional allies, and drew support from them. These alliances, in combination with 
the CWB’s versatility and rudimentary development vision, were central to the emergence and 
stabilization of the index’s network. Further, with social cohesion and “measurable outcomes” as 
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its epistemic foundation, the research network oriented itself towards investigating the “very 
nature” of Indigenous communities, rather than looking at structural power imbalances in 
Indigenous-state relations, for example. In this sense, index research also contributed to 
constituting deficit-based Indigenous subjectivities and circumscribing a development vision to 
capture the “under-development” of Indigenous sub-populations relative to the settler population. 
Finally, the third vignette examined the quantitative shift in knowledge production at SRAD, 
which included the collaboration with the University of Western Ontario, forming the First 
Nations Cohesion Project, and ultimately made way for the production of a series of indices to be 
produced with the aim of informing policy. In conjunction with support of its institutional allies, 
Beavon’s account of the early circulation of the RIHDI shows how serendipity and the mundane 
interpersonal relations within state spaces were also an essential condition in the rise of the CWB 
to its position of relative prominence. Having explored some of the key political, intellectual and 
institutional conditions underpinning the CWB’s emergence, I now turn to an examination of the 
politics of the CWB’s wider proliferation. 
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Chapter 4: The CWB in the Wild 
Introduction: The CWB and Governing Networks 
 
 The previous chapters demonstrate that the CWB is a complex and evolving product of 
expertise, scientific formulas, institutional arrangements, and much more. A close look at 
historical struggles and articulations through which the index was elaborated reveals an 
unfinished work that cannot be separated from the power relations that created it. This chapter 
seeks to extend my analysis of the CWB by examining how this unfinished network has been, at 
least temporarily, articulated in other projects and processes. Specifically, this chapter examines 
how the index has been articulated by governing networks within and around what is 
conventionally understood as the Canadian state.   
 The chapter is organized into four empirical sections. The initial three examine the 
index’s mobilization by distinct yet often interconnected governing networks for different 
purposes. The first section is divided into three subsections that detail efforts of the very same 
INAC scientists who developed the index to extend the index research network: first, I explore a 
variety of discursive and material practices and mechanisms deployed by the scientists to 
legitimize and circulate their work to a broader audience; second, I examine an account of the 
network’s failed web-mapping project to reveal how, despite access to resources and institutional 
allies, the proliferation of the index knowledge was never simply a given; the final subsection 
shows how in publication written for government audiences the index researchers emphasize 
their own expertise in order to contest Indigenous demands for land and resources. In the 
chapter’s second empirical section, I document how bureaucrats use the index to allocate 
responsibility and resources for economic development. The third section engages methods from 
state and event ethnography. It is organized around excerpts from my research journal detailing 
 108 
my observation of a one-day Law and Property symposium in Ottawa in which a researcher from 
the influential free market think tank, the Fraser Institute, presents his CWB research that 
proposes to “empower” Indigenous people by “freeing” them from reserve lands. The fourth and 
final empirical section examines instances of Indigenous engagement with and contestation of 
the CWB and the RIHDI in order to reveal some of the limits and possibilities its proliferation. 
 I briefly conclude by observing how these examples reveal the discursive power and 
performative potential of the index. Although the index can be mobilized by networks with quite 
different affinities and capacities, the resulting interventions are in some ways homogenous. In 
each case, whether the index is used for conservative or more emancipatory projects, it 
contributes to spaces and networks in which Indigenous well-being is analyzed with little to no 
input from actual Indigenous peoples. On the other hand, actual Indigenous interventions in such 
spaces and networks disrupt the index’s hegemony and open up space for other ways of defining 
well-being. 
4.1 Researchers and Academics Strengthening Networks and Contesting Indigenous 
Demands 
 
Publishing, touring and assorted mechanisms for extending the index network 
 
In interviews with members of the CWB team, they reflect upon about their efforts to circulate 
their ideas in the uneven but interlinked policy and academic geographies. These discussions 
reveal how strategic these scholars are in extending the index network as well as indicating some 
of their assumptions about their roles in the political process.   
 As with most experts, the authors of the CWB sought to maintain their expert status be 
distancing themselves from politics. At the same time, they did want to influence policy and they 
did so by publishing in peer-reviewed journals. As one interviewee explained:  
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…all research we produced—not just the CWB—we tried to publish, whether it was on our 
own or in collaboration with Stat[istic]s Can[ada], we tried to get [it] published through the 
peer reviewed journals… And the peer review was external to us, which brought more 
credibility to the work. If we control[ed] the entire dissemination process, we really affect 
how people will use and receive this work, because it's seen as [hesitates] ‘government work’. 
(Interview, 2016) 
The same interviewee went on to reflect that peer reviewed outlets were not entirely satisfactory 
for their purposes because: 
Government people don't typically read scientific journals. In fact, they hate reading that stuff. 
So we need to develop our own little products and they were called 'research briefs', I believe. 
A couple of page[s], three, four max, summarized high-level, not too complicated charts and 
tables so that people can get the information that is really useful to them without getting bored 
too quickly and abandoning the reading of it.  
In other words, the group sought to create a balance between the perceived objectivity of peer 
reviewed journals and the need to reach the less academic world of politicians and consultants 
who typically prefer to read policy briefs. To reinforce the materials circulated to government, 
the group also delivered lectures “where we would give presentations because, you know 
government, they like their power points” (Interview, 2016). In sum, as the interviewee 
explained, the work of bringing the work into the policy sphere was a project of taking “different 
approaches depending on who we wanted to reach… If we wanted legitimacy we went the 
traditional peer reviewed journal [route and if] we wanted [policy makers and colleagues in the 
department] to use the knowledge…we tailored products just for them” (Interview, 2017). 
 While the interviewee did not discuss the peer review process in depth, it is worth noting 
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that the normal workings of sympathetic journals also enlarge the networks of the CWB by 
enrolling additional actors into the performance. This is significant since the work is conducted 
by a relatively small and isolated research unit which cannot produce and maintain the indices 
alone, and which is reliant on these journals for their infrastructure, for the labour of evaluating 
the work, and then publishing and circulating texts to libraries and other centers of learning. 
Further, publishing via peer-review was enthusiastically encouraged by Beavon, the former 
director of the research unit, who hoped to foster an environment where individuals in the 
network could pursue their career paths whether in academia or in policy. It is also worth noting 
that these journals, along with databases and online forums, were created specifically to extend 
the reach of Aboriginal policy research by both the academic branch of the network (working out 
of University of Western Ontario, as part of the offshoot from the First Nations Cohesion 
Project)59 and by the Canadian government’s Social Cohesion Network (see chapter 3: Tracing 
the CWB’s Emergence).  
 In addition to tailoring publications to academic reading publics, the scholars involved in 
producing the CWB also leveraged collaborations with other institutions to circulate the 
knowledge of the index. In a self-conscious effort to boost their credibility, they hired an outside 
firm to assess their level of production.60 The result was that in terms of citations and other 
indications of research success, the SRAD research group (the authors of the CWB and RIHDI) 
was “among the top two in the country. And [that] included universities” (interview, 2014). To 
achieve such high productivity, members of the group deliberately fostered research networks 
 
59 Among its efforts to strengthen Indigenous-specific policy relevant research the First Nations Cohesion Project 
developed The International Indigenous Policy Journal, The Aboriginal Policy Research Consortium 
(International), and IndigiLINK, an online platform meant to create space for sharing Indigenous knowledge. They 
also organized a series of Aboriginal Policy Research Conferences in 2002, 2006 and 2009. The 2006 conference 
included influential collaborates such as the National Association of Native Friendship Centres and brought in 
delegates from the United Nations.  
60 The name of the firm was not disclosed to me. 
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that would multiply their capacity to publish their ideas (interview, 2017).  Statistics Canada was 
particularly important in this regard.  As one scholar in the group reflected: 
So there were only a couple of people in our unit working on the CWB, but because we were 
working with those five, six, seven researchers at Statistics Canada then we were closer to ten. 
We quintupled our capacity in terms of the production of research related to that topic. 
(Interview, 2017) 
While the group was clearly quite self-conscious about how they published and with whom, they 
nevertheless expressed frustration about their inability to circulate their outputs more effectively. 
Members typically complained that they found it difficult to track the use of their research tools, 
and indices and briefs alike and mentioned the long wait for a citational management service 
internal to the department. As one interviewee noted, “that's the curse for all academics. You 
really don't know if anybody is using it [your research] unless you get quoted. But we don't get 
quoted by policy[makers] anyhow” (2017). Nevertheless, the group did attempt to track the 
uptake of their materials. The same interviewee noted that “this year in our research consultation 
process [members of the department involved in policy creation] are reporting that 'yes we've 
been using them. We've been reading them’”.  The researcher also noted anecdotal evidence of 
uptake. He described with some pleasure walking through the department past a colleague 
working on policy creation and noticing that “she had like a dozen of them [research briefs] on 
her desk, one in her hand and she's reading it and asking me questions. And I'm going 'this is 
great'. At least somebody is using it.”   
 The group deployed a collection of other notable mechanisms in their efforts to extend the 
index network. For instance, in the early days of the index production SRAD secured funding to 
physically tour their research to different communities across Canada in what some of my 
 112 
interviewees jokingly referred to as “the road show”. Former SRAD Director Dan Beavon 
recounted “We would work with the regions [the regional offices of the department] and they 
would bring in people, different Chiefs, or people who had interest in the [...] research we were 
doing. And often we would team up with Statistics Canada and set up little mini conferences in 
different regions, presenting our research” (interview, 2016). Another method involved 
allocating the different areas of expertise to different branches within the research unit. Some 
members produced and analyzed the initial research while others were tasked with distilling and 
communicating the findings in an easy to understand manner to the general public. Accordingly, 
some members of the group were given media training. Beavon also recounted that part of 
SRAD’s early dissemination strategies was to distribute “these very fancy, glossy posters with all 
of the research that we had done on it” within the department and to different First Nations 
organizations. Similarly, they “would send copies [of the research books] to every First Nation in 
Canada, free” (Beavon, interview 2016). While these strategies may seem banal or obvious, they 
give a view into the resources required in the processes of index proliferate.   
 It becomes apparent that SRAD extended the reach of its index network through a number 
of different mechanisms. First, there is the creation of discursive boundaries that exploit the 
distance/difference in institutional cultures between the policy world and the academic world by 
publishing in both. Second, there are efforts to create research networks with productive 
individuals in other institutions, in particular Statistics Canada, and third, the use of both formal 
and informal methods to assess uptake of research products, presumably as a way to improve 
circulation strategies. Finally, the group gathered resources and organized ways to disseminate 
their research to Indigenous communities and the general public including through road trips, 
widely distributing books and posters free of charge, organizing conferences, strategically 
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structuring the research unit according to domains of expertise and getting specialized training to 
hone such expertise. Resources and calculated efforts notwithstanding, proliferation was not 
easy. The researchers encountered a range of technical, organizational and institutional 
challenges and were met with occasional failures, one of which I detail in this next section. 
A failed web-mapping project 
 
 As can be expected, not all strategies to create and exploit distance between the research 
and the operations of government result in successful extension of the index network. Tim 
Albert, a GIS (Geographic Information Science) technician hired by SRAD as a consultant in 
developing CWB maps, described one such instance of failure. Following earlier collaborations 
with SRAD, Albert was brought in to assist in developing a prototype of a multifaceted web-
mapping application. It was an application that Albert described as “sort of a Google maps with 
hotspots” that included a database with bundles of information connected to reserve communities 
(for example, information about a community’s language, Census data and CWB scores from 
1981 forward) that would be displayed when a reader clicked on the symbol representing a 
specific community (Interview, 2016). As the project progressed and the group attempted to put 
the application on INAC’s main website, Albert described encountering “headache after 
headache”, citing a series of issues including the pace of communications with the department, 
time-specific data related issues, and the capacity to meet the criteria for such federal projects 
surrounding accessibility for certain user groups, such as those with visual impairment. Albert 
recounted that the director of the project eventually recognized “…we can’t do this within the 
federal government’s website, but we do have partners”. Albert explains, 
FNSI, the First Nations Statistical Institute, which… was First Nations run, Crown funded, 
but supposed to be at arm's length so that they could handle all of their own statistics data and 
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they could become a... sort of an independent organization that could collect and deal with the 
First Nations [data] without having the stigma of being government. So what we did was we 
moved... [SRAD] went through their process, actually divesting the whole thing over to FNSI 
and I started dealing with the FNSI. And we were going down the road again of developing 
the website [with an interactive web-based version of a CWB map] and we got a prototype to 
them with the a web map [mumbles] development application prototype stage so that they 
could see what was available, or what was possible and then they went 'ok great, we want to 
go to the next step'. So, I start writing up the proposals and I'm getting everything going, and 
of course everything takes a long time dealing with organizations like this, and then they [the 
FNSI] were defunded in the federal budget. So, I was like 'great'! And it sits now, I believe, in 
limbo. (Interview, 2016) 
Albert’s story highlights how, despite surmounting numerous hurdles, including navigating well-
known bureaucratic challenges and finding a way to distance the project from the “stigma of 
being government,” in the end, faced with unforeseen institutional pressures, the web-mapping 
project was unable to stabilize enough to gain further influence for the indicator network. 
Somewhat ironically, when the federal funding to the “independent” umbrella organization dried 
up, so did the opportunities to build this aspect of the index network, at least for a time. 
Advising First Nations on preferred “agendas” based on a CWB study 
 
 Finally, the academic and policy channels were used by the index authors to, among other 
things, emphasize their expertise and leverage the index in ways that contest Indigenous 
demands for land and resources. We see this in the introduction to Aboriginal Well-Being: 
Canada’s Continuing Challenge, a book that helped to alter the trajectory of the wider index 
network by introducing its two most durable actors: the RIHDI (initially introduced in 1998) and 
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the CWB. In the introduction Dan Beavon and Jerry White (2007) stray from their purported 
objective of informing policy, reiterated repeatedly throughout their work, and instead deploy the 
CWB to implicitly advise Indigenous peoples on where and how best to approach their 
contemporary struggles. The advice is offered in the context of heightened anxiety on the part of 
the Canadian government about “Aboriginal unrest” and specifically surrounding a National Day 
of Action organized by the Assembly of First Nations to mobilize against poverty (Diabo & 
Pasternak, 2011; Groves & Lukacs, n.d.). Beavon and White champion the day of action as a 
“new type of Aboriginal protest”, which they see as a positive development. They elaborate their 
claim and then point to the findings from a CWB study from their book as supporting evidence. 
They explain:  
[…] the event was not an occupation of a specific piece of land. In fact, protest was not really 
about land at all (sic). What we witnessed was a shift from a rights-based agenda (e.g., 
specific and comprehensive claims, self-determination, self government, Indian status, 
membership, citizenship), which have dominated the Aboriginal political landscape over the 
last thirty years, to a needs-based agenda. While all of these latter rights-based issues are 
important, there is no direct evidence to suggest that the disproportionate attention that has 
been paid to them has improved the quality of life of Aboriginal people or their communities. 
This is not to say we will not see improvements coming from these actions, but only that to 
date such gains have not been measurable (see chapter 9). (Emphasis in original, Beavon & 
White, 2007, p. 5) 
 
Drawing discursive boundaries between a so-called “rights-based agenda” and a “needs-based 
agenda” the social scientists work to dissociate questions of land from those of “well-being” and 
poverty. Put differently, coupling poverty with a “needs-based agenda” and land with a “rights-
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based agenda”, Beavon and White summon the weight of scientific objectivity to urge that 
struggles for rights/land receive “disproportionate attention” without showing ‘measurable 
gains’. Despite their caveat that “rights-based issues are important”, the implied conclusion is 
that more attention needs to be paid to a “needs-based agenda”—left undefined—and to poverty, 
rather than rights and rights to land. This shift in “agendas”, while couched in an appeal to 
produce measurable gains in the socio-economic conditions of Indigenous communities, is an 
avenue through which the academic-state nexus intervenes and attempts to direct Indigenous 
peoples’ struggles away from pursuing questions of land and rights, despite having legal 
precedence, and instead towards integration into the settler economy. 
 The CWB study Beavon and White (2007) reference in support of their argument for a 
“needs-based agenda” seeks to determine whether settlement payments attained through the 
Specific Claims process result in improvement in living conditions for First Nations 
communities.61 While the evidence from the study is not definitive,62 the authors conclude, 
amidst caveats, that there is “[…] little evidence that settling claims leads to improvements in 
well-being” (p. 20). The study authors, White, Spence, and Maxim (2007) are also clear in 
concluding that “the results of this work are less than definitive”, noting the limits of the time 
span of the data and the limited availability of relevant outcomes in claims settlements. The 
limitations, complexities and nuance discussed in the study do not make it into Beavon and 
 
61 The study narrows how Specific Claims are valued—limiting the assessment to only measurable gains in the four 
socio-economic conditions captured by the CWB. It therefore excludes questions of justice despite this being 
paramount to First Nations who engage in the process (Lombard & Charette, 2018). The study also comes in the 
context of mounting pressure to overhaul the Specific Claims process, which was widely criticized, including by the 
Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples and the Auditor General, for being “[…] confusing, complicated, time-
consuming, expensive, adversarial, and legalistic” (Canada, 2006). In 2007, when the study was published, the 
Specific Claims process had a massive backlog of upwards of 800 outstanding claims and an average 13 years 
needed to resolve a claim (see Senate, & Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2006) 
62 The researchers describe a range of challenges inherent to the process of aligning datasets drawn from two 
sources (Census and from INAC’s Specific Claims Branch) as well as their inability to know what year claims were 
filed. Communities also changed CSD boundaries, and the researchers were faced with the issue of “under 
enumeration”, as a number of communities asserted their jurisdiction by refusing to participate in the Census. 
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White’s introduction, nor into their discussion of the efficacy of pursuing a “needs-based 
agenda” for First Nations communities. Still, Beavon and White suggest that a shift in focus 
from demands based on rights, to those based on needs, is a positive step in broader Indigenous 
struggles. 
 Finally, Beavon and White offer no empirical support that a “needs-based agenda” may 
result in the improvement of socio-economic conditions. This is odd given their continual 
reiterations of their commitment to empirical evidence. Not only does their intervention focus on 
guiding Indigenous conduct, rather than policy as they propose, but its implied directives are 
made without citing any research. Moreover, neither a needs-based agenda nor “measurable 
gains” diverge from, let alone challenge, the existing systems and structures used by Canada to 
govern Indigenous communities. That is, the pursuit of a needs-based agenda and efforts to 
“close the gap” in socio-economic conditions have been the primary drivers of the immense 
public policy infrastructure put in place to manage the so-called “Indigenous problem” (Walter 
& Andersen, 2013). This makes Beavon and White’s implied path forward seem both misleading 
and ineffectual in terms of guiding Indigenous struggle—particularly for self-determination—
because they simply point back to the work already being pursued within the existing official 
channels. 
 In addition to setting narrow parameters for the discussions around well-being and 
Indigenous struggle, relating it to either a “rights-based” or “needs-based” “agenda”, and saying 
that “there is no direct evidence” to suggest that a so-called rights-based agenda has improved 
the quality of life of ‘Aboriginal people or their communities’, forges the path for expert 
knowledge to take the forefront in Indigenous struggles going forward. Those with the 
knowhow, technical skills and resources to collect and transform data into evidence are thus 
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empowered. “Measurable improvements”, rather than, for example, justice or land repatriation, 
are introduced as the basis upon which Indigenous struggles are valued or deemed justifiable, 
while experts are given an elevated role in determining what counts as evidence, who can 
produce it and how it might matter. 
 
4.2 Politicians and Bureaucrats Deploying Development Indices  
 
 In the following section, I examine archival video footage of a 2012 Senate Standing 
Committee on National Finance meeting in which the CWB is deployed by Michael Wernick, 
then-Deputy Minister of the recently re-named department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada (AANDC). I use this as a case study of the CWB’s use by politicians and 
bureaucrats. While the CWB has appeared numerous times in the parliamentary and senate 
committee meeting proceedings since 2005, I have chosen Wernick’s CWB interventions as my 
case study in part because of his particularly influential position within the department and also 
because I find his rather reactionary use of the index demonstrative of its persuasive powers. 
Specifically, Wernick draws on the CWB to quickly quell challenges to the integrity of the 
state’s development agenda, redirect the focus of debates, shift responsibility for development—
and blame for “under-development”—onto Indigenous communities, and justify the allocation of 
resources to the state’s benefit. Before analyzing Wernick’s use of the CWB, I briefly 
contextualize by describing the characteristics of the index’s broader use in parliamentary and 
senate committee meetings and then give background to Wernick’s intervention. 
 Much like in published reports, the CWB is brought into debates and presentations to 
rationalize actions taken by policymakers and elected members of parliament in the name of 
Indigenous peoples’ well-being. For the most part, those who invoke the CWB do so within a 
scripted presentation. Presenters generally make three steps in the process. First, they introduce 
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the index, briefly citing its bibliographic background and its component parts, to establish the 
existence and extent of “the gap” in socio-economic conditions between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous communities. Sometimes specific numbers and statistics are listed or projected or 
distributed in handouts to the audience, but more often presenters simply describe the general 
trends in “closing the gap”. Second, its user—usually a visiting expert, researcher, bureaucrat, or 
technician—offers an explanation about what is behind the gap moving trends, whether the gaps 
are opening or closing.63 The third step is to prescribe an improvement intervention that is 
predominantly treated as technical, rather than political, in nature. While these dynamics hold 
true in Wernick’s intervention, he uses the index in a more off-the-cuff, less pre-scripted manner, 
as a ready-made tool to summon expertise in support of his position and deflect challenges from 
his counterparts in the senate meeting. 
 During a Senate Standing Committee for National Finance, the CWB is called on to act in 
a larger performance of settler state economic development and governance. Michael Wernick, 
then-Deputy Minister of the recently re-named department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada (AANDC), is presenting the department’s estimates for the upcoming 
2012-2013 budget to a group of approximately twelve Senators and their assistants, all seated at 
large oak tables configured in a rectangle facing one another, flanked by Canadian flags and 
tripods for video cameras. At first, Wernick mostly stares downwards at his papers, running 
quickly through introductory remarks in a perfunctory manner. He emphasizes the department’s 
robust fiscal management to date despite “ever growing responsibilities” and highlights its 
numerous accountability and transparency measures. Securing such accountability and 
 
63 Notably, there is a near ubiquitous move on the part of CWB users to point to perceived determinants behind the 
trends in development scores. Generally, the CWB authors try cautiously to avoid this—especially in the early 
stages of the research, which were seen as simply a process of measuring—however, even they occasionally 
participate in the slippage and suggest drivers behind the CWB trends. With the numbers and trends visible, such a 
move appears irresistible. 
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transparency from First Nations on the other hand, he suggests, requires sustained efforts from 
the department and the implementation of proper mechanisms. Posing this challenge, Wernick 
seeks to foster a sense of common understanding among branches of government so that the 
committee can see that AANDC is justified in its financial demands— that it has much to 
accomplish that will serve the national best interests. The estimate amounts to a total of $7.8 
billion, “a great deal of public money”, he acknowledges. That figure is up by 5.8 per cent from 
the estimate tabled for 2011-2012. To explain the increase he points to $286 million in the cash 
flow related to negotiation, settlement and implementation of claims, and a one-time payment 
related to the settlement of the Coldwater-Narrows Specific Claim in Ontario, and finally cites an 
example of Residential School Settlement Agreements to explain that the remainder of the 
budget increase can be explained by a number of “targeted investments that respond to specific 
initiatives and needs”. Regardless, he emphasizes, the main estimates are ultimately an indication 
of the government’s commitment to improving Indigenous peoples’ and Northerners’ quality of 
life. As he frames it, “resolving these kinds of claims and litigation is a priority of the 
government because it puts issues from the past to rest and lets us focus on the future”. Then, 
drawing on the contemporary departmental rhetoric, he explains, “[it] is part of building self-
sufficient and prosperous communities. [Resolving] claims enables Aboriginal people and 
communities to take charge of their own futures, make their own decisions, manage their own 
affairs and make a stronger contribution to the country”. After running through a number of 
additional large ticket budget items Wernick seems buoyed and ready to answer questions, 
largely without referencing the large stack of documents on his table. 
 Throughout the presentation Wernick characterizes the department’s work as the 
“empowerment” of Indigenous communities so that they can “meet their potential” and “improve 
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their own social well-being and economic prosperity” (Senate Standing Committee on National 
Finance, 2012). In turn, Indigenous peoples are expected to integrate and “contribute fully to 
Canada”—Wernick highlights this as the department’s ‘dominant policy theme’. He contends 
that the “most efficient way” to conjure this aim is by “increasing Aboriginal participation in the 
labour force and the economy of the country… [and by] moving people out of dependency into 
employability”. The alternative, according to his framing, is for Canada to face the threat of 
drowning in a veritable demographic tidal wave of dependent First Nations youth who will 
amount to “a big drag on growth and productivity” (Senate Standing Committee on National 
Finance, 2012). What is initially cast as empowerment ends up more closely resembling a 
decorated reiteration of the so-called “Indian Problem”. 
 The CWB does not enter Wernick’s presentation until part way through question period. Its 
foremost contribution to the performance is to showcase settler state accountability while 
somehow simultaneously allocating blame and responsibility for the poor conditions experienced 
by many communities onto the communities themselves. It also furnishes Wernick with an easy 
to explain, simple to grasp, narrowly framed, well resourced vision of development that he 
deploys to naturalize neoliberal interventions on Indigenous communities and their lands. After 
having fielded questions and taken the occasional grilling from some of the senators about a 
range of issues from funding allocations to welfare and education reforms, Wernick draws on the 
CWB to deflect a suggestion from Conservative Senator Housakos for the department to adopt 
additional policy benchmarks. Housakos opines,  
I came from a world where, as an operator of medium-sized businesses, when I authorized the 
expenditures of tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars, I set clear benchmarks. In this case 
you are authorizing hundreds of millions of dollars to deal with a specific issue. What sort of 
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benchmarking is being done in the department? [...] Why the discrepancy of results from 
community to community? My general opinion would lead me to believe that the discrepancy 
is due to the fact that as a government, we are not doing enough in terms of benchmarking. 
Subtly bristling at Housakos’ suggestion to start benchmarking, Wernick compliments him for 
the “excellent questions” and then turns to the CWB, introducing it in the most efficient manner 
possible—by referencing its much more famous relative, the UN Human Development Index 
(UNHDI). He then enrolls unnamed expertise from “outside” of government to come to his aid in 
explaining the longitudinal trends and variation in geographic distribution of CWB scores.64 He 
explains, “The people who do serious research on this look at the data and see why some 
communities are trending up and some are trending down”. He continues,  
The people who do research on this and work on it in academia say the biggest variable is 
leadership, as it is between countries, between provinces and between municipalities. Strong, 
committed leadership makes a difference; community involvement makes a difference. If 
parents do not care and do not bring their kids to school, there is nothing that government 
programs can do to push that. People are not widgets. You are dealing with human behaviour, 
education, income assistance, patterns of dependency that are deeply rooted in some 
communities, and these are not variables that respond. I can give you lots of widget-like 
examples of how many contaminated sites were remediated, how many water plants were 
built and how many acres of land were moved. We have rich performance management 
information.  
 
64 While Wernick does not cite which researchers and academics found that “the biggest variable [in determining 
socio-economic conditions] is leadership”, having reviewed a wide swath of CWB studies, this finding most 
resembles the work of the right wing think tank researcher John Graham. Like Tom Flanagan, Graham serves as an 
outside expert whose work helps to normalize DIAND’s agenda in presenting market-based solutions as the 
foundation of Indigenous development, including such policy initiatives as the First Nations Property Ownership 
Initiative. Graham produced two studies that deploy the CWB published by the Institute on Governance. 
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In other words, according to Wernick, Indigenous communities’ poor conditions can be blamed 
on their poor leadership. In a universalizing move he parallels Indigenous leadership with 
governance processes at the scale of nation-states, provinces and municipalities and then jumps 
quickly across scales down to the minutia of a community and the individual—parents "who do 
not care”. Communities are effectively painted as idiosyncratic and dysfunctional from their 
leadership to the family unit. Development inertia is seen as intrinsic to Indigenous communities, 
ascribed to "human behaviours”—‘variables that do not respond’. In turn, government programs 
are framed as ill-equipped to correct such behaviours—one cannot reasonably expect programs 
to force a parent to care about their child’s education (Wernick has something else in mind which 
is described below). This framing, undergirded by the CWB, naturalizes the settler gaze towards 
Indigenous peoples as deficient and the source of their own problems, and in doing so absolves 
the state and settler society from its role in producing the conditions of impoverishment that 
Indigenous peoples are subject to. Moreover, it omits and distracts from structural factors 
actively working to dispossess Indigenous communities.65 Two infamous examples, among 
many, come to mind: first, the two per cent funding cap on most federal program expenditures, 
put in place by Paul Martin in the 1990s, which, among other things, has had a deeply 
detrimental effects on First Nations youth access to education; and second, the chronic and 
discriminatory underfunding of Indigenous child welfare services which the state fought to 
maintain the underfunded status quo for nine years, a fight that began under Wernick’s tenure as 
Deputy Minister of INAC, in a Human Rights Tribunal court, and that the state eventually lost.66 
 
65 Wernick’s explanation also neglects to raise the issue of trauma associated with residential schooling as a 
potential factor contributing to why one might hesitate to make their child go to school.   
66 As I write this, the Canadian government has received its seventh non-compliance order from the Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal on this matter. (see First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. V. 
Attorney General of Canada, 2019).  
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Instead, the logic remains in keeping with the INAC’s discourse of "empowerment" in which the 
department is there to help Indigenous peoples so that they might help themselves through 
behavioural changes, and so that individuals may one day be convinced to care about matters 
such as their children’s education.  
 Wernick offers two examples of the type of help for communities that the department is 
considering, both of which employ coercion and feed into settler acrimony towards Indigenous 
peoples for their perceived dependency. For one, he expresses interest in applying neoliberal 
welfare reforms to reserves akin to those implemented on the general public in the 1980s and 
1990s, explaining, “You do not get a welfare cheque if you are not signed up for a training 
program, if you are not re-skilling, if you are not involved in something to make you a 
participant in the labour force” (Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, 2012). 
However, Wernick laments that such reforms to reserves are proving to be a challenge for both 
the provincial programs and the federal Human Resources Skills Development program because, 
as he puts it: “Their reach into reserves is not good...”  
 Wernick’s second example of a prospective policy initiative on reserves is the 
implementation of Bill-C21, the First Nations Financial Transparency Act (FNFTA), a 
contentious legislation, framed by AANDC as emerging from the demands of First Nations 
members, but criticized and resisted by First Nations for increasing a communities' reporting 
burden to the settler public and the Canadian state while doing nothing to increase accountability 
of First Nations governments to their own communities (Wawzonek, 2015). Nonetheless, 
Wernick professes to his audience of senators, 
I think that it will be controversial, but I am a big fan of that piece of proposed legislation in 
that it will allow community members to see what money came in and what money went out, 
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and if they are not happy, then they go to their own council and hold them to account for 
better results, which is what happens in any other kind of government. We built an elaborate 
machine where communities report to us, but that will not change things as effectively as 
reporting to their own communities. 
While on the surface appearing as a progressive move that could facilitate greater democratic 
engagement, Wernick’s interventions bring to mind Pasternak’s (2016) argument that 
contemporary discourses of accountability and transparency demanded of Indigenous peoples by 
the settler public are cornerstones of a centuries old tension between demands for Indigenous 
peoples to be ‘self-sufficient’ and the concurrent investment of the state in the dispossession of 
Indigenous lands while settlers denounce Indigenous dependency on the state.67 Thus what is an 
insidious, paternalistic, and racist policy position is framed as a ‘natural’ pillar of settler–
Indigenous relations. Presented as the tough-love gift of welfare reform and accountability 
mechanisms bestowed upon First Nations by the caring state, Wernick’s interventions feed into 
and cultivate settler disdain for Indigenous dependency. The CWB helps in this process by 
supplying him with a fast reference to scientific explanation, despite his avoidance of specific 
citations, which helps him to shift the burden of accountability and transparency off of the state 
and onto First Nations. Meanwhile, the meeting is peppered with derisive and racist flare-ups on 
the part of senators who claim to want solutions and whose queries work to tether the aims and 
failures of the government’s longstanding policy agenda of “closing the gap” to individual 
behaviours, thus pathologizing Indigenous communities. Senator Runciman, for example, asks 
about potentially relocating communities because during a visit to a reserve he apparently saw 
 
67 Pasternak (2016) traces the emergence of these discourses, and the ensuing policy mechanisms, to the end of the 
War of 1812 when the Colonial office of London took the view that alliances and diplomatic relations between the 
English, the Haudenosaunee, and other nations were extraneous and expensive. 
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“significant numbers of males, for the most part, passed out on lawns at 10 and 11 o’clock in the 
morning”. In this milieu, Wernick can come across as the voice of reason, pursuing stern 
solutions in defense of Indigenous well-being. Responding to Runciman’s query, Wernick again 
points to “a diversity of conditions” revealed by census data and the CWB: “Some are trending 
up and some are trending down... There is a spread of communities where everyone is working 
and no one is on welfare and every kid finishes high school”. Meanwhile, his focus on 
transparency and accountability mechanisms looks away from the role of state policy in 
producing the dependency that many First Nations experience, including the denial of economic 
rights, and the mechanisms he proposes are state-supplied solutions to problems the state has 
helped to create and maintain.68 Yet again, Wernick pins the blame and responsibility to fix these 
conditions on Indigenous peoples.    
 Lastly, still drawing from the CWB, Wernick makes the case for intensifying extractivist 
economic development on Indigenous peoples’ lands in the name of their well-being: 
There is another variable that seems to be making a big difference. This is a big 
generalization, but if you looked at the [CWB] map, in the North, in B.C. and through the 
Prairies, things are trending up because overall the economy is pulling people up. In Atlantic 
Canada, things are trending up. Where we have a huge problem is in the communities around 
James Bay, and Manitoba and northern Ontario, the old Rupert’s Land sort of area. Until now, 
they do not have the connection to the economy that would really pull social conditions up. I 
think you can be more optimistic about northern Ontario because of the Ring of Fire 
development and there will be tens of billions of dollars of mining, railroads, electrification 
 
68 In chapter 4 of the book The Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land Rebuilding the Economy Arthur 
Manuel and Grand Chief Ronald Derrickson (2017) describe economic dependency as a second pillar in structure of 
settler colonialism. Following dispossession from theft of land, dependency became a means through which settlers 
could control every aspect of Indigenous peoples lives. 
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and that sort of thing, which will create some pull on those communities. On the other side of 
the bay, in Quebec, the James Bay Cree are doing quite well. They are quite entrepreneurial. 
They have a lot of businesses and much better indicators. 
Thus, with a quick reference to the CWB map, Wernick justifies the broad national economic 
development strategy of industrial expansion on and near Indigenous lands as being in 
everyone’s best interest. In addition to deploying the CWB to blame First Nations for governing 
themselves into poverty and dependency, Wernick argues for the status quo policy orientation by 
generating the narrative that the Canadian economy is the tide that lifts all boats, with the caveat 
that for the tide to reach boats in remote regions there must then be sufficient expansion of the 
industrial sector, “mining, railroads, electrification and that sort of thing”. Entrepreneurialism is 
then off-handedly, without further elaboration or evidence, singled out as a trait to explain First 
Nations who achieve better indicator scores.69 
 Finally, beyond his role in proselytizing about CWB trends to the Standing Senate 
Committee, Wernick was responsible for cutting funding to First Nations programs and 
organizations and for introducing coercive mechanisms to gain compliance from First Nations in 
compliance with the DIAND development agenda. Wernick was also busy working with industry 
to access Indigenous resources. In 2011 Wernick, along with First Nations Cohesion Project 
founder Jerry White, traveled to Krasnoyarsk Russia to attend an International Conference on 
Siberian North and Arctic jointly organized by the Government of the Krasnoyarsk Krai, 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Institute of Economics and 
Industrial Engineering (Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences), and the Siberian 
 
69 An increase in AANDC’s budget does not amount to First Nations receiving greater funds. During his tenure as 
Deputy Minster, Wernick oversaw major funding cuts to Indigenous organizations, including for example, a ten 
percent cut to the core funding for all Aboriginal Representative Organizations and the elimination of funding for 
Tribal Councils’ advisory services so as to exclude political advocacy for member bands (Diabo, 2012, p. 18). 
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Federal University. Wernick’s role was as a co-chair along with Russia’s Deputy Minister for the 
Ministry of Regional Development on the Russian Federation, and the Canada-Russian Program 
on Sharing Best Practices in Northern Governance. White’s presentation Canada's Experience: 
Oil and Gas Development on Indigenous Lands: Laws, Regulations and Case Studies was based 
on a draft of a paper that informs industry on how to best engage with Indigenous communities 
within the legal bounds so that their development projects could proceed with greater certainty 
(see Wright & White, 2012). Considered in conjunction with a suite of other initiatives designed 
to undermine Indigenous self-determination overseen by Wernick during his tenure as Deputy 
Minister of AANDC,70 the quest for Indigenous “empowerment” and “support”, in which the 
CWB plays a role, appears narrowly circumscribed if not altogether disingenuous. The CWB 
contributes to a larger performance, providing key narratives about development that are readily 
woven into arguments for the expansion of the settler economy. It contributes to the creation of 
deficient Indigenous subjects, and in turn, lays the foundation for the state to justify strategizing 
how best to transform Indigenous subjects into self-sufficient, entrepreneurial citizen subjects.71 
 
70 In 2016, when Wernick was appointed the Clerk of the Privy Council after serving as the Deputy Minister of 
AANDC for eight years, Indigenous policy analyst and activist Russ Diabo (2016) published an extensive list of the 
various initiatives supported by Wernick to undermine Indigenous self determination and criminalize Indigenous 
dissent. Among the list was the formation of a spying network comprising AANDC and a number of other federal 
departments, as well as the RCMP, designed to identify First Nations leaders, participants and outside supporters 
during occupations and protests, including Idle No More. He also supported the Harper government’s refusal to 
adopt the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and his decision to spy on renowned Indigenous 
children’s advocate Cindy Blackstock in retaliation for her filing a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights 
Tribunal against the Canadian government for systemic discrimination and chronic underfunding of Indigenous 
child welfare. For the full list and explanations of Wernick’s record of attempting to subvert self-determination 
struggles, see Diabo, (2016). 
71 Finally, I don’t wish to give the impression that Wernick’s interventions encompasses all CWB interventions 
made by politicians. Some use the index to leverage for more equitable land claims—“modern treaty”—processes, 
and for the government to make Indigenous peoples’ economic outcomes a central focus of the budget. For example, 
on a number of occasions between 2006 and 2013, New Democratic Party (NDP) Member of Parliament for 
Naniamo/Cowichan Jean Crowder and her colleague Robert Morales, the lawyer and chief negotiator for the 
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group comprising six First Nations in B.C., drew on the CWB during House of Commons 
debates to advocate for a treaty process (i.e. land claims) that would no longer require First Nations to extinguish 
their inherent rights and title, nor fix them with unwieldy loans for engaging in the process. They also pointed to the 
gap in CWB scores to urge the government to negotiate in good faith and allow for self-determined development 
decisions. In addition to using the CWB to advocate for Indigenous rights, another closely related and crucial 
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4.3 Free-Market Expertise in Everyday Performances of Well-Being 
Making white settler experts on Aboriginal futures 
 
 In recent years the CWB has been leveraged by experts in right wing think tanks seeking 
to “free” Indigenous peoples (First Nations in particular) from their reserve lands by opening 
them to markets and encouraging intensified market-based governance. This section examines 
the uptake of the CWB in these networks and interrogates the mundane and everyday processes 
and practices in the production of these market-oriented truths. I begin by briefly reviewing the 
work of Flanagan at the Fraser Institute and the Frontier Centre for Public Policy (FCPP). I then 
examine the spacial and relational character of Flanagan’s meaning making practices as he uses 
the CWB in a presentation during a one-day symposium entitled “Law and Property” hosted by 
the Institute for Liberal Studies in Ottawa in 2016. This analysis is based on my observation of 
this presentation and event, and is organized around excerpts of my research journal written 
during and shortly after the event. Before turning to these materials I now introduce some of the 
key actors in this network, its underpinning discourses and narratives, the principle arguments it 
generates, and its relations with the CWB.  
 Since 2013 well known and well connected right wing pundit and political strategist Tom 
Flanagan, along with a collection of co-authors, has repeatedly spotlighted the CWB as a 
definitive definition of development for Indigenous peoples, using it as the foundation for a 
string of explanatory studies that prescribe neoliberal solutions to improve the socio-economic 
 
difference between the aforementioned interventions from numerous other examples is the use of the index to 
allocate responsibility to the state, rather than prescribing the Hul’qumi’num communities with a set of governance 
interventions drawn from “successful” First Nations, for example. Instead, Crowder and Morales point to the 
government’s conduct and seek to influence fellow politicians to engage in more just relations with Indigenous 
nations. 
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conditions of First Nations communities.72 Flanagan is a former political science professor at the 
University of Calgary and has played a number of key roles within political institutions including 
as a senior advisor and national campaign chair to Stephan Harper in the lead up to his 2006 
election as the Prime Minister. He also managed the 2012 provincial election campaign of the 
right wing/libertarian Wildrose party in Alberta and was a founding member and president of the 
mysterious and influential, membership-based, libertarian Civitas Society (Morton, 2013; Wells, 
2016). Flanagan is afforded a national platform as the go-to expert on Indigenous issues through 
his involvement in think tanks and as a regular columnist for a selection of prominent Canadian 
media outlets, including The Globe and Mail, the National Post and the Calgary Herald.73 He is 
a Senior Fellow at the influential right wing think tank the Fraser Institute and, despite the 
noticeably awkward optics as a white settler with a body of academic work opposing Indigenous 
peoples’ hereditary, treaty and constitutional rights, Flanagan is also the Chair of the “Aboriginal 
Futures” program at the far-right / libertarian Frontier Centre for Public Policy (FCPP).74 Given 
Flanagan’s influential position and that his intellectual output through the think tanks has relied 
nearly exclusively on the CWB from 2013 to date, the index’s role in contributing to Flanagan’s 
 
72 Flanagan is not alone in deploying the CWB to produce neoliberal facts and prescribe “best practices” in market-
based governance to First Nations. For example, he follows, John Graham (2010) a Senior Associate of the Institute 
of Governance who argues that “a highly dysfunctional First Nation governance system is a significant brake on 
achieving better [CWB] results for First Nation communities” (p. 1). However, whereas Flanagan uses the CWB to 
generate new statistical models and brings in additional variables that he deems significant, Graham only uses the 
CWB to frame his argument. Graham also appears before the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples on 
May 6th 2009 and uses the CWB to advise the Committee on reforms to Indian Act elections. 
73 Searching the archives of the Canada’s national newspapers, The Globe and Mail and National Post, and 
Toronto’s two major dailies, the Toronto Sun and Toronto Star, reporter Jennifer Yang (2018) found that (not 
counting the 32 news articles that he authored) in one decade Flanagan’s name was mentioned in 112 news articles 
that contained the words “Indigenous,” “First Nations” or “Aboriginal”. Using the same criteria and searching the 
same newspaper archives, she found that collectively, 16 Indigenous researchers were only cited 82 times. 
Indigenous child welfare activist, Cindy Blackstock, was the only Indigenous researcher who was cited more 
frequently than Flanagan. 
74 The Fraser Institute’s describes itself as an "independent, non-partisan research and educational organization" that 
has charitable status in Canada and the USA. However, investigative reporter Beth Hong (2012) and 
academic/activist Sharron Batt (2019) have shown that it receives millions of dollars from corporate donors in the 
pharmaceutical and oil and gas lobbies, including the Koch Brothers, and the Aurea Foundation. 
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neoliberal political projects is worthy of scrutiny. What are the characteristics of the CWB that 
endear Flanagan to adopt it as his primary tool of preference in producing knowledge to propel 
the free market projects? How does it contribute to the performance of neoliberal governance?    
 The dominant narrative underpinning Flanagan’s work, and that of the intellectual output 
of the right-wing think tank network more broadly, is that the Indian Act stifles the natural 
evolution of capitalism on reserves, thus resulting in poverty and related social ills. This 
narrative holds that the advancement of markets—and the implementation of individualized 
private property holdings on reserves—is the ready-made antidote to the problems generated by 
the Indian Act. For example, the FCPP (n.d.) website proposes its Aboriginal Futures program as 
a way to “...break through the inertia of the Indian Act and special interests to propose policies 
that allow First Nations people to leverage their inherent land assets by proposing a workable 
regime of ownership on reserve”.75 Over the years, Flanagan has contributed significantly to 
constructing and circulating this narrative. His more recent work intervenes in Indigenous self-
determination struggles by injecting his own narrowly conceived definition of self-determination 
that focuses intently on “effective governance”: 
... [measurable progress] comes from self-determination: [First Nations] taking control of 
their own affairs and making the most out of their assets. The most effective [federal] 
government intervention has been legislation to remove roadblocks and create opportunities 
that First Nations can exploit under their own initiative. (Flanagan, 2016) 
Whether highlighting that “First Nations are the most disadvantaged” or focusing on the success 
stories, Flanagan relies on CWB scores to justify his interventions.   
 
75 Based on a review of Flanagan’s work, I understand “special interests” named in this quote from the FCPP to be 
code for First Nations leadership, which the Fraser Institute and the FCPP commonly target and characterize as 
corrupt and nepotistic, often referred to by this group of experts disparagingly as the “Aboriginal Industry”.  
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 Crucially, Flanagan, along with think tank and academic associates, has had a critical role 
in formulating and lobbying for the implementation of government interventions that he 
references in the above quote—namely the First Nations Property Ownership Act (FNPOA), a 
legal “off ramp” (Flanagan’s terminology) from the Indian Act that would permit First Nations 
bands and individuals on reserve to hold their lands in fee simple title. His 2010 co-authored 
book Beyond the Indian Act introduced the FNPOA to the public. While one might assume that 
Flanagan’s work on the FNPOA would be abandoned following the 2015 election of The Liberal 
Party under the leadership of Justine Trudeau which promised a new era of reconciliation with 
Indigenous peoples and to govern according to the Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Jeremy Schmidt (2018) shows this not 
to be the case. Rather, Schmidt details the many ways in which bureaucrats kept the FNPOA 
alive and circulating by “realign[ing] the program to fit the priorities and rhetoric of the 
incoming government and to strategically introduce new ministers to [...] the First Nations 
Property Ownership Initiative” (p. 2). 
 Flanagan’s efforts to employ the CWB hold particular sway thanks to his public status, 
yet the CWB is also employed in seemingly far more mundane and everyday practices, whose 
end result is still that of enrolling the CWB in networks of neoliberal and free-market truths. The 
following excerpt draws from my research journal written following my visit to a 2016 Law and 
Property symposium in Ottawa hosted by the Institute of Liberal Studies,76 where Tom Flanagan 
presented findings from his recent CWB studies to a group of colleagues. His presentation 
primarily deployed the CWB to assess the performance of First Nations governments in 
 
76 The Institute of Liberal Studies is an NGO with a mission to advance classic liberalism and free market capitalist 
thought and practice in Canada (“The Institute for Liberal Studies,” n.d.). Among its projects, the Institute of Liberal 
Studies hosts “Freedom Week”, a five-day camp where students and faculty convene for seminars and social events 
designed to spur enthusiasm for neoliberal and free-market principles. 
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Saskatchewan in generating income through relatively recently introduced legislative 
mechanisms termed Treaty Land Entitlements (TLE) and urban reserves (explained in more 
detail below).  
Observing the CWB at a liberal studies law and property symposium 
 
 I received an invitation to the symposium from Flanagan after having called the Frontier 
Centre for Public Policy to ask about any upcoming presentations of his latest work using the 
CWB. Flanagan called me back that night to tell me that he would be presenting on more recent 
work. He then put me in touch with his intern who had been involved with creating variables 
from the raw data of the FNFTA, as well as with Matt Bufton, the executive director and co-
founder of the Institute for Liberal Studies. I registered for the symposium free of charge as a 
“student observer”: 
I arrived in Ottawa the night before the symposium and stayed on a friend’s couch. A quick 
bus ride to the Rideau Centre in the morning gets me within a few blocks of the symposium. 
There are no other pedestrians and very few cars. I have trouble finding the address and worry 
I am at the wrong place. Finally find the door tucked away. It is an attached grey stone 
building. I climb the stairs to the third floor and go through the door into a large open space 
with florescent lights set in a drop-down ceiling. I am one of the first people to arrive. Matt 
Bufton and a student assistant welcome me. Bufton has a big voice and a firm handshake. He 
tells me that the space used to be a bookstore. Seemingly to make me feel comfortable, he 
discusses the work of a geographer he knows named Pierre Desrochers. He points me to a 
table with pastries and coffee and tea. The student assistant is busy warming up the projector, 
positioning the screen against the front wall with windows and testing the technology. Others 
start to arrive. I mingle a bit awkwardly with two other early arrivals, one who is there to 
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present, the other (Stacey) who will provide technical support for one of the presentations if 
needed. A large bookshelf at the back of the room is stocked entirely with Ayn Rand books. 
There is a black and white poster on the wall that has an image of a clean-cut looking white 
man, libertarian and founder of the Foundation of Economic Education, Leonard E. Read. He 
is smoking a cigarette looking up pensively from a page. The poster has a long quote that ends 
in the words in bold print “leave all else to the FREE UNFETTERED MARKET!” and a URL 
for LibertyForKids.com at the bottom.  
 
Flanagan arrives. We shake hands and stand near the table with coffee and begin to make 
small talk. After only a short conversation he catches me off guard by suggesting that he 
could be my external supervisor on my thesis committee. I thank him for the offer and tell 
him I will look into the possibility. Bufton interjects to introduce Flanagan to another 
presenter. Bufton plays host, running around attending to the last minutes needs of guests. As 
more people arrive it seems that they are mostly already aquatinted with one another. There 
are handshakes and smiles and the coffee pot requires refilling. I overhear Bufton crack a joke 
that Flanagan waived his speaker’s fee but that the money saved went to buying him an 
expensive security detail. I stand and sip coffee and talk with Stacey until we are all called to 
sit down and the first of three sessions of presentations begin.  
 
Bufton introduces the event and mentions that this year’s symposium is deliberately pared 
down to make for a more productive discussion. I count nineteen attendees (including 
myself), mostly white, mostly men, three women. He shares the wifi password: Hayek1974 
and explains it is in honor of liberal economist F.A. Hayek who argues for the reduction of the 
 135 
state and a return to classic liberalism. 1974 is the date Hayek received a Nobel prize. I use 
the complimentary notepaper on my table to map the room layout (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Hand sketched map of room layout at Law and Property symposium in Ottawa 
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The first presentations of the day set the tone of the conference. They concern: securing the 
status of private property rights in Canada through the constitution, by elevating “activist” 
judges in the supreme courts—a suggested strategy that stirs some controversy; defending the 
rights of individual property owners from state expropriation; using popular culture mediums 
to advance discourses of property; and finally, providing proof that, to quote the presenter, 
“property is inevitable [...] not a preference [...] a thing that must exist if we start from the 
proposition that the use of force between people is wrong”. Questions after presentations are 
generally friendly. I get the sense of being part of a free-market libertarian brainstorming 
session, or perhaps indoctrination. 
 
Flanagan’s presentation is in the second session (see Appendix C for symposium schedule). 
He is directly before Dwight Newman, the only other presenter addressing issues directly 
relating to Indigenous rights and property. Flanagan’s talk is about measuring the socio-
economic performance of First Nations who have used Treaty Land Entitlements (TLE) to 
create urban reserves. There is slippage in his explanation between whether he is measuring 
the contribution of the TLE and urban reserves to First Nations’ well-being or measuring how 
well First Nations governments do in turning them into an economic engine. The presentation 
starts with background information about these TLE’s. They were designed to compensate 
First Nations in Saskatchewan to purchase land for “shortfalls in the size of Indian reserves as 
originally surveyed”. In this regard, Flanagan explains that the program is meant “to 
rectify[...] a historical injustice, not having fully lived up to the terms of the treaty”. However, 
the compensation is also meant to support economic development—this is the entrance point 
for Flanagan’s calculative intervention. First Nations may use the funding to purchase lands in 
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urban areas, which can be transferred to reserve status (land held collectively for First Nations 
by the Crown) and become urban reserves.  
 
Flanagan introduces the CWB, describes its component indicators and jokes “it has to be 
reliable and good, it is produced by the government of Canada”. The slide with a CWB chart 
showing the average scores for communities across Canada is poorly formatted and too small 
to read. Bufton's technical assistant steps in to help resize the image. He mistakenly makes it 
even smaller and then expands it way beyond the size of the projector screen. When he gets 
the slide to the right size Flanagan quips, “There you go. Now stop there. It's like government 
intervention: it never stops". The audience laughs. He compares the longitudinal trend lines 
and the gaps in average scores for First Nations vs. non-Indigenous communities: 
“There's a twenty point gap between First Nations and the rest of Canada at the start of the 
period in 1981 [the point at which the CWB starts to be calculated], and there's still a twenty 
point gap thirty years later in 2011. So there has been a tide lifting all boats, but some boats 
are higher than others.” Next he compares the scores of First Nations nationally versus those 
in Saskatchewan, moving to an increasingly finer scale of comparison First Nations 
communities in Saskatchewan with TLE agreements and urban reserves versus those without 
them. Of those with TLEs and urban reserves he concludes, “their rate of improvement in 
CWB [scores]... is really not that much different from anybody else's”. Finally, he compares 
the trends in average scores within a group of twenty-one First Nations with urban reserves. 
Of the twenty-one, Flanagan is interested in a “sub-group of eight” who “have gotten into 
business in a fairly big way [by building] casinos... shopping centers, office blocks, golf 
courses, hotels.” This sub-group achieved higher CWB scores than the others. Here, Flanagan 
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concludes: “Merely transferring property rights to a different group of owners [i.e. from the 
government to First Nations bands] does not in-itself produce any dramatic result, but if you 
combine a transfer of property rights with some other [employment related] factors…” To 
validate his findings he mentions another CWB-related study that he just produced, “Seven 
Habits of Highly Effective First Nations.” The audience laughs recognizing the reference to a 
popular business and self-help book published in the late 1980s 7 Habits of Highly Effective 
People. The study is not related to urban reserves, but Flanagan believes that the lessons are 
applicable all the same. He runs through a list of characteristics that “successful First Nations” 
show including: “economic opportunism”, a willingness to take advantage of location to use 
land for development, to lease lands, to develop natural resources, to engage in transactions 
with the surrounding communities, to “invite people in to stay in their hotels to party on their 
land”, have long-term leadership, and a respect for the rule of law. Flanagan contends that 
combining these behaviors and “the right kind of attitude” with the transfer of property rights 
“can yield demonstrable improvements”. If urban reserves are approached with an 
“entrepreneurial spirit” they can become an “income generator” for First Nations. 
 
Flanagan then takes question. Someone asks if the sub-group of eight communities are near 
more successful urban centers and if that is behind their higher scores reflecting again “a tide 
that lifts all boats”. The next string of questions sets aside the CWB and focus on the issue of 
Indigenous “collectivism”, seen as a persistent barrier to private property. Andrew Pickford 
asks, “... in Australia there was a push to inject more individual rights within the collective 
group, in terms of federal government [being] leveraged through particular mechanisms, is 
[sic] there any attempts at that within the Saskatchewan or prairie provinces”? Flanagan 
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points to his book Beyond the Indian Act as his “proposal for introducing individual rights [to 
reserves]”. Then he jokes, “like most of what I've done in my life [this] has ended in failure... 
It's not going to happen. And so, I've stopped agitating”. He later elaborates that the ideal 
political configuration for introducing (voluntary or “opt-in”) private property rights through 
legislation had been in place during Stephan Harper’s majority conservative government and 
during which “a minority group of First Nations headed by Manny Jules from British 
Columbia […] were asking for [private property legislation]”. In a resigned tone, Flanagan 
continues “But um, Idle No More caused them to pull back and so they just dropped it. And 
so... I don't see it happening in our lifetimes. Not in mine anyways. Maybe in Laura's lifetime 
[Flanagan jokes, referring to the younger person sitting to my right]”. Laura chimes in, “I'll 
just counter the point that Nunavut is having that vote on May 9th about whether 
municipalities will decide to move to a fee simple partnership”. Laura seems hopeful that this 
vote will mean that municipal governments in Nunavut may soon be able to sell the lands that 
they are currently only allowed to lease to occupants. 
 
The final questions return to the subject of controlling for outside variables—“degree of 
corruption”, accountability, and location, are the examples given—when measuring the 
effectiveness of urban reserves. Flanagan points to another one of his CWB-derivative 
studies, the First Nations Governance Index, to conclude that although these factors were not 
included in the study of Saskatchewan urban reserves, “I think I can demonstrate that there 




Newman follows Flanagan to make a case that conservative political theory offers better 
defense of Indigenous rights than left-liberal and liberal egalitarian theories. Then we break 
for lunch and walk two blocks to the Novatel Hotel where we join a much larger crowd to eat 
a pricey-looking buffet (folded cloth napkins and hot plates) while Ilya Somin delivers the 
keynote address about a supreme court case surrounding land expropriation in Connecticut, 
which he describes as the empowerment of “the grasping hand of the state at the expense of 
the invisible hand of the market”. As the people I am seated with discuss one of them having a 
new academic job and feeling hesitant to let his new colleagues know about his libertarianism, 
I eat crème brulée and quietly ponder if I have anything to add to the conversation that would 
help me feel less like a spy.  
 
While Flanagan deploys the CWB in similar fashion to the performances of politicians and social 
scientists (i.e. examining the “diversity of conditions”, exploiting the easily taken for granted 
hierarchical ranking of communities to compare and highlight the “success stories” in the quest 
for best practices and so on) his performance also differs in that he comes to the index with an 
overt free-market ideological position that he seeks to support. The CWB is used to corroborate 
neoliberal theories, which are generally not named as theories, but instead presented as 
development prescriptions—e.g. ‘communities will have higher well-being if they adhere to the 
rule of law and respect property rights’. Of course, there is a certain amount of implicit buy-in. 
For instance, no one in the audience asks for clarification or definitions of these highly abstract 
concepts—“rule of law” is taken as a given stand-alone “fact”. However, they are drawn from 
and resonate with sources that are well-known to the other symposium participants and serve to 
align with the “truths” that Flanagan produces using the CWB. This includes reports from think 
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tank colleagues at the Fraser Institute and FCPP; studies from well-known neo-institutionalist 
economists such as Douglass North and neo-conservative political scientists, such as Francis 
Fukuyama; or, occasionally findings cherry-picked from academic work such as the Harvard 
Project on American Indian Economic Development.77 
 In combination with the circular reasoning that his neoliberal development prescriptions 
work within—i.e. if a community engages intensively in an array of economic development 
exploitations, it will attain higher scores on a predominantly economic metric—he also 
simultaneously obfuscates and reinforces his statements by layering them one on top of another. 
For example, while presenting specifically about measuring the economic growth of a small 
sample of communities in Saskatchewan—in Flanagan’s words, “we have such a small group 
[eight “successful” communities with urban reserves] that you can't reach any kind of statistical 
demonstration”—he was quick to enroll findings from two of his other CWB studies that 
measured disparate phenomena in widely different contexts, in order to substantiate his 
assumptions about which factors ought to be most important in considering creating more urban 
reserves. These assumptions were then used to substantiate truths of free-market economic 
theory. On the one hand, working at the level of the province makes it possible for Flanagan to 
test his hypotheses. On the other hand, it challenges him to transpose the findings from his other 
studies, undertaken at different political scales, in order for them to have nation-wide 
implications. His solution at the symposium is to simply tack the studies on at the end of his 
presentation and highlight their findings to imply a correlation between the studies and across 
scales. 
 The free-market agenda is further reinforced at the symposium through a network of 
 
77 (See “The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development”, n.d.) 
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minute relations: the off-the-cuff quips that establish common ground among participants (about 
an overreaching interventionist state, for example), the curation of the space (book collection and 
posters) and presentation of disparate topics that come to be related through the challenges they 
pose to achieving an idealized free-market society (presented to an intimate crowd of familiar 
associates). While (re)establishing norms about market-based governance, Flanagan’s status as 
an expert on Indigenous issues—“Aboriginal futures”, no less—is also validated, at least within 
the setting of the symposium attended predominantly by white settlers. In turn, First Nations 
reserves are envisioned as the frontier for markets—spaces where stubborn cultural barriers such 
as “collectivism” and nepotism, must be corrected and social relations reorganized to facilitate 
the implementation of markets as best as possible.78  
 Flanagan also makes use of the CWB’s subtle normative underpinnings—using the seven 
First Nations success stories to set a development standard and an ideal to be emulated by all 
other communities—to stabilize the common sense of his neoliberal vision. This further 
naturalizes a settler demand for Indigenous peoples self-reliance through entrepreneurial 
Indigenous-citizen subjects and assumes that First Nations communities across Canada need the 
same set of solutions.  
4.4 Indigenous Leaders Engaging and Contesting Development Indices 
 
“To govern means to act on the actions of subjects who retain the capacity to act otherwise” —
Tania Li, 2007, p. 17 
 
78 During question period Flanagan was asked about introducing individual property rights on reserves. In his 
response he repeatedly characterized economic development on reserves as variations of a deviant form of 
capitalism, using the following descriptors “collective capitalism”, “crony capitalism” and “red capitalism”. He then 
stated “It's probably not my idea, or your idea of a free market economy, but it may be, under the circumstances, the 
only kind of free market activity that could possibly happen for First Nations, on the reserve” (personal 
communications, 2016). Against this backdrop, Flanagan’s efforts to introduce markets are deeply evocative of the 
early colonial “civilizing mission” with a contemporary free-market bent. For discussion of the “civilizing mission” 
of the church and state see: RCAP, 1996; Stevenson, 1999; Tobias, 1991, among others. 
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“We are not only what we are, but what we might have been, and the possibilities for what we 
might have been are transformed.” — Ian Hacking, 2004, p. 110 
 
 As can be expected, there are a variety of approaches to these development indicators 
coming from Indigenous people,79 including different degrees and ways in which they embrace 
and resist the index’s “truths”. This final empirical section examines instances of Indigenous 
peoples’ public engagement with and contestation of, these indexes. On the one hand we see that 
under particular conditions these indices have been effectively deployed by Indigenous rights 
advocates to advance arguments for self-determination. In other instances, Indigenous peoples’ 
outright refusal to have their visions of well-being delimited by the “expert” discourses of 
development indices, has created openings for already-existing and self-determined definitions 
of well-being and knowledge practices to be more widely heard and acknowledged in the same 
networks in which the indices have gained traction. 
Deploying indices to advocate for rights 
 
 In a 2016 lecture on Indigenous economic rights at the Osgoode Hall Law School in 
Toronto, the late Secwépemc leader and Indigenous rights activist Arthur Manuel explained to 
his audience, “Systematic impoverishment is what my people have suffered from since 1867 
[when] the British North America Act was passed in Britain and Canada’s first constitution [was 
created], where they divided up all the land in Canada between section 91 federal... jurisdiction 
[and] section 92 provincial or Crown jurisdiction.” He then explained that the land base of all the 
 
79 In addition to the Community Well-Being Index, I also examine the use of the Registered Indian Human 
Development Index (RIHDI) in this section. As a measure of population rather than communities the RIHDI it offers 
different possibilities for advocacy and tends to be used to support collective demands for Indigenous rights. 
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reserves in Canada amounts to merely 0.2 percent of the country’s entire land base, resulting in a 
scenario where, “the United Nations Human Development Index, when it is applied to the 
statistics of my people living on Indian reserves, [...] we’re [ranked at] about level seventy-four 
and Canada is up at around five [out of a total of 175 countries].” As with most development 
index interventions, Manuel references the RIHDI only briefly to stage his larger arguments, 
which advocate for self-determination and expose some of the pernicious ways in which Canada 
continues to deny Indigenous rights and title despite a string of Supreme Court cases that pave 
the way for their implementation. However, some notable features set Manuel’s interventions 
apart from previous examples explored in this thesis. For one, rather than draw a discursive line 
between a colonial past and the postcolonial present, he highlights continuity between historical 
violence and dispossession and contemporary dispossession and impoverishment. Manuel also 
interrogates the systemic nature of the poverty experienced by Indigenous peoples. That is to say 
that while others use the CWB to examine seemingly apolitical/ahistorical questions about issues 
such as the relationship between well-being and geographic proximity to urban centers, Manuel 
uses the RIHDI to highlight a relationship between settler wealth and Indigenous poverty, the 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples and exploitation of lands and resources by the settler state 
for the benefit of settler society. Further, Manuel is explicit about the politics of his work. Unlike 
the CWB authors who claim to work “not from an advocacy or political viewpoint, but from an 
empirical and scientific perspective” and then inject themselves into Indigenous struggles as 
somehow objective advisors (Beavon & White, 2007, p. 4),80 or Flanagan, who treats his index 
studies as strictly technical exercises and uses Indigenous peoples’ well-being as a cloak under 
which to smuggle free-market interests, there is no excavating necessary to understand the 
 
80 See discussion of a Beavon and White’s suggestion for First Nations to adopt a “needs-based agenda” in section 
one of this chapter.  
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politics of Manuel’s project. His work supports self-determination and the struggle for 
Indigenous rights and title, and he uses the RIHDI as a tool to unambiguously demonstrate what 
is at stake. Further, Manuel makes use of the RIHDI (a population measure) to give weight to 
Indigenous peoples’ collective demands for rights and better living conditions, rather than using 
the “higher granularity” offered by the CWB to seek out the best practices of “successful” 
communities to apply across the board. Finally, the RIHDI and CWB are predominantly used in 
ways that contain their examinations of policy issues to those that are narrowly deemed relevant 
to Indigenous socio-economic conditions, thus bracketing out the examinations of the broader 
national policy agenda. In contrast, Manuel, along with co-author Nicole Schabus (2005) 
expands the parameters of what matters to Indigenous socio-economic conditions to include 
issues such as international trade. For example, they use the RIHDI to draw a relationship 
between a combination of the state’s refusal to implement constitutional recognition of the rights 
of Indigenous peoples and the consolidation of international trade agreements giving 
corporations access to land and resources held by Indigenous peoples while simultaneously 
excluding Indigenous peoples from trade negotiations. This engagement with the index broadens 
the scope of the questions to be asked and the relations to be considered in efforts to improve 
socio-economic conditions in Indigenous communities. 
 
Contesting indices  
 
 Nancy Karetak-Lindell, the Liberal member for Nunavut, in an exchange with SRAD 
demographer Eric Guimond during his 2006 research presentation to the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, gives us an excellent 
example of someone contesting the validity of Indigenous-specific development indices. During 
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question period at the end of the long presentation, Karetak-Lindell challenges the deficit-based 
narratives of INAC’s latest index research and the conclusions that can be drawn from it while 
also pointing to its performative powers and potential unexpected consequences:  
I'm very pleased to hear that you’re looking at different ways of analyzing the data you get 
because when you ask who defines ‘well-being’... I was just telling Todd we like to say we 
didn’t know we were poor until someone told us we were poor. We like to say that in the 
North because technically that’s true. As long as we were healthy, happy, and the caribou 
didn’t bypass us and we could get a good living off the land, that was okay, until someone 
came in and decided that because we didn’t have grade 12 diplomas, because we didn’t know 
how to do this, this, and that, and we didn’t have social insurance numbers, we were like a 
third-world country. So you really need to be careful about what conclusions you come to 
because of data. 
Karetak-Lindell challenges the imposition of forms of settler state knowledge production in the 
Northern context, and makes strange the state’s efforts to define and measure Indigenous well-
being according to settler standards, and she does so from within the same everyday state spaces 
in which the practices of politicians and experts routinely (re)produce and naturalize the subjects 
and spaces of Indigenous development. Pointing to earlier interventions intended to improve and 
render legible Inuit lives (Scott, 1998), such as diplomas and social insurance numbers, Karetak-
Lindell situates the index project (the CWB and RIHDI) within a history and geography of 
colonialism and development in the North. This helps to disrupt the modern/primitive dualisms 
underwriting the Canadian state’s development initiatives and to illuminate how quantitative 
technologies interweave with larger structures and patterns of relations as settler society extends 
not only into Indigenous territories, but into Indigenous epistemologies and identities as well.  
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 Karetak-Lindell’s intervention also subtly disrupts Guimond’s methodological 
explanation made earlier in his presentation. Guimond explained:  
On that particular idea of why we picked these indicators, it’s because these are indicators that 
you’ll find in most indices around the world. We’ve done some literature review on that. So 
the components of the CWB are cohorts of almost all the indicators. Even if they have 50 
components, you’ll find in there the ones we have. (Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development, 2006) 
 
The universality of development “common sense”, built up through networks of international 
development institutions, such as the World Bank and OECD, provides an increasingly 
invulnerable foundation for the Indigenous-specific indicator project. Science Studies scholars 
see this as a form of rhetoric, not so much in the sense of an artful use of persuasive language, 
but rather as a process of accumulating a greater number of allies than competing performances 
(see Barnes, 1998; Latour, 1987). Guimond expedites credibility through his reference to 
networks of experts from far afield who stand in apparent agreement, thus constructing a wall of 
objectivity and isolating those who may seek to challenge the work. Even still, Karetak-Lindell, 
grounded in her knowledge of the Northern context, highlights the incommensurability of the 
universalizing categories such as “Third World” drawn from the international development 
context and then mapped over Northern peoples’ specific experiences. This exposes power the 
imbalances that characterize the terrain of knowledge production in an (post)colonial state and 
which are often camouflaged by good intentions, the quest for improvement, and claims to 
objectivity, all as pre-existing Indigenous visions of well-being are overlooked to make room for 
the hegemonic settler vision of development.  
 Finally, Karetak-Lindell’s cautioning—“to be careful about what conclusions you come 
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to because of data”—is more than a suggestion about taking a “balanced approach” in presenting 
information, which is Guimond’s interpretation of Karetak-Lindell’s critique (that he shares in 
his response). Rather, she is calling attention to the power of indicators (and statistical 
knowledge more generally) to define, and in so doing produce, particular subject positions and 
spaces of development. By stating, “we like to say we didn’t know we were poor until someone 
told us we were poor”, Karetak-Lindell describes the widespread internalization of an identity 
constituted through development discourses.81 In this sense, Karetak-Lindell’s intervention 
points not only to the performative power of development indices, but also to the need for self-
determined methodological approaches to assessing well-being. 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter set out to demonstrate the discursive power and performative potential of the 
CWB as it is deployed within governing networks. It was organized into four sections according 
to the index’s uptake within specific extensions of its network, each instance revealing different 
and at times contrasting politics. The first section examined how social scientists, technicians 
and academics developed strategies to secure legitimacy for the index research by distancing it 
from association with DIAND. I then showed how findings from a CWB study were used as a 
“black box” in an effort to foster forms of conduct in Indigenous struggles that were preferred by 
the state. The next two sections demonstrated patterns of engagement with the index by experts 
(politicians, bureaucrats, and free market think tank policy strategists) with differing capacities 
and agendas. Whether deployed by bureaucrats to leverage for departmental funding and blame 
Indigenous communities for their poor conditions, or to advocate for more just engagements 
between the Canadian government and Indigenous nations, the CWB bolstered the performances 
 
81 See introduction of Chapter 3: Tracing the CWB’s Emergence in which I discuss Walter and Andersen’s (2013) 
concept of the “deficit Indigene” 
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of these actors with objective scientific authority, elevating their own position as experts, as well 
as an underpinning of benevolence. The chapter’s final section pointed to the ways in which 
Indigenous leadership’s engagement with and rejection of the CWB and RIHDI disrupts index 
common sense. In the case of the RIHDI, I drew attention to Author Manuel’s subversion of 
predominant index use by exposing the continuity between historical land dispossession and the 
contemporary conditions of poverty, and how this in turn reveals ongoing settler complicity in 
the maintenance of such conditions. Lastly, in a brief exchange with one of the CWB’s authors, 
liberal politician Nancy Karetak-Lindell also drew attention to the continuity in this form of 
quantitative knowledge production, its entanglement with dispossession in the North, and the 
performative power of such statistical technologies to produce deficit Indigenous subjectivities, 
key to producing and maintaining power imbalances. Ultimately, this final section pointed to 
how Indigenous interventions in the index network open space for other ways of defining and 
knowing development and well-being. Having explored the role of the CWB in the production of 
subject positions, spaces and development norms, I now turn to share my closing reflections 
about the CWB and my research. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions: How, Why, and to Whom Does Measuring Matter? 
 
 The first study I encountered that used the Community Well-Being Index was published 
by the Fraser Institute, and it opened with the think tank’s motto—“If it matters, measure it”. My 
research has pushed against the prescriptive and narrowing logic of this motto by exploring how, 
why and to whom measuring projects themselves—specifically the CWB—have come to matter, 
particularly within governing networks in Canada. This has led me to question what work the 
CWB accomplishes beyond simply measuring and ranking communities according to a set of 
socio-economic conditions. How have grids of power, in particular between social scientists, 
technicians, Indigenous communities and settler bureaucracies, shaped the CWB, and how has 
the index in turn enacted its own relations among these actors in the contest to define 
development? Drawing on theories of performativity, my work has rejected the taken-for-granted 
separation between representation and reality that undergirds the work of the CWB across the 
spectrum of its authors and users by showing that the experts and technicians are deeply 
embedded in the making and spread of the index. Further, postcolonial and settler colonial 
literatures have guided my exploration of the CWB’s discursive power and its role in co-
constituting Indigenous and settler expert subjectivities and spaces alike. This has helped to shed 
light on some of the ways in which the index connects into deeper histories of Indigenous-state 
relations, exercises power, normalizes particular development logics, and justifies development-
based policy interventions. This final chapter revisits the major conclusions of my research, 
highlights some of its limits, reiterates what is at stake in the proliferation of these quantitative 
technologies, and points to future research possibilities.  
 My introductory chapter started by reviewing the postcolonial, settler colonial and critical 
development literatures to establish the broader contextual foundations of, and sketch the 
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historical and geographic entanglements of settler state governing rationales and practices, 
knowledge production, expertise, dispossession and concern for and about Indigenous peoples. I 
drew on a body of scholarship that traces the transition from the overt violence of early colonial 
rule to the contemporary and more insidious forms of colonial power enacted through a variety 
of techniques and technologies that, to use Rose’s (1996b) terminology, seek to “govern from a 
distance”. This literature helped me to make sense of the emergency of Indigenous-specific 
indicators and the role of the CWB in the context of neoliberalism. It also helped me to trouble 
the common practice within indicator knowledge production cultures to actively deny or leave 
unconsidered its own politics. The literature review also highlighted how settler state concern for 
Indigenous well-being has long been tethered to assimilationist efforts, how a variety of 
technologies (maps, statistics and legislation) have been central to the formation of governable 
subject positions, and how Indigenous peoples have also, at times, leveraged these technologies 
to resist colonial power. I then reviewed the literature on the history of social indicator research 
to outline the relationship between this form of knowledge production and modern/neoliberal 
governance processes and practices. 
 My first empirical chapter, Chapter 3: Tracing the CWB’s Emergence, was a historical 
geography of the index, exploring some of the key political, intellectual and institutional 
conditions underpinning the CWB’s emergence. Informed by the performativity literature—and 
Actor Network Theory’s treatment of performance in particular, with its attention to the 
processes of assembling and stabilizing networks—the chapter examined the processes and 
politics of the CWB’s ascendance to the status of a hegemonic proxy for Indigenous 
development, while its adjacent indices gradually either dissolved or, in the case of the RIHDI, 
assumed a much-diminished role. Beginning by investigating the practices, assumptions and 
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concepts that animated the earliest efforts to create Indigenous-specific quantitative development 
typologies in Canada, first Gerber (1979) and then Armstrong (Armstrong, 1994, 2001; 
Armstrong & Rogers, 1996), I detailed how Gerber’s endeavour to define less-than-self-evident 
categories such as “institutional completeness” and “personal resources” rested on problematic 
assumptions about the degrees of a First Nations community’s traditional nature and “purity”, 
and concomitant perceived threats to a community’s viability in the face of “modernity”. I also 
discussed the murkiness of the discursive boundaries that Gerber drew between integration and 
assimilation in an effort to distance her project from advocating an assimilationist position. 
Decades later, Armstrong and Rogers (1996) demonstrated the extent of exclusions necessary 
when constructing development typologies capable of greater generalizability. Thus, despite 
initial aspirations to generate more comprehensive measures that would account for First 
Nations’ perceptions of well-being, the end result of these development typologies was the 
production and naturalization of development realities grounded in and prioritizing the interests 
of the settler society and state. I then looked at the broader national level and institutional 
contexts in the formation of the CWB network in late 1990s and early 2000s, namely the First 
Nations Cohesion Project (FNCP) and the Strategic Research and Analysis Directorate (SRAD) 
at DIAND in order to describe a number of instances in which indices played a role in 
constituting deficit-based Indigenous subjectivities and circumscribing a development vision to 
capture the “under-development” of Indigenous sub-populations relative to the settler population 
and those few Indigenous communities deemed development success stories. Ultimately, 
Chapter 3 put forth two broad arguments: the first being that while the set of indicators produced 
through the FNCP are novel to Indigenous–state relations, they are in many respects constructed 
from fragments of previous social science and policy concerns and DIAND initiatives. The 
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performative effect here was one in which certain Indigenous-specific development discourses 
and subjectivities were naturalized reiteratively through the studies. For instance, the studies 
helped to concretize the “common sense” that Indigenous cultures are at risk from either too 
much or not enough migration between remote communities and urban centres, or that 
Indigenous peoples’ well-being would improve if they adopted the language of the dominant 
culture. Despite shifts in social science concepts, assumptions and aims, in the quest for solutions 
to conditions of poverty, research orientations of previous eras that stubbornly targeted the 
“nature” of First Nations communities persisted—thus framing First Nations as the source of 
their own problems.  
 The second broad takeaway is that for the CWB to emerge as an authoritative measure of 
Indigenous well-being required an immense and sustained effort as well as a dose of 
opportunism and serendipity. This included privileged access to resources and powerful allies, 
such as international development and federal institutions, and the use of popularizing social 
science concepts such as social cohesion and social capital. This is significant because it disrupts 
the prevalent narrative that indicator science is a democratic, apolitical intellectual terrain for 
knowledge production, where most interests can ostensibly be pursued and where the knowledge 
produced is good in-itself and to everyone’s benefit. Even while the indicators signal a focus on 
Indigenous peoples’ well-being, or socio-economic conditions, or capacity, this chapter 
demonstrated that it is expertise and state imperatives that have predominantly driven index 
research agendas and design. These conditions make up the often-invisible politics of 
Indigenous-specific development index production and circulation.  
 The politics of the CWB’s geographical proliferations were the focus of Chapter 4: The 
CWB in the Wild. Specifically, I examined instances of the CWB’s mobilization within Canadian 
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governing networks and ended the chapter by exploring examples of Indigenous engagement 
with and contestation of the CWB and its closest relative, the RIHDI. The chapter’s overarching 
theme was the tracing of relations of subject positions, spaces and norms, as index expertise and 
its targets were constituted through performative means. Through a series of examples, the 
chapter demonstrated the CWB’s role in producing and normalizing reserves as “deficient” 
spaces and frontiers for markets, while Indigenous subjects in these spaces were discursively 
framed as either themselves “deficient” (i.e. in need of intervention) or industrious and self-
reliant (i.e. ideal role models of development); simultaneously, white settlers with varying 
political agendas assumed positions of expertise on Indigenous well-being. The chapter detailed 
a range of efforts, with varying degrees of success, undertaken by these experts to build and 
extend the index network. For instance, it showed that while the index authors set out to bridge 
cultural barriers between academia and bureaucratic/policy work, they simultaneously developed 
discursive strategies to emphasize the differences between those two institutions in order to 
minimize scepticism about the state’s role in the research design and findings and to secure 
legitimacy for their academic labour. Further, I drew attention to the slippage between the CWB 
authors’ measuring of well-being and their use of the index to advise Indigenous peoples about 
the “best paths” to achieve well-being. The example I drew on demonstrated the way in which 
the less-than-definitive findings of an exploratory CWB study are used as a “black box” (Latour, 
1987), abandoning nuance and appearing unambiguous while simultaneously being leveraged to 
steer Indigenous peoples’ conduct away from rights-based actions and point them to preferred—
less contentious—development pathways (i.e. a “needs-based agenda”). I also showed how 
politicians and bureaucrats used the CWB to deflect challenges from their colleagues, advance 
the settler state’s development-based policy agenda, justify the pursuit of paternalistic governing 
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tactics, and allocate responsibility for the poor conditions experienced by many communities 
onto the communities themselves. Here, I also pointed to how some politicians used the CWB to 
advocate for First Nations’ rights and for the government to engage in more just and meaningful 
negotiations. Meanwhile, powerful players like the Deputy Minister of AANDC point to the 
distribution and range of CWB scores as evidence that the majority of First Nations lack good 
governance and then try and justify budgetary increases to AANDC to support its ongoing 
interventions designed to reform Indigenous behaviours and governing practices in the name of 
the "national good”. The CWB’s ability to make visible a “diversity of conditions”, 
hierarchically ordered, was key to naturalizing such interventions, as it furnished a normative 
framework that marks standards of development and points to an ideal to be replicated by all 
other communities, achieved through “appropriate” conduct and pursuit of development “best-
practices”. Finally, the chapter ended by highlighting examples of Indigenous engagement with 
and contestation of the CWB and RIHDI, demonstrating some of the ways in which Indigenous 
interventions within state spaces and networks have disrupted the hegemony of these indices and 
opened up space for other ways of defining well-being. 
 At its core this thesis has sought to establish how the CWB matters to the politics of 
Indigenous development in settler colonial Canada. I found that the index came to matter as a 
proxy for development not so much because it provided an objective assessment of Indigenous 
well-being, but because of an alignment of factors relating to the politics, processes and practices 
in the formation and stabilization of the index’s network itself. Among these factors were: a 
rudimentary definition of well-being; utility to a wide variety of actors in neoliberal governing 
practices; the ease with which the index can be combined with other community-level data sets 
to produce a diverse array of meanings; access to resources and support from a wide range of 
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powerful institutional allies and alignment with the themes of their work; rhetorical overtones of 
benevolence and concern (i.e. who would be willing to argue against the need for improvements 
to “well-being”); a relationship to national anxieties over social cohesion; an alignment with 
Canada’s pre-existing development-based policy orientations; the use of existing data and 
adoption/re-definition of popular social science concepts. Whereas the CWB categorization of 
well-being assumes universality, my research has worked to ground the CWB in a specific 
geographic and historical context and set of relations. As Barnes (2002) contends, performativity 
focuses attention on practice and “what people do rather than what they say they do” (p. 508). In 
the case of the CWB, its authors say their work sets out to expose “racialized and ethnicized 
understanding of differences in resources and resulting hierarchies and overlay this 
understanding with an appreciation of the integrated relative deprivation theory [so that they] can 
understand the import of the current situation” (Beavon & White, 2007, p. 7). What this actually 
involves is the social scientists not only spending countless hours at Statistics Canada’s Research 
Data Centres sifting through and transforming micro-data into standardized scores for 
communities that can then be plugged into an array of charts and maps, but also traveling in a 
“road show” to communities to share research findings, and collaborating to develop academic 
journals tailored to Indigenous policy research that could help to distance indices from their 
association with “government research”. While its authors are consistently forthcoming about the 
limits of the CWB’s definition of well-being, they do not address the inequalities in access to 
resources that privilege their network and the index’s authority in ways that may preclude other 
definitions of well-being. In part, my hope is that having examined its genealogy and explored a 
variety of its roles in the exercise and allocation of power, I have disrupted some of the CWB’s 
consolidated power to make room for approaches to Indigenous well-being that do not amount to 
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a matter of technical and depoliticized prescription to Indigenous communities on the part of 
experts and politicians, and in which the quest for generalizable knowledge does not subjugate 
the value of local specificity. 
Reflecting on this thesis’ limits and future research possibilities 
 
  In reflecting on some of the silences and gaps in my research, a number relate to 
questions of methods and access. Firstly, a closer, more sustained study of the everyday work in 
the production and dissemination of the CWB would undoubtedly offer a more fine-grained and 
nuanced reading of the politics of such indices and the spaces in which they circulate. My 
relatively limited access to the group of social scientists that elaborate the CWB meant that I 
relied more heavily on textual analysis than I had initially hoped. Further, the texts I engaged 
with were often well honed for publication, which made it more challenging to access the politics 
underlying these texts. Similarly, despite engaging with the CWB authors and analyzing its 
presentation in governing networks, my account of the CWB’s uses in policy and decision-
making processes remains uncomplete. For instance, in what ways does the CWB , with its 
attention to the “diversity of conditions”, shape the terrain of Indigenous-specific economic 
development policy? How does it inform funding allocations (if at all) or how policy makers 
engage with Indigenous communities? Some clues are offered in the CWB literature, which 
repeatedly touts the index as an essential policy tool and points to examples of its utility in this 
role, including in devising merit-based funding allocation strategies and in assessing a 
community’s sustainability (e.g. whether or not to relocate certain communities with very poor 
CWB scores).82 However, in contrast to the literature, one interviewee told me that despite all the 
talk of the CWB’s policy relevance, “We [only] say that in our research, but basically when 
 
82 See Beavon & White, 2007; White, 2003 
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people work in the policy or program areas they do whatever they want. They only use research 
if it helps them further what they want to do” (2016). Future research that entails sustained 
access to policy makers/policy spaces, including observation of meetings and presentations in 
which the CWB is used to inform decisions, would potentially help to make sense of such 
contradictions. One final and related area that my research was unable to fully unpack within the 
scope of a Master’s thesis involves the rise and fall of the CWB as a departmental performance 
measure at INAC. A future in-depth engagement in this area could help reveal closer 
understandings of indicators more broadly in neoliberal settler state practices.  
 In a 2015 interview regarding the connection between Indigenous and anti-capitalist 
struggles, scholar and activist Glen Coulthard describes colonialism as “a structure of 
dispossession that is fundamentally grounded in the theft of land and the usurpation of 
indigenous peoples’ political authority in relationship to that land and their communities” 
(Epstine, 2015). While my research has helped to disrupt the narrative that the CWB is somehow 
in-itself a tool for advocacy of Indigenous peoples, it is limited in its contribution to 
understanding the relationship between development indicators and broader questions about land 
and control over political and economic systems that are fundamental to the operation of colonial 
power in the present.83 In her analysis of Samuel Hearn’s story of Bloody Falls Massacre, Emilie 
Cameron observes “... settlers long to believe that their occupation of Indigenous lands is both 
natural and consensual, and they continually produce knowledge to secure this belief” (p. 177). 
In my view, this insight is instructive for orienting future research that sets out to examine 
development indicators and colonial structures of dispossession. Cameron’s intervention, if 
applied to studies of Indigenous-specific indicators of development, suggests the need to 
 
83 Perhaps the closest I get to questions of land and control are in sections of chapter four that highlight the use of 
the CWB by settler bureaucrats to assert the state’s development agenda and its use by the CWB authors to direct 
Indigenous peoples in their struggles. 
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examine how settlers relate to the “truths” about Indigenous peoples that such knowledge 
technologies produce. Whose knowledge claims about development gain positions of authority 
and how do we account for the mechanisms and networks through which such authority is 
derived? How are the interests of state and non-state authorities served by quantitative 
knowledge that makes visible the socio-economic disparities between Indigenous and settler 
society as well as the gaps between Indigenous communities? What types of development 
interventions are legitimized by such technologies and how should we account for the persistent 
disavowal of politics or interests in their deployment? Even a quick glance at Tom Flanagan’s 
latest CWB study points to the relevance of this line of questioning. In it he uses the CWB to 
myopically charge that oil and gas pipelines are “perhaps the only way [for remote Indigenous 
communities] to escape poverty”. Flanagan masks underlying settler interests in extractive 
development projects with benevolence and scientific claims to knowing what is in the best 
interest of Indigenous peoples and Canadian society in turn. Insights from performativity 
scholarship reminds us that it is important not to get hung-up on whether or not Flanagan’s 
claims are “true” or “false”, but instead to pay attention to the ways that such knowledge matters 
to the (re)ordering of social relations. As Indigenous Services Canada moves to develop a “broad 
dashboard” of indicators meant to supplement the CWB and purportedly better reflect 
Indigenous concerns regarding efforts to measure and close socio-economic gaps, critical 
research exploring the terrain of knowledge claims and their discursive and affective power will 
be crucial. Such research provides an opportunity for a sustained examination of settlers’ 
positioning in relationship to Indigenous peoples’ well-being, including how settlers approach 
questions of their belonging on Indigenous land, their responsibility to Indigenous peoples, and 
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how this responsibility is acted upon. This could contribute towards disrupting narratives about 
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Questions About the use of the Community Well-Being Index (CWB) in the Plans and 
Priorities Reports (PPR) and Departmental Performance Reports (DPR) of Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada: 
 
In the 2009-2010 PPR both the Aboriginal HDI and CWB are introduced as performance 
indicators for the Strategic Outcome: The People (see p. 6). Then, in the DPR from the same year 
the Aboriginal HDI is dropped (see p. 10, footnote a).  
 
a) What made the CWB a better performance indicator than the HDI (or was this simply to 
eliminate any redundancy between the two indices)?  
 
b) Am I correct in assuming that the “Aboriginal HDI” is a more recent version of the 
“Registered Indian HDI”? 
 
In 2009-2010, the CWB became a key performance indicator used in the PPRs & DPRs. A 
variety of targets were proposed over the course of its use (and for a few years no targets were 
determined). For example, the 2009-2010 PPR target for “The People Strategic Outcome” is to 
“reduce the difference between the CWB scores of Aboriginal communities and those of the 
general Canadian population” (p. 6), but in the corresponding DPR (p. 10) the target is under 
review.  
 
How are targets determined? Who is involved in the process (i.e. what types of expertise are 
drawn upon)? Where do these processes take place (i.e. do people meet to discuss, or is there 
discussion through some form of electronic communication platform)?  
 
Of the various targets set using the CWB—1) reduce gap between Aboriginal and general 
Canadian populations 2) Increase the percentage of First Nation communities with positive 
change in rating in the CWB 3) positive change in indices—which produced the most useful 
results? 
 
The 2010-2011 DPR (p. 22) states:  
“As part of the Northern Strategy, AANDC moved forward a number of key initiatives to 
support the development of sustainable Northern communities and to improve the business 
climate while taking necessary steps to protect its fragile ecosystems and to provide Northerners 
with more control over their destinies.” 
 
a) How is sustainable defined? 
 
b) Is the CWB an indicator of a community’s sustainability? 
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By 2012-2013, the CWB is used only to assess the performance of Program Activities and seems 
to have dropped out as an indicator at the Strategic Outcomes level. Program Activities included: 
2.2 Social Development (p. 39), and 3.3 Community Infrastructure (p. 51).  
 
a) Are there different considerations that must be taken into account when assessing performance 
at different levels (i.e. Strategic Outcomes level vs. Program Activities)?  
 
b) Has assessing performance at the level of Strategic Outcomes now stopped altogether 
(continuing without the CWB)? If so, what is the thinking behind this?  
 
The 2012-2013 DPR (p. 49) lists the following challenges with using the CWB to support 
evidence-informed decisions: “the data is only available every five years; the four indicators of 
well-being pertain mainly to socioeconomic well-being; and the indicators used in the CWB do 
not fully capture the economic realities of some First Nation communities.” 
 
a) Are there any specific examples that can be given to demonstrate the final point: “the 
indicators used in the CWB do not fully capture the economic realities of some First Nation 
communities”?  
 
To what extent did the change from the Census to the NHS add to the complexity of using the 
CWB as a performance indicator?  
 
As programs shift—i.e. 3.3 Community Infrastructure of 2012-2013/2013-2014 become 3.4 
Infrastructure and Capacity in the PPR 2014-2015—new sub-programs are incorporated. The 
CWB targets remain the same (for example, Index rating greater than 57—2006 baseline by 
March 31, 2016). Is the CWB affected by such program changes (or are there any anticipated 
effects)?  
 
The 2014-2015 PPR (p. 59) states:  
“Target [for Program 3.4 infrastructure and capacity] established by AANDC’s Community 
Well-being Index group (Index rating of 57). Note that this indicator will be dropped by the 
2015–2016 cycle because there is no evidence that the program has a direct impact on the 
Community Well-Being Index.”  
 
a) How do you assess whether a particular program has a direct impact on the CWB (without 
detecting impacts of other programs)? Are there specific examples of changes in the CWB that 
can be attributed to programming?  
  
In the most recent (2015-2016 and 2016-2017) PPRs the CWB does not appear to be featured.  
 
a) Is the move away from the CWB related to the previously listed challenges?  
 
b) Will targets set for 2016 be abandoned? 
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How has the use of the CWB informed the process(es) of selecting/developing performance 
indicators?    
 
Do you have any reflections that you could share about the overall trajectory in the CWB’s use 
as a performance indicator? 
 
Does the department ever get feedback from the general public regarding CWB results, or its 
applications in the PPRs or DPRs? 
 
Additional points for clarification:  
 
From 2010-2011 DPR (p.16)  
Strategic Outcomes  
 
CWB Components 
The Government Labour Force and Income 
The People Complete CWB Index and Education 
The Land Labour Force and Income 
The Economy Labour Force, Income and Housing 
The North Labour Force and Income 
Office of the Federal Interlocutor N/A 
Given that Education is already a part of the CWB, why is it listed as an extra component here? 
 
Where should I look to gain a better understanding of the relationship between funding and 
performance targets?  
  
 183 
Appendix B 
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